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ABSTRACT
Landman (1989) introduced contemporary linguistics to the as-phrase. An as-phrase
is a qualifier, introduced in English by as. John is corrupt as a judge, for instance,
contains the as-phrase as a judge. Philosophical discourse is full of examples of
as-phrase sentences. Their presence can make it difficult to distinguish valid from
invalid arguments, a perennial concern for philosophers. Landman proposed the first
formal semantic theory of as-phrases, based on a set of seven intuitively-valid patterns
of inference involving as-phrases. Szabó (2003), Jaeger (2003), Asher (2011) each
attempt to improve upon Landman's theory.
Chapter 1 reviews and criticizes a temporal account of as-phrase semantics, while
tracing some precedents and motivations for my approach. Chapters 2-3 criticize
Szabó's and Asher's theories. Szabó's theory shows problems handling the future
tense and intensional contexts. Asher's complex theory solves these problems, but
resorts to the obscure notions of relative identity and bare particulars.
Chapter 4 argues that neither Szabó's nor Asher's theory is clearly superior, because
implicitly, they focus on different classes of sentences, which I call Type A and
v
Type B. From John Bowers' syntactic research, I argue that the element common
to Type A and Type B is Pr, a predication head pronounced as in some contexts.
Chapter 5 develops a formal semantic theory tailored to Type A sentences that solves
the problems of Szabó's theory while avoiding Asher's assumptions. On my approach,
the semantic properties of Type A sentences resolve into an interaction among generic
quantifiers, determiner-phrase interpretation, and one core quantifier based on a prin-
cipal ultrafilter. It is the interaction-effects of these elements that give rise to the many
unusual readings we find in these as-phrase sentences. This result supports my moti-
vating view that linguistic research helps to solve semantic problems of philosophical
interest.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1. Descartes does not doubt all moral principles. He believes that one should obey
the laws and customs of his country. The thinker who pursues radical doubt in
the Meditations, however, doubts all moral principles.
2. John opposes the bill. As well he should. If it were to pass, his own son would
lose his health insurance. But Senator Smith supports the bill. As well he
should. Most of his constituents want it to pass.
3. Superman jumps over tall buildings in a single bound. But Clark Kent does
not jump over buildings at all. He tracks down stories for the Daily Planet.
4. The vandal's hammer annihilated the alabaster statue in Caesar's image. But
the vandal's hammer could not annihilate one atom of the statue. The conser-
vation of matter was one law the vandals could not break.
Life is messy even for inanimate objects. What couldn't even destroy one part of
a thing did destroy the whole of it, according to 4. Unfortunately for John (not to
mention moralists), he is Senator Smith. Clark Kent's alter ego is well known, and
so are his exploits. And Descartes, of course, is the thinker of the Meditations who
doubts what the man himself never really called into question.
Yet cases 1-4 invite simple arguments against all of these messy apparent truths. By
the Non-Identity of Discernibles, it follows from 1 that Descartes is not the thinker
who pursues radical doubt: the thinker has a property that Descartes lacks.[1] From
2, it follows that John is not Senator Smith, for the same sort of reason. And so on.
These non-identity arguments might make you uneasy, though. They should. The
position I will defend entails that these simple non-identity arguments are all invalid.
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Since the simple non-identity arguments are all instances of one inference-form, The
Non-Identity of Discernibles, the invalidity of that form would invalidate them all.
That is not the lesson I think we should draw from 1-4, though. Rather, I propose that
the truth-conditions of the sentences composing these four discourses differ from those
that their overt forms suggest.[Sza03]1 If their truth-conditions are not like sentences
that share their overt forms, then what are they like? They are like those of sentences
containing a construction that some philosophers and linguists have called an as-
phrase[Sza03, Jäg03, Ash06, Ash11]. Informally speaking, an as-phrase qualifies the
way in which its sentence's main predicate applies to its subject. It is quite natural to
summarize 1, for example, using sentence (1) below. Each as-phrase sentence (1)-(4)
is a good paraphrase for its similarly numbered discourse.
(1) Descartes as a radical doubter doubts all moral principles, but Descartes does
not doubt all moral principles.
(2) John Smith has a duty to oppose the bill as a father, but John Smith has a
duty to support the bill as a senator.
(3) Superman leaps over tall buildings as Superman, but Superman does not leap
over tall buildings as Clark Kent.
(4) The statue was annihilated as a statue, but the statue was not annihilated as
matter.
One might worry about the coherence of discourses 1-4. Each of 1 - 4, however, is
satisfiable. For some purposes, this simple correspondence is all we need to understand
discourses 1-4. For those of the semanticist, philosopher or logician, though, it is only
1This is the proposal made in Szabó (2003). The above examples follow the pattern of Szabó's
examples. I also follow his general strategy for arguing that discourses like 1-4 are perfectly
coherent, since the simple non-identity arguments based on them are invalid.
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a clue. Perhaps the logician wants to know the logical form of 1 - 4, the general
properties of these sentences in virtue of which they are satisfiable. A philosopher
or linguist interested in meaning wants to know the relationship between the truth-
conditions of 1 - 4 and their syntactic structures. She also wants to study the various
inferences that speakers might draw from them, like entailments, implicatures, and
presuppositions.
The philosopher might share these interests, but likely for a different reason. He
notices that qualified claims like those expressed by 1 - 4 are pretty common in
philosophy.[Wil14, Rus12, Par71, Raw05, Hei06][2] He is concerned, as a philosopher,
with making valid arguments in areas where it is very hard to distinguish valid from
invalid reasoning, as Williamson puts it.[Wil07]2 A philosopher can pursue that con-
cern in several ways, though. These include stipulative definitions of terms, the anal-
ysis of truth-conditions for individual sentences, intuitive generalization from a few
example inferences containing the term of interest, and informal logical paraphrase.
Correct logical paraphrase or truth-conditional analysis will conclusively determine
the validity of an inference. However, we have no effective procedure for produc-
ing correct logical paraphases, let alone direct analyses of truth-conditions. Truth-
conditional analysis of single sentences is indispensible for any assessment of validity
based on truth, but it is unsystematic. It says nothing about how the grammar of
natural-language sentences bears on their entailment relations or truth-conditions,
however. It leaves an infinity of similar sentences' truth-conditions out of reach of
the piecemeal analysis. Stipulated definitions of terms within a sentence only obtains
precise truth-conditions at the cost of cutting loose from the terms of popular debate,
which are inevitably couched in ordinary language.
2Williamson (2007), p.284.
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For that reason, some means of systematizing our understanding of the entailment
relations of natural language sentences is preferable to other ways of assessing natural-
language arguments for validity. For philosophers, the utility of a formal semantic
theory lies in its ability to offer a consistent, automatic verdict on the entailment
relations of a wide range of sentences. A sound, empirically fruitful semantic theory
of the relevant set of sentences would automatically clarify their logical role in debate,
without doing violence to the terms of the debate.
The present work presents a formal semantic theory of as-phrase sentences like 1 - 4.
My motivations for this work are philosophical and linguistic. As-phrases may very
well contribute to other dimensions of sentence-meaning beside entailment prag-
matic or discourse dimensions of meaning, for example. But for reasons of scope and
the philosopher's concern with natural-language validity, I will only deal with these
dimensions insofar as it becomes necessary to account for the sentences' entailments.
While the as-phrase is still under-studied by philosophers and semanticists, four dis-
tinct semantic theories of these sentences do exist. I'll now turn to the earliest two
of these theories.
1.1 TWO EARLY THEORIES OF AS-PHRASES
Though one would prefer a precise account of what constitutes an as-phrase, provi-
sionally I will sketch the general idea with more examples.
(5) John is corrupt as a judge.
(6) John raised a question as a judge.
(7) Superman as Clark Kent does not leap over tall buildings.
(8) Tim used the book as a paddle.
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(9) Ernest sees Andy as a spy.
(10) Peter saw the paper as a decidability proof for first-order logic.
Each of 5 - 10 contains an as-phrase. Call any sentence which contains an as-phrase an
as-phrase sentence. Many as-phrase sentences, but not all, are substitution-instances
of the schema
a (is) F as G.3
Call this the as-phrase schema. Many other languages lexicalize what appears to be
the same semantic function as the as-phrase as in English.4 Though a comparative
study of these devices would be germane to some of the tricky problems I will mention,
I will only consider English. The morpheme as finds several patterns of use in
English, several of which involve no as-phrase.5 For example, each of 11 - 14 illustrates
a distinct use of as in English. Each contains as, but no as-phrase.
(11) As Mary rounded the bend, Joe ran up to the car.
(12) No one works as hard as Joel.
(13) Maurice spoke as if reading from a script.
(14) Did you read the paper? Not as yet.
The most empirically successful contemporary theories of as-phrase sentences have a
few features in common. Syntactically, they predict that an as-phrases is an adjunct
3Where parentheses (, ) enclose optional terms: those that appear in this position in some
substitution-instances of the schema, but not necessarily all.
4See Asher (2011), Eide and Åfarli (1999). For example: Norwegian, Spanish, Russian, Korean,
German, Latin.
5If there were any cause for concern that we cannot reliably distinguish the as-phrase as from the
others in English, chapter 4 defends necessary and sufficient conditions for being an as-phrase.
I think all of the theorists who use the term as-phrase will accept these conditions, in light
of their writings on the subject (Landman (1989); Szabó (2003); Jäger (2003); Asher (2006),
(2011)).
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to a verb-phrase or a sentence.6 Semantically, they assume that as-phrases are predi-
cates that share their subject with another predicate in the sentence. As-phrases are
not the only such predicates.[HSB06]7 A special semantic relation among the predi-
cates distinguishes an as-phrase, according to these theories. Semanticists dispute the
nature of this restriction. However, each of the two most successful theories accounts
for it with a partial ordering, over entities of the sort involved in the semantics of
predication on that theory.[Sza03, Ash11]
A likely first guess at the truth-conditions of as-phrase sentences is a simple frame-
adverbial account. Linguists give the name frame-adverbial to certain adjunct verb-
modifiers that serve to delimit the location or time-period in which the action de-
scribed by the verb happens. For example, in the sentence Ernest works at IBM
between 9:00 and 5:00, between 9:00 and 5:00 functions as a frame-adverbial. In
a straightforward event-based semantic theory, frame-adverbials contribute a quanti-
fier to the sentence's logical form.[Par90] It binds a variable representing the time at
which the sentence's main predicate holds of its subject. On such an account, Su-
perman leaps over tall buildings but Clark Kent does not is a paraphrase of Clark
Kent, when he is a superhero, leaps over tall buildings but Clark Kent, when he is a
reporter for the Daily Planet, does not.
As Szabó (2003) observes, any theory or account that treats an as-phrase as a tem-
6The most successful two theories, that is, both are based on the assumption that a prepositional
phrase containing as Merges with the existing VP to form a higher VP (i.e., it adjoins to VP),
before any movement occurs. The semantic theory of as-phrase sentences presented in Asher
(2011), however, requires that both predicates be moved into a higher structural position before
semantic interpretation.[Ash11]
7On other types of secondary predicates in various languages, see Himmelmann and Schultze-
Berndt (2006). A simple example of a secondary predicate besides an as-phrase is flat in Sam
hammered the metal flat. This type of secondary predicate is known as a resultative, since
flat describes the state that the metal ends up in if the sentence is true. Despite semantic
differences from Himmelmann and Schultze-Berndt's examples, subject-control sentences like
Sean contrived to win also have two predicates sharing a single argument.
6
poral frame-adverbial is false.[Sza03] Although this simple account sounds appealing,
its paraphrase isn't even extensionally equivalent to the source sentence, let alone
synonymous with it. For as Szabó writes, Clark Kent is a reporter even when he
doesn't act like it.[Sza03] Suppose Clark Kent is a superhero at t. Then Clark Kent
leaps over tall buildings at t. Then Clark Kent is not a reporter at t. Clark Kent is a
reporter at t, though (perhaps this is essential to Kent). The sentences have different
entailments, so they are not equivalent, and therefore they are not paraphrases of
each other. But this contradicts our assumption that they are paraphrases. An ac-
count which predicts that each as-phrase sentence is the paraphrase of some sentence
with a temporal frame-adverbial has counter-examples. It's not clear how any theory
or account in this approach could resolve this problem. The simple frame-adverbial
account is false.
1.1.1 LANDMAN'S THEORY
Szabó (2003) points out that the Medieval European logicians write about the Latin
qua, and Elizabeth Anscombe also deals with something like predicate-qualification
in her work.[Sza03, Sau97, Kri80, Bro14]8 These were not formal semantic theories in
the contemporary sense, of course. Landman (1989) presents the first formal seman-
tic theory of as-phrase sentences. He develops this theory in support of his theory
of the semantics of terms denoting groups, e.g. committee and team.[3] Landman
opens his discussion of as-phrase sentences with an important distinction. He ac-
8Szabó does not mention that Kripke speaks about as-phrases in passing in his Locke lectures,
published in Reference and Existence. Kripke does not use the term as-phrase, but he deals
directly with the opaque contexts in Superman sentences like those of Saul (1997), e.g., Superman
appears as Clark Kent, in his discussion of the verb to appear. It is possible though perhaps
unlikely that Szabó had read the passage from Kripke's 1973 lecture in 2003 (see Stuart Brock's
notes on the history of Kripke's Locke lectures in his review of Reference and Existence, available
at <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/reference-and-existence-the-john-locke-lectures/>).
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knowledges that there might be both term-oriented and predicate-oriented as-phrase
sentences. That is, an example like as a judge, John is trustworthy may be better
paraphrased into John-as-a-judge is trustworthy or John is trustworthy-as-a-judge.
His compositional theory treats only term-oriented as-phrases. In conjunction with
his focus on term-oriented as-phrases, compositionality limits his choice of syntac-
tic analyses for as-phrase sentences.9 He argues that the English as in as-phrase
sentences is a device which creates term modifiers. Adjectival phrases are the most
familiar examples of term modifiers in this sense. For example, in the sentence the
red ball bounced, J"red"K composes with J"ball"K to yield a denotation that differs
from the one assigned to ball in the ball. For this reason, the adjectival phrase
containing red is said to modify the term ball. This syntactic account predicts
that as-phrases themselves, e.g., as a judge, fit into the same distributional frame
as other term modifiers. On Landman's theory, any substitution-instance of a as
G occurring within an as-phrase sentence denotes a set of properties, which he calls
an aspect of a .10 Semantically, he considers propositions primitive, to facilitate his
property-set analysis. On his theory, as denotes a higher-order function that maps
functions of type <e,<e,p>>, the type of an individual entity and that of a property,
into functions of type <<e,p>,p>, the type of a noun-phrase denotation in Land-
man's intermediate logical language. Landman limits the extension of J"as"K across
its various models with eight axiom-schemata.[Mon74b]11 The idea is that any deno-
9This is just to say that if Landman wants the semantic type of John as a judge to be the same as
that of any term (DP or NP), then J"as"K must have the type of a function into term-denotations.
Landman accomplishes this by making J"as"K a function from term-denotations and predicate-
denotations into term-denotations. To preserve compositionality, he simply makes the syntactic
formation rules fit this semantic type for J"as"K. There is some independent evidence, however,
for a different syntactic structure for as-phrase sentences (see chapter 2).
10These aspects that Landman refers to are not to be confused with the aspects that Asher (2011)
employs, which are not sets of properties. I give an extended account of the semantic theory in
Asher (2011) in chapter 3.
11Axioms like these, whose role in the semantic theory is to limit its range of models, are sometimes
called meaning-postulates, after Montague (1973). The point of a meaning-postulate is to force
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tation assigned to J"as"K by a given model should at least satisfy each instance of
each of these schemata. The schemata over natural-language expressions that these
axiom-schemata represent are:
1 a as G is a.
2 a as G is G.
3 a as a is a.
4 if a as G is F and a as G is G, then a as G is F and H .
5 if a as G is F and being F implies being H , then a as G is H .
6 it is not the case that a as G both is F and is not-F.
7 a as G either is F or is not-F.
8 if a as G is F , a is G.
There are a number of standing objections to Landman's theory. One such objection
is that it's unsound. The axiom-schemata have substitution instances that are incon-
sistent, as both Szabó and Asher infer[Sza03, Ash06]. Suppose a is John and G is
judge and F is also John. By 8, if John as a judge is John, then John is a judge.
We know that John as a judge is John by 1. We conclude that John is a judge. If we
started from the assumption that John as a non-judge is John, however, then we can
conclude by similar inferences that John is a non-judge.
Landman might reply that the entailed sentences are jointly satisfiable. These are
not cases of inconsistency in the axiom-schemata at all. Rather, natural-language
predicates are vague. The appearance of contradiction in John is a judge and John
is a non-judge, for example, stems from our naïve idea of the sentence's logical form,
a particular predicate in the intermediate logical language the theory employs to have (one of a
range of) certain, sensible, interpretations.
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i.e., P (x)∧¬P (x). His axiom-schema (6) only requires that a under any fixed aspect
G is not both F and non-F . This simply requires, for instance, that John-as-judge is
not both strict and lenient. The substance of this reply is that for the relevant class of
natural-language predicates which can stand in for G in Landman's axiom-schemata,
pa is G and a is non-Gq is satisfiable.
In objection to this reply, consider the instance John for a , exactly one hundred
eighty-two pounds for G and John for F . One can run the objection above for
these predicates and conclude that John is exactly one hundred eighty-two pounds
and John is not exactly one hundred eighty-two pounds. I think that Landman might
reasonably reply that the predicate exactly one hundred eighty-two pounds simply
cannot compose with as to yield a noun-phrase. More to the point, J"as"K should
not take the argument J"exactly one hundred eighty-two pounds"K to yield a term
modifier. I imagine that Landman would say: for every predicate that seems to allow
one to derive an unsatisfiable sentence from the axiom-schemata, it will turn out that
the objection cannot be run . This first objection is problematic for these reasons.
Another objection to Landman comes from syntax. It claims that as-phrases don't
distribute like the term-modifiers Landman says they are. There is evidence from
linguistic syntax against the claim that as-phrases are modifiers of the kind Landman
assumes they are. Szabó (2003) notes that all other such modifiers form determiner
phrases, DPs for short.[Sza03] For example, the constituent [an apple] in Bill ate
an apple is a DP. Szabó cites examples suggesting that no as-phrase combines with
a DP to form another DP. Szabó cites 15 - 17:
(15) * John as a judge and Bill are corrupt.
(16) * John as a judge's reputation is excellent.
(17) Who is the commencement speaker this year?  *John as a judge.
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Szabó concludes that, since we should be able to substitute any DP into the sentence-
frame DP and Bill are corrupt to yield an acceptable sentence, and we cannot do so
with John as a judge, as a judge does not combine with John to form a DP. But
we can't do that with any other as-phrase either. Therefore, no as-phrase combines
with a DP to form a DP. On Szabó's assumptions, it follows that no as-phrase is a DP
modifier. Therefore, no as-phrase is the kind of modifier that Landman's syntactic
formation rules make them appear to be.
Another objection to Landman's theory is that it fails to predict that some important
validities (e.g., that of the instances of 1-8) are due to the logical forms of the sentences
involved. Instead of predicting that the seven inference-patterns Landman proposes
are logical validities, it considers them lexical validities. According to Landman,
John is corrupt as a judge entails John is a judge in virtue of the meaning of as,
represented by his axiom schemata.12 Szabó (2003) argues that a theory of as-phrases
should avoid using such stipulations to predict the entailment data.[Sza12a][4]
A final objection to Landman's theory is that it cannot handle what he calls predicate-
oriented as-phrases. If evidence for the existence of predicate-oriented as-phrases
should come to light, Landman's theory would be unable to handle these sentences.
as is a device that forms NPs from NPs and predicates, according to Landman. The
syntax-semantics interface that his theory assumes would need reworking to support
predicate-oriented as-phrases. And if Szabó and I are correct, at least a large subclass
of as-phrase sentences are predicate oriented13.
12i.e., the meaning-postulates corresponding to the informal schemata 1-8 above.
13See chapter 2 and chapter 4 for details.
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1.1.2 JÄGER'S THEORY
Jäger (2003) proposes another semantic theory of as-phrases.[Jäg03] It is based on
the syntactic assumption that in each as-phrase sentence, the as-phrase saturates an
unpronounced syntactic argument of some verb phrase. Each verb-phrase denota-
tion for a verb of n phonologically realized arguments must be a function of n + 1
arguments. This theory interprets as-phrases like the English x (is) AP for DP
construction, where for DP specifies a reference-class for some graded adjective in
AP , like small. For example, That flea is small for an animal, but it's large for a
flea contains this construction.
Semantically, Jäger proposes that an as-phrase fills in an underspecified element of
a predicate's denotation.[Jäg03]14 It does this by resolving a presupposition that the
predicate introduces into the discourse in which it appears. This amounts to the
argument that each natural-language predicate carries a slot for a respect in which
it applies to its subject. So Jäger claims, for example, that the denotation of [is
corrupt] is underspecified in John is corrupt. [as a judge] in John is corrupt as a
judge resolves the presupposition, introduced by [is corrupt], that John is corrupt in
a certain respect. Jäger bases his theory on the assumption that the complement of
[as] in as-phrase sentences is a small clause denoting a situation. Some, though not
all situations have a spatial and temporal location, according to his interpretation
of his theory's models. Thus his theory accommodates as-phrase sentences with two
abstract predicates, e.g., mathematical sentences. Just as easily, it yields the right
predictions for the logical characters of as-phrase sentences with embedded temporal
adverbs. For example, it predicts that John is always corrupt as a judge is consistent
with John is corrupt as a judge, but not entailed by it. Any theory of as-phrases
14See underspecified 5.6 for a definition.
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ought to preserve this feature if possible.
One semantic objection to this theory is that some as-phrase sentences simply aren't
factive: the subject a need not (be) G for the sentence to be true. However, Jäger's
semantics entail that all as-phrase sentence are factive in this sense. Consider his
theory's treatment of perceptual verbs like [see]. Jäger rightly includes as-phrases
among the acceptable objects of these verbs. He argues that the objects of these
verbs are small situations (smaller than a world). Two lines of objection are possible
here.
First, many as-phrase sentences containing [see] are satisfiable even though the subject
a is not actually G. According to Jäger's theory, these sentences should generate
a presupposition failure, as does we went to the playhouse, but it wasn't located
anywhere. Yet the sentence Peter saw Tom as a spy can be true even if Tom is not
a spy.
Second, some satisfiable as-phrase sentences containing [see] contain as-phrases whose
denotations (under their intended interpretation) are not in any possible world or
situation. An example makes this fact evident: Peter saw the paper as a decidability
proof for first-order logic. These sentences are more like propositional attitude-
contexts than the extensional perceptual report sentences to which Jäger's theory is
suited. As Cresswell (1975) points out regarding those contexts, the more difficult it
is for a subject to know that a claim is necessarily false (psychologically speaking),
the more likely that instances of the schema
s believes that p
are attested in natural languages. A similar moral holds for as-phrase sentences
containing perceptual verbs. Semantically, the core assumption of Jäger's theory
is that as-phrases flesh out a situation whose properties are underspecified in the
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denotation of the copular construction, by generating the presupposition that the
situation in question supports the truth of pa is Gq. For this reason, it is unclear how
one could modify the theory to accommodate counter-factual situations or situations
that are part of no possible world. Assume that the situation σ′ which supports the
truth of a sentence s uttered in context C is some extension of the topic-situation σ
of C. That is to say, σ is a part of σ′. Jäger's semantic theory is based on a theory
of situations like the one proposed in Kratzer (1989).[Jäg03, Kra89] On Kratzer's
situation theory, which is an extension of David Lewis's counterpart theory, actuality
is determined indexically, and every world is a large situation that is maximal with
respect to the parthood relation over situations.[Kra14, Lew68]. Thus it is safe to
assume that Jäger's theory is committed to these claims, too. Then it follows that σ′
is actual, since it has a part which is part of the world w in which s is uttered in C,
and therefore w is the actual world by definition.15
Finally, there are two syntactically motivated objections to this sort of theory. The
first is that it entails that every predicative phrase whatsoever has an extra argument
for which there is no independent syntactic evidence. For example, [corrupt] would
specify an argument which is a way of being corrupt that [as a judge], or another as-
phrase, can saturate. This sort of theory is unacceptably ad-hoc, since it postulates
similar additions to the lexical structure of many adjectives without specifying any
simpler (i.e., systematic) means of accounting for the data. The second, perhaps more
obvious objection is based on observations in Szabó (2003). He points out that even
if natural-language predicates have this extra argument Jäger describes, it cannot be
saturated twice. If as-phrases are truly on par with comparatives, a single predicate
containing a comparative and an as-phrase should be grammatically unacceptable.
15Implicit premise here: no two distinct worlds share a part; this is an axiom of Lewis's counterpart
theory (Lewis (1968)).
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But John as a judge is well paid for a janitor or John is well paid for a janitor as
a judge contain such predicates. And they are perfectly acceptable.
The two semantic theories of as-phrase sentences with the least standing objections,
or the least serious ones, are those of Szabó (2003) and Asher (2011). Since they are
the most successful theories yet proposed, I devote one chapter to each. Chapter 2
considers Szabó's theory, while chapter 3 deals with Asher's. There, I consider the
advantages and shortcomings of each theory, and draw lessons from each that my
own proposal will exploit. It is this proposal for a new semantic theory of as-phrase
sentences that I will now briefly sketch.
1.2 THE PROPOSAL
The theory I propose follows both Landman and Szabó's basic approaches in a number
of ways. My analysis of the constituent structure of those as-phrase sentences my
theory treats is roughly similar to Szabó's. I argue for some revisions to this structure,
in light of distributional evidence and theoretical pressures in chapter 4. I also retain
Landman and Szabó's central use of principal ultrafilters over properties to predict
of as-phrase sentences. I depart from Szabó and Landman's work in several respects,
though.
It is difficult to see how Szabó's 2003 theory might be made compositional. He offers
a syntactic analysis of as-phrase sentences, but his semantic theory makes no mention
of the syntax of these sentences. Szabó articulates his theory by directly associating
English sentence-schemata with schemata over formulas of a first-order language.
These formulas are supposed to represent the sentences' logical forms. This approach
is convenient for initial work on a little-studied construction like the as-phrase. It
wisely avoids introducing extra complexity too early, while the researcher works out
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a plausible first hypothesis. For a host of reasons, however, a compositional theory is
ultimately preferable to this paraphrastic approach.
Szabó's schema over English sentences has many substitution-instances that his the-
ory is clearly not intended to handle. Among these are examples I would intuitively
consider as-phrase sentences, as well as examples of entirely different constructions
whose overt form just happens to fit the schema. Szabó explicitly excludes some of
these examples from the domain of his theory.16 Yet it remains unclear from Sz-
abó (2003) just what constitutes an as-phrase sentence. It is relatively clear that
some constructions found among his schema's substitution-instances are semantically
unrelated to the ones Szabó considers. These include the comparatives, instances
synonymous with and or while, and metaphor or simile examples mentioned in
Section 1. A firmer linkage between syntax and semantics would help to clarify what
domain of sentences is appropriate for semantic theories of as-phrases, by spelling
out the contribution of each syntactic constituent to semantic interpretation.
Landman's theory, by contrast, is strictly compositional: the relation between syntac-
tic and semantic types is at least many-to-one.[Lan89, PTW90, Mon74c]17 The syn-
tactic structure that he proposes for as-phrase sentences, however, is speculative. The
syntactic analysis is made to fit the strictly compositional semantic interpretation that
the theory specifies. Still, the syntactic structure of an individual natural-language
sentence is not just a matter of stipulation, if Chomsky's generative enterprise is a
scientifically valuable one.[Cho95, Cho86] Challenging as it undoubtedly is, the more
promising approach to semantics is grounded in empirical syntax, while aspiring to
16See his footnote f.6, pp.409-410 on tried as an adult.
17Specifically, his theory obeys the requirement that Montague considered necessary for composi-
tionality, that there exists some homomorphism from an algebra characterizing the full generative
range of the syntax, to an algebra that characterizes the corresponding range of semantic deno-
tations. See Partee (1990), Montague (1970) ( Universal Grammar)..
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the goal of strict compositionality. The semantic theory that I work out in chapter 5
of the present work takes the lead of recent work in the syntax of predication. At
the same time, it is constructed in order to approach this goal of compositionality as
closely as possible.18
In contrast to all of my precursors in the semantics of as-phrase sentences, I propose
that all as-phrases share a single, functional phrase-category: PrP. A growing body of
evidence from linguistic syntax suggests that syntactic representations must include
a type of phrase strictly dedicated to predicates, as opposed to the lexical categories
that form the most familiar predicates VP, AP, and others.[Bow93, Bow01, Bow10,
den06, AR03, Cit08, Bal14] Though they all contain a PrP, the class of as-phrase
sentences is syntactically and semantically heterogeneous.
In chapter 4, I argue that a basic syntactic difference distinguishes what I call Type A
from Type B as-phrase sentences. In that chapter, I build a semantic typology of as-
phrase sentences on the basis of this syntactic difference. Specifically, I argue that in
Type B but not Type A sentences, intentional verbs like see and understand may
complicate the truth-conditions of an as-phrase sentence considerably. The semantic
properties of these Type B sentences are so different from other as-phrase sentences
that they ought to be handled by a different semantic theory. Informally speaking, the
difference in meaning between those Type B sentences with such intentional verbs and
other Type A or B as-phrase sentences lies in the different relations that hold between
their subjects and predicates. The unusual Type B sentences' truth requires their
18That is, as closely as possible for me. Currently, there are a number of obstacles to obtaining strict
compositionality for as-phrase interpretation, on realistic assumptions about their constituent
structure. One such obstacle derives from the apparent presence of two quantifiers in each as-
phrase sentence. These two quantifiers must somehow join to form a single quantifier, in the
semantic derivation. In chapter 5 I explain this problem, and tentatively propose a solution
through what has been called hole semantics, a type of underspecification.[BB05, Egg10] More
speculatively, Barker and Shan's continuization technique might hold a solution to this technical
problem.[BS14]
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subject to be an agent whose mental state is about the intentional verb's complement,
and about it in the particular way that the as-phrase prescribes.19 If my typology
is correct, a future compositional semantic theory could channel interpretation of an
as-phrase sentence according to its constituent structure alone. This divide-and-
conquer research strategy would avoid some of the disadvantages of the generalize
to the worst case strategy in natural language semantics.20
Since it makes a theory's prospects for consistent integration with other semantic
theories more perspicuous, compositionality is a major source of theoretical discipline
for semantic theories. Other things being equal, we ought to prefer a theory that could
be consistently extended to handle other constructions embedded within as-phrase
sentences, constructions more familiar to semanticists than as-phrases. For example,
it remains unclear how to treat tenses, adverbs of quantification, or modal contexts
within as-phrase sentences, or even how compositional interpretation would proceed
in such cases. As I argued in Section 1, the possibility of such discipline is a key reason
to prefer an explicit semantic theory over piecemeal logical paraphrases or conceptual
analysis, for the purposes of assessing validity in natural-language inferences. More
generally, the point of using formal semantic theories in philosophy is not just rigor
for its own sake, but to take advantage of the epistemic benefits a virtuous semantic
theory could offer the philosophical methodologist. Here, I have in mind the usual
virtues of simplicity, parsimony, the avoidance of ad-hoc explanations, and consistency
with other theories.
19For ease of expression here, I am glossing over the distinction between the sentence subject (a part
of the sentence), the subject's denotation (an abstract entity composed of sets), and the entity
or entities that we can pick out by means of the subject's denotation and the semantic theory
that assigned that denotation. By subject or complement, here, I mean just the last sort of
entity in most cases, a non-linguistic entity that would be involved in making the sentence true.
20Asher (2011), for example, pursues generalize to the worst case in his semantic theory of as-
phrase sentences. Chapter 3 deals with his theory in detail. See generalize-to-the-worst-case
on page 210 for a definition of the term.
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My theory also departs from earlier research by predicting more entailments that
as-phrase sentences intuitively have. For example, there are standing objections to
Szabó's theory based on its inability to predict correct entailments for as-phrase
sentences containing referentially opaque contexts. Call this the Objection From
Intensionality. In strictly extensional examples, it also remains unclear in each case
what temporal relations we must ascribe to states that satisfy his state-parthood
relation.21 This relation is at the core of Szabó's theory. Szabó (2003) persuasively
argues that strictly temporal relations among states of objects cannot sufficiently
account for the truth-conditions of all as-phrase sentences. But to predict certain
entailments of as-phrase sentences, the theory has to license some deductive moves
from state-parthood claims to claims that the subject of the sentence is in some
state at a particular time.22 An important standing objection to Szabó's theory is
that it does not do this. Call this the Objection From Temporal Relations.
Finally, there is an interesting and frequently attested subset of as-phrase sentences
that carry generic readings; specifically, dispositional readings. None of the existing
semantic theories of as-phrase sentences is designed to treat these examples, which
requires the theory of as-phrase sentences to interface with a quantificational theory
of generics, such as the ones we find in Wasserman (2011), Fara (2005), or Krifka et
al. (1995).[Far05, Was11, KPC+95]
21Again, for convenience I am glossing over the important distinction between the binary predicate-
symbol ≤ in Szabó's first-order language, the interpretation of that symbol in a model, and
the relation or class of relations that could play the role which this interpretation in the model
prescribes. For the purposes of his semantic theory's descriptive adequacy, it is the symbol's
interpretation that matters, since it determines which natural language inferences the theory
validates. chapter 2 deals with this issue at length. See descriptive adequacy on page 209 on
what I mean by descriptive adequacy here.
22My caveats above about my imprecise use of terms for convenience apply here, too.
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1.3 THE METHOD
The method of inquiry I'll use here is model-theoretic semantics of natural language,
combined with generative syntax and a methodology drawn from work in the philos-
ophy of language. A major inspiration and source for my conception of semantics in
this mold is the work of Richard Montague.[Mon74b] His basic insight in the area was
that Tarski's way of specifying the meanings for terms in an artificial logical language
could be applied to natural languages as well.23 By making the artificial language
more and more expressive, one could construct closer and closer approximations to
the power of natural language. Another key example of this method is David Lewis's
work on subjunctive conditionals in Lewis (1973).[Lew73] In Lewis's theory of coun-
terfactual conditionals, especially, one finds a semantic theory of a natural-language
construction that plays a prominent role in philosophical talk. The theory can then
be used to determine validity for arguments containing that construction. This philo-
sophical project has many current practitioners. Timothy Williamson is one of the
most prominent. His Philosophy of Philosophy contains a very clear statement of
this project's motivations, assumptions and ends.[Wil07] Nicky Kroll's recent work
on the progressive aspect in verbs with is another philosophically-motivated and in-
formed project in formal semantics.[Kro12] Delia Graff Fara's work on the hypothesis
that proper names are predicates is another such project that takes its bearings from
philosophy of language.[GF14]
Unlike some of the seminal contributors to this project of formal semantics for natural
language, I do think that empirical data from generative syntax should exert some
discipline on the design of a semantic theory.[HK98, CMG00]24 There are also two
23See esp. Thomason's introduction to Montague (1974).
24In this respect, I follow the two recent texts in the field, Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Chierchia
and McConnell-Ginet (2000).
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other features of early research in this area that I wish to avoid. One is the design of
completely self-contained theories without considering how these can integrate with
semantic theories of other constructions. As in the sciences, the need to maintain
consistency with the best-supported theories of related phenomena adds another,
valuable source of discipline on theory-design. The second feature of early research
I wish to avoid is a lack of integration with eventualities, in the sense of Parsons
(1991): events or processes extended in time, involving entities and agents in various
roles.[Par90]
There are at least three chief ways for a formal semantic theory to discipline (i.e.,
constrain) the design of philosophical theories. One is to build the best general se-
mantic theories possible, and then read off one's ontology or metaphysics from their
ontological commitments.[Lud99]25 Another is to test particular philosophical theo-
ries, like realism and anti-realism about some class of entities, by noting which sort of
semantic theory of talk about those entities develops most fruitfully: one committed
to their existence, or one not so committed.[Dum91]26 A third is to develop seman-
tic theories of good predictive power over a large cross-section of natural language
constructions, and use those to determine whether philosophical arguments about a
particular subject are valid.
This third way of disciplining philosophy with a semantic theory is the one I pursue in
the present work. My central linguistic aim is to bring the theory of these sentences
into connection with independent semantics research on predication, quantificational
adverbs, names, and genericity. The more we know about these modular semantic
connections, the better we will understand some of those offhand but sophisticated
uses that we make of as-phrases in philosophical discourse.
25Peter Ludlow pursues essentially this project in Ludlow (1999).
26This is Michael Dummett's basic approach in Dummett (1991).
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2 SZABÓ'S THEORY
2.1 THE THEORY
Szabó (2003), On Qualification, defends two key claims. The first is that some
apparently good arguments based on Leibniz's law are invalid. These include the
arguments based on examples 1-4 in chapter 1. The arguments are only apparently
good, since they are invalid, according to Szabó. For that reason, they fail to show,
in each case, that some objects a and b are non-identical. When we choose certain
sentences as premises to an inference that should be licensed by Leibniz's law, the
form of the resulting inference fails to render it valid.[Sza03]1 One might think that
these problematic premises cast doubt on the validity of the argument-schema LN:
1 a is F
2 b is not F
LN
3 a 6= b
Szabó asks us to consider S as a premise of an LN-instance.2
S Superman leaps over tall buildings but Clark Kent does not.
A paraphrase of S yields substitution-instances for 1 and 2 in LN. Call the resulting
argument B:
1Szabó (2003), p.385.
2Szabó (2003), p.386.
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1 Superman is a leaper-over-tall-buildings
2 Clark Kent is not a leaper-over-tall-buildings
B
3 Superman 6= Clark Kent
If B's conclusion is false, then some of its premises are false or it is invalid. While
the premises of the above argument B seem true, however, its conclusion is false.
On these assumptions, S appears to be a counter-example to the validity of LN, or
even a counter-example to the Non-Identity of Discernibles. But suppose there were
a dispute over this issue. The burden of proof in this dispute falls upon those who
deny that the Non-Identity of Discernibles is a valid pattern of inference. Suppose
further than LN is a good schematization of the Non-Identity of Discernibles. Only
one consistent interpretation of B remains. The truth-conditions of its premises must
differ from more familiar instances of the schema a is F and b is not-F . S must be
true under some conditions which falsify these other instances. On this interpretation
of S, however, we need not doubt the validity of LN or the truth of B's premises.
Szabó proposes that a tacit assumption about the relations between English syntax
and logical validity leads us to mistake some invalid LN-instances for valid ones. We
make this mistake because the overt structure of some English sentences lead us to
an erroneous idea of their truth-conditions.
To clear up this confusion, Szabó seeks a theory of the problematic sentences' truth-
conditions. Szabó evaluates semantic theories of as-phrases according to three re-
quirements he proposes for any such theory. No theory before Szabó's meets all of
these requirements.[Sza03]3 First, he requires that a theory should yield a logical
3Szabó (2003), pp.387-394. Szabó does not explicitly enumerate these and call them requirements
for a semantic theory of as-phrase sentences. He criticizes four theories competing with his own,
and each of his objections is an instance of one of these requirements I have formulated.
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form for each as-phrase sentence that accurately predicts the data, i.e., the logical
character of natural language sentences that we can know by reflecting on its truth-
conditions. I will call this requirement descriptive adequacy.4 Second, it must not
depart from empirically-supported generalizations about sentence-structure and the
syntax-semantics interface, unless there is independently compelling evidence for that
departure.[Adg03, Hae94]5 Thirdly, the theory must avoid ad-hoc solutions where pos-
sible.
Szabó's critique of previous as-phrase theories motivates his second key claim, a
proposal in the semantic typology of English. He directs our attention to the English
instances of the schema a (is) F as G, where a is a sentence subject, F is a's
restricted predicate,G is a's restricting predicate, and asG is syntactically realized as
an adjunct to the sentence's VP. This is the as-phrase schema introduced in chapter 1.
In that chapter, each sentence (5)-(10) is an instance of this schema. Szabó's second
key claim is that each instance of that schema has a logical form which instantiates
the schema I'll call D.6
D ∃σ[∃s[F (σ) ∧ θ(a, σ) ∧ Ξ ∧G(s) ∧ In(a, s) ∧Ψ ∧ Z]]
As Szabó explains, θ is a predicate which roughly translates the thematic role that
the natural-language predicate F assigns its subject.[Sza03] Ξ is a (possibly empty)
sequence of conjuncts, and so is and Ψ.7 Z is also a sequence of extra conjuncts
4See descriptive adequacy on page 209 for a more thorough definition of the term.
5Under the category of syntax-semantics interface, I mean to include (for example) the theta-grids
of a word which represents the relation between its distributional frame (c-selection) and its
argument structure (s-selection). On this distinction, see Adger (2003) and Haegeman (1994).
6Szabó (2003), p.401.
7Szabó (2003), p.402. Szabó includes Ξ and Ψ in his analysis of the general logical form of a two-
predicate sentence, presumably to stand for two different conjunctions of additional predicates.
Ξ then represents additional event-predicates that the natural-language predicate F contributes
to the logical form of a (is) F , while Ψ represents a similar conjunction of event-predicates
introduced by G in a (is) G.
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(possibly empty). It specifies the logical relation between the two clauses, and ac-
cordingly, it can be different for different kinds of adjunct predications.8 An instance
of D is true9 just in case:
there is an eventuality σ that is F , a state s that is G, the head of the
English predicate translated as F  assigns a to σ in its theta-grid, a is
in the state s, and a certain relation obtains between σ and s which is
appropriate to the meanings of the English predicates translated as F 
and G, respectively.10
According to this gloss of Szabó's theory John is corrupt as a judge is true just in
case there is a state σ that is John's state of being corrupt, a state s that is John's
state of being a judge, John is in this state s, and σ is a part of s.
The internal structure of Z is left entirely unspecified in D. Szabó's's idea is that
the relation between restricted and restricting predicates that he intends Z to spec-
ify will vary with the meanings of the particular English predicates which F  and
G translate in the logical form of the sentence.[Sza03]11 The class of English sec-
ondary predicates suggests several different logical relations between the secondary
and primary predicate in a given sentence including them. D is supposed to represent
the forms of all simple sentences containing a single primary and a single secondary
predicate. Therefore, each semantically, distinct type of adjunct predicate will have
its own internal structure for Z.
An as-phrase is a type of adjunct predicate on Szabó's theory, with some specific
8Idem.
9True, here, refers by shorthand to the designated semantic value (e.g., 1) within the interpreted
logical language whose formulas Szabó intends D to range over. It does not refer to any natural
language's truth predicate, one example of which the English word true picks out in many
contexts.
10By another shorthand, I refer to the terms of that formula according to their intended interpre-
tations, e.g., that s and σ denote objects to be interpreted as eventualities.
11Szabó (2003), p.402.
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differences. Accordingly, D must be fleshed out with terms appropriate to as-phrase
sentences in particular, in place of Z. The schema E below is D fleshed out to suit
the logical properties of as-phrase sentences, according to Szabó.
E ∃σ[∃s[F (σ) ∧ θ(a, σ) ∧ Ξ ∧G(s) ∧ In(a, s) ∧Ψ ∧ s ≤ σ]]
The relation that ≤ denotes in Szabó's theory is to be interpreted as a partial-
ordering relation on the class of states.12 More specifically, he has a parthood relation
in mind.[Sza03]13 s1 ≤ s2 should be pronounced, s1 is a part of s2. Szabó tells
us that J≤K is transitive, asymmetric, reflexive, and stronger than the relation of
temporal inclusion. It is the same parthood relation which he takes an ordinary use
of the following English sentence to denote: raising questions is an important part of
being a judge. In the previous sentence, J"raising a question"K should be interpreted
as one state s1, and J"being a judge"K should be interpreted as another state, s2.
Szabó's theory predicts that the sentence is true only if s1 is a part of s2.
The motivation for employing states in this theory stems from Szabó's second key
claim, and from his Davidsonian account of natural-language predicates. Szabó says
of his theory that the chief advantage of this proposal is the fit with a plausible view of
the syntax of qua-sentences [i.e., as-phrase sentences] [..] They are predicates ascribed
to an individual insofar as another predicate is.[Sza03]14 Szabó also holds that any
natural-language predication, simple or complex, is true only if an eventuality of some
sort exists.15 This is what he calls a neo-Davidsonian account of natural-language
12Formulas of Szabó's intermediate logical language directly quantify over these states. As far as
the models of this language are concerned, relevant entities in the quantifier domains (and the
semantic values of non-logical constants) must simply be in the extensions of various predicates
like ≤ and In in order to count as states.
13Szabó (2003), pp.402-403.
14Szabó (2003), p.405.
15Idem.
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predication.16 It follows from this assumption of Szabó's that each as-phrase sentence
is committed to at least one eventuality.
A state is a type of eventuality. By eventuality, I mean some entity of the general
class that includes states, punctual events, and processes.[Par90]17 The main empirical
evidence for an eventuality-based account of predication is found in the cases of
adverbial modifiers and predicate nominalizations. On a neo-Davidsonian account,
every sentence with a predicate is committed to the existence of one eventuality
or another. The natural-language predicate contributes at least three elements to
the logical form of the sentence that contains it, on this account: the existential
quantifier which binds the term that denotes the eventuality, the term itself, and a
formula within that quantifier's scope. In each case, this formula is a conjunction
like that found in an instance of D or E above. The existentially-bound term which
denotes the eventuality offers a bridge between the logical form of a sentence like
John walks fast and that of John walks. By simple Conjunction Elimination,
the neo-Davidsonian account of predication predicts that the first sentence entails
the second. For example, the formula walking(x) ∧ fast(x) implies walking(x).
Likewise, this account readily predicts that the nominalization John's walking is fast
entails both John walks fast and John walks.18
These advantages of the neo-Davidsonian account of predication come at a cost,
however. The account forces us into a dilemma. The very basis of its nice treatment of
adverbial modifiers makes the account predict that John is happy about the weather
and John is unhappy about his taxes jointly entail John is happy and John is
16Szabó (2003), p.398.
17An excellent introduction to eventualities in natural language semantics is Parsons (1990), espe-
cially chapters 8-10.
18Here, I ignore any readings on which these sentences do not entail each other, since they clearly
do so on other readings. For example, I want to avoid here the other verb-aspects that the simple
present tense can introduce in English (e.g., the habitual).
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unhappy. But Szabó holds that John is happy and John is unhappy is unsatisfiable,
so his basic account of predication must not predict that joint entailment.19 Szabó
must either give up the neo-Davidsonian account of predication, or modify it to avoid
making any predictions of this type. The basic neo-Davidsonian account assumes that
the logical form of any natural-language predication is a conjunction of predications of
some eventuality. Consequently, it treats the relation between John's happiness and
the weather in the same fashion as the relation between John's walking and quickness,
for example. To make the neo-Davidsonian account treat these examples differently,
Szabó must complicate the conjunctive logical forms that his theory assigns to these
sentences. To do so, Szabó defines a class of persistent predicates in natural language.
A persistent predicate applies to its subject just in case the predicate F  that it
contributes to that sentence's logical form applies to
1. that term s which denotes the state that the natural-language predicate con-
tributes to its sentence's logical form, and
2. any term s′ denoting a state of which the state that s denotes is a part.
Informally speaking, persistent predicates describe states of the subject that either
apply to the subject without qualification or fail to apply to it at all. Not all natural-
language predicates are persistent. Thus by predicting different logical forms for
persistent and non-persistent predicates, Szabó's account avoids predicting (jointly)
satisfiable sets of sentences to be unsatisfiable.
This way out of the dilemma makes trouble for for theory of as-phrases, however.
Szabó observes that some as-phrase sentences, like John earns $20,000 as a janitor
and John earns $50,000 as a judge have peculiar joint entailments, e.g., John earns
$70,000. These are not persistent predicates, according to Szabó's requirements
19Szabó (2003), p.400.
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above. If they were persistent predicates, strictly speaking, then earns $20,000
would be incompatible with earns $50,000, because both predicates would persist
up to the subject's maximal state, and $20,000 6= $50,000. If Szabó were to treat
these two as persistent predicates, then his semantic theory would predict the above
two sentences jointly unsatisfiable. Suppose however that he treats the two as non-
persistent predicates. In that case, no further earns sentence would follow from the
conjunction of John earns $20,000 and John earns $50,000. That prediction is too
weak, though. If we give each sentence a lower-bound reading for its numeric predi-
cate, then the two sentences are consistent and jointly entail John earns $70,000.20
Thus the two numeric predicates are neither straightforwardly persistent, in Szabó's
sense, nor simply non-persistent.
Szabó solves this problem by adding a disjunction to the matrix of such sentences'
logical forms, the qualified persistence clause.[Sza03]21 This clause requires that ei-
ther the persistent predicate applies to the maximal state of the subject and to every
state between it and the state to which the sentence is explicitly committed, or some
salient alternative [predicate] [..] in context applies to that maximal state. To pro-
vide this salient alternative in a given context, Szabó adds a function-symbol Altc to
his intermediate logical language. As Szabó describes it, J"Altc"K is a function from
first-order predicates to first-order predicates. The subscripted c, however, repre-
sents a context, in which Altc denotes a salient alternative of F.22 Presumably, the
object language contains many such function-symbols, one for each natural-language
sentence containing a non-persistent predicate. Abstracting from the details of its
implementation in the object-language, it is more enlightening to imagine that Alt
20That is, the two sentences jointly entail John earns $70,000 on the at least reading of that
sentence's predicate. The at most readings of the two sentences' predicates could be forced by
an overt modifier like in total or by some pragmatic means such as presupposition.
21Szabó (2003), p.404.
22I am paraphrasing Szabó (2003) p.404, here.
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denotes a function of two arguments: a first-order predicate and a context. Given
some object-language predicate F, J"Altc(F )"K is an alternate predicate that applies
to the maximal state of the sentence's subject, instead of F itself. If we interpret
F as the predicate which applies to all and only those things which earn $20,000,
and c as the context of a sentence where earns $50,000 is also predicated of the
subject, then J"Altc(F )"K should be the predicate that applies to a thing just in case
it earns $70,000.
2.2 DRAWBACKS
Despite its attractive simplicity, its empirical basis, and its adequacy to a large class
of examples, Szabó's semantic theory of as-phrase sentences raises some difficult ques-
tions.
2.2.1 THE QUALIFIED PERSISTENCE CLAUSE
First, it is not clear how to implement Altc, and his theory cannot do without it.
Suppose that some sentence, u, is an intuitively satisfiable substitution-instance of
Szabó's as-phrase schema a (is) F as G, where F is a persistent predicate as de-
scribed in sec. 2.1 above. If J"Altc"K does not yield the correct alternate predicate for
u'sG-instance, then one of two outcomes results. Either the disjunct pAltc(G)(a)q is
not satisfied and s ≤ s′ is, or the theory predicts that the sentence is unsatisfiable.
In the second case, the theory is false, since it predicts incorrect truth-conditions for
u. In the first case, the theory predicts that u entails its restricted predicate. For an
example of this first case, the theory would predict that John is corrupt as a judge
entails John is corrupt.
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To see why it must predict this granted these assumptions, consider the logical form
that Szabó's theory predicts for an as-phrase sentence with a persistent predicate:
p∃s[∃σ[G(s) ∧ In(a, s) ∧ F (σ) ∧ σ ≤ s ∧ ∀σ′[((σ ≤ σ′) ∧ In(a, σ′))
→ (F (σ′)∨Altc(G)(a))]]]q
Consider any case in which the above formula is true while pAltc(G)(a)q is false.23
Perhaps this disjunct is falls because J"Altc"K is undefined at G. In any such case,
provided all of the other conjuncts are true, the only way for the whole formula to
be true is either for no value of σ′ to satisfy the antecedent within the universal
quantifier, or for pF (σ′)q to be true for each state bound to σ′ that satisfies the
antecedent. For the antecedent to be false in this case, it must be the case that
the value of σ is not a part of any state, or that a is in no state other than the
semantic value of s (a state). But if a is in that state, then the value of σ is a
part of that state. Thus, each value of σ which makes the antecedent true must
satisfy pF (σ′)q as well. Szabó stipulates that ≤ is to be interpreted as a parthood
relation (a partial ordering on states), however.24 Thus, given that σ ≤ s is true
(ex hypothesi), it follows that each state (each value of σ′) up to the maximal state
of a must satisfy pF (σ′)q to make the whole formula true. Szabó holds that any
predicate that is true of the maximal state of an entity must be true of that entity
simpliciter.25 This is why his theory predicts that a satisfiable as-phrase sentence
entails its restricted predicate if pAltc(G)(a)q is false in a case where F is persistent.
23Just for shorthand, I will write in this section suppose pφq is false in some case instead of
suppose that the interpretation of pφq in a model M assigns the semantic value 0 to pφq. In
this section, I will continue to write things like the first to mean things like the second, for the
sake of brevity.
24Szabó (2003), p.405.
25This assumption underwrites, for example, the neo-Davidsonian theory of predication that Szabó
adopts here. He holds that pa is F q where F is persistent, is true iff for every state s of a up
to its maximal state, JpF (s)qK = 1. This follows from the logical form of pa is F q on Szabó's
theory, from the transitivity of the state-parthood relation, i.e., J≤K.
31
This is not a happy result for Szabó's theory, however.26 Given the above result,
consider any two as-phrase sentences u and v, such that both u and v have persistent
predicates as F -instances. Both u and v have some a as their subject, and u's F -
instance has the anti-extension of v 's.27 If pAltc(G)(a)q should fail to be satisfied
in u's and in v's predicted logical forms, then the theory predicts that each sentence
entails its F -instance. That being so, however, the theory predicts that u and v are
not jointly satisfiable. Suppose that John is honest as a father and John is dishonest
as a politician are both true of a certain man, John. Further suppose that J"Altc"K is
undefined at the predicate which translates the natural-language predicate honest.
From the previous argument and these assumptions, it follows that the theory predicts
John is honest as a father entails John is honest and that John is dishonest as a
politician entails John is dishonest. The theory predicts that these sentences are
not jointly satisfiable, though they clearly are.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that context can provide the information which J"Altc"K
requires to yield the correct predicate. One likely way for this theory to constrain
the range of J"Altc"K by context is pragmatic enrichment. Szabó and Stanley (2000),
for example, argues that the context of an utterance in discourse is usually necessary
to fix the domains of quantifiers in the logical form of the uttered sentence, through
pragmatic enrichment of a basic logical form that a semantic theory must assign
that sentence independent of context.[SS00] Asher (2011), however, points out that
Szabó and Stanley (2000) does not explain how features of the discourse context
in which a sentence is used could fix the values of variables in the sentence's basic
26Asher (2006) and (2011) point out this problem as well. Asher (2006) does not mention Altc,
which makes his objection to the persistence of predication in Szabó's theory appear to assume
a misreading of Szabó (2003). But Asher (2011) makes it clear that he is aware of Altc and
its role in the theory (p.198, ff.8). Asher simply doubts that the contextually-salient alternative
function it names could be made to do the work Szabó imagines for it. Without a complete
re-design of Szabó's theory, that is. I share his doubt.
27Suppose further that u's a-instance and v's a-instance are co-referential and rigid.
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logical form left underspecified by the semantic theory. Asher notes this lack of a
mechanism for determining the salient [entities] with which to bind the variable
[..] in logical form.[Ash11]28 If the underspecified J"Altc"K cannot be tailored to its
argument given this context, then Szabó's theory yields many incorrect predictions
about the entailment relations of sentences.
2.2.2 THE OBJECTION FROM TEMPORAL RELATIONS
Szabó's theory runs afoul of the temporal relations between states in at least two
ways. Together, these ways constitute the Objection From Temporal Relations to his
theory.
The first of these troubles with temporal relations concerns what Szabó calls tem-
poral inclusion. Szabó intends his state-parthood relation to be an ordering relation
stronger than temporal inclusion.[Sza03]29 Yet it's not clear what this claim requires
of the relation. I will argue that clarification of this remark is necessary, because there
is no plausible interpretation of temporal inclusion on which temporal inclusion is
either necessary or sufficient for the intuitive notion of state-parthood that motivates
Szabó's predicate ≤. Szabó's own remark implies that whatever it is, temporal
inclusion per se is not sufficient for state-parthood, and that claim is not without
evidence from the various interpretations of state-parthood I will propose. The pair-
ings of as-phrase sentences with those conditions that intuitively make them true, and
conditions that intuitively make them false, place important constraints on the range
of relations that could be Szabó's state-parthood. But according to these intuitive
truth-conditions for several types of as-phrase sentences, they are true in scenarios
where a state-parthood relation stronger than temporal inclusion would predict them
28Asher (2011), p.88,
29Szabó (2003), p.403.
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false. If the state-parthood relation were stronger than temporal inclusion, and not
just different from it, then presumably temporal inclusion would be necessary for
state-parthood. But if Szabó's theory generates incorrect predictions when we in-
terpret state-parthood in this way, then temporal inclusion cannot be necessary for
state-parthood, either.
The logically weakest way to interpret temporal inclusion here is clearly a non-
starter. This interpretation makes a state s1 temporally included in state s2 iff there
exists some temporal moment t such that s1 holds at t and s2 holds at t. Call this
relation Temporal Overlap (TO). State-parthood is not just Temporal Overlap, nor
is Temporal Overlap sufficient for state-parthood. For the sake of concision, let's
define 4 so that pα 4 βq is true iff α,β are temporal moments and α is identical
to or prior to β. If s2 holds from moment t1 to t2, not every state u that holds at some
moment t such that t14 t 4 t2, is part of s2 in the relevant sense. John once ruined
the roast when he was a father clearly does not entail John ruined the roast as a
father.30 But a Szabó-style semantic theory would predict that this entailment holds,
if Temporal Overlap were an accurate interpretation of state-parthood. Therefore,
Temporal Overlap is not an accurate interpretation of state-parthood.31
A slightly stronger requirement that Szabó might intend here is that a state s1 is a part
of a state s2 only if the running-time of s1 is wholly contained within the running-time
of s2. Call this requirement on the interpretation of ≤ Temporal Bounding (TB).[5]
Szabó's own critique of the simple frame-adverbial theory of as-phrase sentences sug-
gests that state-parthood is not just Temporal Bounding (chapter 1, sec. 2.2.2). After
all, Temporal Bounding is nothing more than the relation that frame-adverbial con-
30At least, on one natural reading of the latter sentence. Nevertheless, the availability of this reading
causes problems for Szabó's theory.
31If it is accurate, then Szabó's theory is false. I assume for the sake of argument here that Szabó's
theory is not false.
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structions impose on the eventuality corresponding to their sentences' main predicate
(see chapter 1).
Though insufficient for state-parthood, Temporal Bounding might nevertheless be a
necessary condition for state-parthood. However, assuming Temporal Bounding and
Szabó's logical form for an as-phrase sentence (schema E, sec. 2.1 above), the most
straightforward way I can imagine to implement the future tense in as-phrase sen-
tences generates false predictions about the sentence's entailments. If state-parthood
requires Temporal Bounding, then the part may not hold at any time when the state
it is a part of fails to hold. But if the English predicate to which the part corresponds
contains certain tense inflections, then there is one natural reading of such a sentence
on which the part must hold at a time when the whole does not.32 Consider examples
18- 20.
(18) John was lonely as a child.
(19) Tom will enjoy retirement at sixty-five as a thirty-year-old state employee.
(20) Louise, as a tiger cub, will be an adult tiger.
Past tenses do not present a problem for a Szabó-style semantic theory of as-phrase
sentences. If 18 is true, it predicts that John's state of loneliness is part of John's
state of being a child. Assuming that TC is at least necessary for state-parthood,
this simply requires that John's state of being a child, holding strictly at times before
the time of the sentence's semantic evaluation, temporally contains his state of being
lonely.
The future-tense inflection on the F -instance in 19 and 20 do cause problems for such
a theory. 19 can be read at least two ways. On the first reading, call it A, 19 is true
32If the sentence is true, that is.
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only if Tom's state of enjoying his retirement is temporally included within his state
of employment by the state, in the sense of Temporal Overlap at least. The sentence
is false on this reading, however: one cannot literally be sixty-five years old while
he is only thirty . On the second reading (call this B), 19 is true in cases where
that temporal relation between John's two states fails to hold. For example, 19 on
B is true if John is in a state of enjoying his retirement at some time, though that
state need not be temporally included within his state of being a state employee, even
in the sense of Temporal Overlap. Perhaps what does make 19 true on B is rather
that John's state-employment at 30 causes him to enjoy retirement at 65.33 Perhaps
John would not have enjoyed this sort of retirement, under normal conditions, had
the state never employed him. In any case, B is as plausible a reading as A if not
more so. Like 19, 20 is true under certain conditions on reading B, it is true under
no conditions on reading A.
19 and 20 are not idiosyncratic examples. There is a large set of as-phrase sentences
that cannot be true on reading A because of the interaction between their F -instance
tense and the logical relation between their F and G-instances. Namely, the F -
instance tense of these sentences is future, and their F -instance predicate (restricted
predicate) is incompatible with their G-instance predicate (restricting predicate). I
take it that it's not possible that anything is an adult tiger and a tiger cub at the
same time.34 But it is quite possible that some a is a tiger cub at t, an adult tiger at
t′ such that t 4 t′, and that being an adult tiger at some time after t is part of a's
being a tiger cub.
33Or at least, perhaps his earlier employment by that particular institution causes his later retire-
ment, even if he has the misfortune to find no enjoyment in it.
34I'm assuming for the sake of argument here that even though the predicates adult tiger and tiger
cub are both vague, there is no ontological vagueness or paradox-of-motion type of problem to
contradict my assumption that it's not possible that anything is an adult tiger and a tiger cub
at the same time.
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Suppose that we extend a semantic theory like Szabó's to handle non-present tenses
on the sentence's F -instance. The most obvious way to accomplish this is to include
another conjunct in the sentence's (predicted) logical form, which requires that the
state corresponding to the sentence's F-instance hold at some time after the seman-
tic evaluation of the sentence. Suppose that this extended theory makes Temporal
Bounding a necessary condition for state-parthood. Such a theory predicts that 20 is
unsatisfiable. But 20 is satisfiable on its B reading. Though 20 is indeed unsatisfiable
on its A reading, it is nevertheless a failure of descriptive adequacy for a semantic
theory to predict a sentence unsatisfiable if it has a reading on which it is satisfiable.
For that reason, the class of sentences constructed after the pattern of 20 presents a
problem for the descriptive adequacy of this simple, extension of Szabó's theory.
Consider an objection to the above argument. Suppose that the semantic theory
simply assigns a state of being-an-adult-tiger-in-the-future to Louise, in its interpre-
tation of 20. This state must simply satisfy Temporal Bounding in order to be a part
of Louise's present state of being a tiger cub. But this cannot be done. There is a
dilemma. Either this present state of being-an-adult-tiger-in-the-future does not hold
of Louise any time before she is a tiger cub (indeed, since she has existed), nor does it
hold while she is a tiger cub before she becomes an adult tiger, or temporal inclusion
is weaker than Temporal Bounding. On the second horn of the dilemma, the only
weaker interpretation of temporal inclusion I know of is Temporal Overlap. But we
cannot simply lower the bar to state-parthood to Temporal Overlap for sentences like
20, alone. At least, if we do so, we had better have some compositional way to do so,
and an argument against the ad-hoc nature of the exception supported by empirical
evidence. Supposing for the sake of argument that the class of as-phrase sentences
is as semantically homogeneous as Szabó assumes it is, he cannot consistently accept
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this way of treating sentences like 20 . So we must reject the second horn. In the
first case, it's clear that if at t′, x is such that px will be an F q is true, then at every
moment t 4 u (when x finally becomes an F ), px will be an F q is also true (if not at
moments after u). It is also clear that if at t′, px will be an F q is true, then at every
moment t such that t0 4 t 4 t′, where t0 is the moment of x 's beginning, px will be
an F q is true.35 But this contradicts the first horn of the dilemma. Consequently, we
must reject the first horn of the dilemma as well. Thus it appears that this hypotheti-
cal theory based on the state of being-an-adult-tiger-in-the-future is no real objection
to my argument that Szabó's theory cannot consistently require Temporal Bounding
for state-parthood for every as-phrase sentence without generating false predictions
for some of these sentences.
Two logically stronger interpretations of temporal inclusion are, in increasing order
of strength, Temporal Filling (TF) and Temporal Coextension (TC). Temporal Fill-
ing requires that s1 is part of s2 only if for every moment t at which s1 holds, s2
holds at t., while Temporal Coextension also requires the converse, amounting to the
requirement that s1 and s2 hold at exactly the same moments. But both of these
interpretations are demonstrably incorrect, since they would make Szabó's theory
validate inferences that are clearly invalid.36 Temporal Overlap, Temporal Bound-
ing, Temporal Filling, and Temporal Coextension are the only requirements I know
of that offer suitable interpretations for Szabó's state-parthood. Yet each of these
interpretations is incorrect. Thus it appears that state-parthood cannot be stronger
35At least, there is a natural reading of these sentences on which these constraints hold. And that is
all that I need to establish that conclusion of the present argument: that the future-tense will
in English simply does not behave the way it would have to behave in order for the first horn of
this dilemma to be true.
36For a proof of these claims by natural deductions in an extension of Szabó's theory, see Appendix
A, Deduction showing that S+ predicts J valid on page 20 on page 220. I call this extension to
Szabó's theory S+ for short. S+ differs from the original theory (S) only by a few meaning-
postulates, which I introduce in order to spell out the temporal implications of the state-parthood
relation in S (formalizing TO, TB, TF, and TC, respectively).
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than temporal inclusion after all. If that appearance is not misleading, then Szabó's
theory is left without any means of validating important natural-language inferences
between as-phrases and sentences whose truth-conditions deal directly with the tem-
poral relations among eventualities. I will now turn to the specific trouble that this
conclusion causes for a semantic theory of as-phrase sentences.
This second temporal trouble for Szabó's theory emerges from the need to predict en-
tailments from as-phrase sentences to sentences containing adverbs of quantification.
Consider examples 21 and 22.
(21) John works a double shift as a janitor.
(22) Sometimes John works a double shift as a janitor.
I suppose that 21 cannot be true unless 22 is. Prima facie evidence for this relation
between 22 and 21 is a discourse like 23 below. Intuitively, the inclusion of 23e makes
23 incoherent.
(23) a. John works a double shift as a janitor.
b.  Did he work a double shift yesterday?
c.  No.
d.  But he does work a double shift sometimes, right?
e.  No; he has never worked any particular double shift. He just works a
double shift as a janitor.
This relation between 21 and 22 might be classified as a presupposition or an entail-
ment, but the relation between their respective truth-conditions remains the same.
Either account is consistent with the claim that an inference from 21 to 22 is valid.
If a semantic theory of as-phrase sentences cannot validate the inference from 21 to
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22, it is not descriptively adequate. Of course, 21 and 22 are only single instances of
sentence classes in which many if not all members share these same truth-conditional
properties. Presumably, a good semantic theory of as-phrase sentences will validate
all of these inferences or none of them. If my previous conclusion about the temporal
properties of the state-parthood relation are true, however, then Szabó's theory does
not validate any of these inferences.37
According to Szabó's theory, the logical form of 21 is 24.
(24) ∃σ[∃s[J(σ) ∧D(s) ∧ In(j, s) ∧ s ≤ σ]]
I suppose that sometimes is an adverb of quantification, but not quite in the
sense of Lewis (1975), which argues that adverbs of quantification introduce an
unselective variable-binding operator into the logical form of a sentence with free
variables.[Lew75] In the particular case of 22, we can afford to lose some of the gen-
erality in Lewis's account of such adverbs. The occurrence of sometimes in (20)
is quite specific in its function. Along the lines of de Swart's treatment of quantifi-
cational adverbs, we can just treat sometimes as an existential quantifier ranging
over moments of time the temporal analysis of quantificational adverbs that Lewis
(1975) considers and ultimately rejects.[dS93] Consider 23 again. It resembles the ex-
amples that advocates of event-based semantics for adverbs propose to support their
theories.[Par90] The underlying idea behind such theories is that various arguments to
predicates which characterize an eventuality like a running by whom? where from?
where to? starting when? can be existentially closed without giving them a deter-
minate value, so to speak. For example, whatever the fine-grained meaning of John
ran, there is at least one reading whose truth requires John to have participated in a
37At least, the theory presented in Szabó (2003) does not validate them.
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particular eventuality. That eventuality begins at a determinate time, even if John
ran carries no further information about that time, taken out of any context.
In an event-based semantic theory like Szabó's, that uses an intermediate logical
language, there must be some predicate in that language to relate the existence of
an eventuality, its subject, and the times at which that subject is involved in the
eventuality. Szabó's interpretation of his intermediate logical language solves this
problem by directly quantifying over eventualities and relating them to their subjects
using the two-place predicate In. Though it remains implicit in Szabó (2003), I
assume that his logic provides some way to deduce formulas of the form In(x, s) from
formulas of the form In(x, s′) ∧ s ≤ s′. This is necessary to implement persistent
predication, for example (see sec. 2.1).38 But that is not enough for it to validate, for
instance, the inference from 21 to 22.
Suppose that the logical form of 22 on an event-based theory like Szabó's includes
an existentially closed variable over times, t, and within the scope of that quantifier
that binds the time variable, a formula Φ. Within Φ, there must be a conjunct that
contains some predicate relating t to the eventuality corresponding to 22's restricted
predicate (works a double shift). Call this predicate Hold. Unless one of two
possibilities is the case, however, this logical form of 22 will not be deducible from
that of 21. The first possibility is that the logical form the theory predicts for 21
includes a conjunct containing Hold. In this case, it will be possible to deduce the
logical form of 22 from that of 21, other things being equal. This is not true of the
38It is not clear to me from Szabó (2003) whether In(s,x) should be glossed by the state x holds
of s at present, or s is the subject of x, or something else. Nevertheless, formulas containing
either In or ≤ must be deducible from formulas containing some predicate of eventualities
with a time argument, in some fashion. The alternative is for Szabó's theory to remain silent
on natural-language's apparent entailments between sentences like (19) and (20). For reasons
of descriptive adequacy alone, a semantic theory of as-phrases should avoid that alternative if
possible.
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theory presented in Szabó (2003), however. But it isn't necessary for the theory to
validate inferences like that from 21 to 22, in any case only sufficient. The second
possibility is that the logical language includes some axiom or rule that relates In
or ≤ to Hold, making formulas containing the second predicate deducible from
formulas containing one of the first two. In other words, this is the possibility that
the theory includes a meaning-postulate restricting the interpretation of ≤ in a
model of the language, according to that predicate's role in derivations involving In
or ≤. This is not present in the theory of Szabó (2003), either.
Moreover, it seems that any attempt to pursue the second possibility runs into the
problems I have described above. Given a subject j and two eventualities s1 and s2,
respectively, the times at which s1 holds of j and those at which s2 holds of j have to
be related in some way: bijection (TC), injection (TF), intersection (TO), etc. Yet
there are counter-examples to each of these options. The truth-conditional properties
of our everyday utterances involving as-phrases and temporal adverbs depend on tem-
poral relations or something like them. The upshot of my Objection From Temporal
Relations, then, is that a semantic theory of as-phrase sentences must include some
analog of temporal relations for the sake of its descriptive adequacy. Yet there is no
obvious (conservative) extension of Szabó's theory including such an analog that is
both sound and descriptively adequate.
2.2.3 THE OBJECTION FROM INTENSIONALITY
Consider the as-phrase sentence (23).
(25) Superman does not leap over tall buildings as Clark Kent.
(26) # Superman does not leap over tall buildings as Superman.
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(27) # Clark Kent does not leap over tall buildings as Clark Kent.
In the Superman fiction, Clark Kent and Superman co-refer to one man who leaps
over tall buildings, but sometimes refrains from doing so in particular cases. At his
place of work, this man goes by the name Clark Kent. Leaping over tall buildings
is not part of Superman's Clark Kent persona. It's in virtue of this feature of the
fiction that 25 is true. Yet 26 is false, since Superman is well known to leap over tall
buildings (in a single bound). Here, we have a true instance of the schema a F as
G, while pa F as aq is false, though we ordinarily consider Superman and Clark
Kent to refer to one and the same man. Braun (2012) offers a conventional definition
of non-extensional context: a part of a complex expression in which substitution of
co-referring expressions may change the extension of the complex expression.[Bra12]
From this definition and the different truth-values of 25 and 26, we can conclude that
the position of Clark Kent in 25 is a non-extensional context.39 Saul (1997) observes
that these Superman sentences are notable examples of non-extensional contexts,
though they lack the overt markers associated with the better known cases of non-
extensional contexts, such as propositional attitude ascriptions.[Sau97] Since 25-27 are
as-phrase sentences, some as-phrase sentences do have non-extensional contexts in
their G positions.[Ash06]40 When we turn to 27, however, we find that the Superman
fiction makes it true. Leaping over tall buildings is certainly one of the things that
Clark Kent avoids. Evidently, 25 and 25 differ in truth-conditions, as well. The
only overt difference between 25 and 27 is that in 27, Clark Kent is substituted for
Superman in a position. By Braun's definition of non-extensional context, then, 25
39Or what I will call a position, according to the schema.
40Although Asher (2006) makes a point of this fact to criticize Szabó (2003), his was not the
first published work to point out that some as phrases contain intensional contexts. Landman
(1989) was already aware of this, and his semantic theory accounts for it, contra Asher (2011).
Landman's valuable discussion of intensional contexts in as-phrases is in some respects more
nuanced than Asher's. I will return to this point in chapter 3.
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has a non-extensional context in its a position. Thus, both G and a positions are
non-extensional contexts in some as-phrase sentences.
Szabó's theory runs into trouble with a pair of sentences of the forms a (is) F as
G and a (is) not-F as H , where G and H may be identical but need not be. He
introduces the persistent predicate clause to save his theory from predicting that ap-
parently inconsistent natural-language sentences are consistent, in the case of simple
predications. His theory needs Altc to prevent the persistent predicate clause from
generating incorrect predictions in as-phrase sentences with F -instances that would
be persistent in the context of a simple predication. The purpose of both measures is
to avoid making incorrect predictions about sentences like 25. The theory's underly-
ing flaw appears to be that it individuates those aspects of a subject which as-phrases
highlight by means of the subject's spatio-temporal locations.[6] The case of the Su-
perman sentences suggests that these aspects of subjects are individuated more finely
than just the actual spatio-temporal states of the subject.
These shortcomings of Szabó's theory form a familiar pattern. Some as-phrases con-
tain non-extensional contexts. A theory that individuates the aspects of a subject
that as-phrases pick out by the space-time locations of the subject's states proves
problematic. These are two classic symptoms of intensionality.[Bea98]41 It is well
known that intensional semantic theories have been relatively successful in application
to other natural-language constructions.[Cre75, HK98][7] Naturally, we ask whether
such a theory could make the right entailment predictions for as-phrase sentences
like these Superman sentences.42 In particular, Montague (1973) proposes a canoni-
41Classic examples of each symptom: Frege's failures of substitutivity while preserving truth in
propositional attitude contexts; the non-synonymy of cordate and renate for taxonomists,
despite the fact that the predicate are co-extensive. Examples courtesy of Bealer, Intensional
Entities, (1998).
42Evidently, these sentences are examples of a much larger class: that of as-phrase sentences whose a
or G positions contain names or descriptions known to have intensional properties. The Superman
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cal treatment of non-extensional contexts which resemble those of 25 - 27 in certain
respects. Unfortunately, an off-the-shelf intensional semantic theory like Montague's
fails to make correct entailment predictions for these Superman sentences. To see
why that is, consider the arguments B and C below.
1 Superman is a leaper-over-tall-buildings
2 Clark Kent is not a leaper-over-tall-buildings
B
3 Superman 6= Clark Kent
1 The temperature is rising
2 It's not the case that ninety is rising
C
3 The temperature 6= ninety
B bears a striking resemblance to C. B is the argument that started the recent litera-
ture on as-phrases, with Saul's identification of the Superman sentences and Szabó's
paraphrase of those examples into as-phrase sentences. C is a variation on an older
argument discovered by Partee.[Mon74b]43 Her original example infers from the tem-
perature is rising and the temperature is ninety the conclusion ninety is rising. It
is puzzling because its form is apparently valid, though its conclusion is apparently
unsatisfiable.[Bro13][8] C, a variation on Partee's original, is puzzling because it has a
counter-example, though it appears to instantiate a valid inference-pattern.44 B also
seems valid in virtue of its form, although it has a counter-example.45
sentences thus support a serious objection to theories that purport to treat as-phrase sentences
strictly by extensional means.
43In Montague (1973).
44That is, the non-identity of discernibles. It's conceivable that the temperature is, in fact, ninety,
though the temperature is rising. Certainly, it's not the case that ninety is rising in any possible
scenario (provided that ninety rigidly refers to a certain number).
45The counterexample to B is that Superman is identical to Clark Kent.
45
The formal similarity of B and C suggests that we ought to account for their invalidity
in the same way. Let's try to do this. The semantic theory of Montague (1973) (PTQ)
correctly predicts C to be invalid by distinguishing between two different semantic
values for the temperature. It predicts that the two semantic values of the phrase
are related as intension is to extension. The type of intension that PTQ assigns
to the temperature is called an individual concept. For Montague, each individual
concept is the intension of some non-logical constant. His theory models this type
of intension with a function in W x De, a function from worlds to the domain of
individual entities.[9] Suppose JtKM is the individual concept that PTQ assigns to
the object-language phrase the temperature.46 Then it predicts the inference C to
be invalid, simply because J tˇKM,w1 = 90.47 That is: the extension at a given world w1
of the individual concept for the temperature, is identical to 90. The result means
that the theory predicts the conclusion of C false but predicts both of the argument's
premises true, in M . This scenario is possible only because the temperature has
two readings, each yielding a distinct semantic value. On one reading, it denotes
the extension of the individual concept of the temperature, at the world where it's
evaluated. On the other reading, it denotes an intension, a function in W x De, which
is certainly not identical to 90 in any world. Nevertheless, there are worlds at which
the extension of that individual concept is identical to ninety.
Suppose that we have a predicate in our intermediate logical language, Lotb′, to
translate the object-language phrase leaps over tall buildings.48 Suppose we also
have two non-logical constants s and k, to translate Superman and Clark Kent.
46I omit the world, time, and assignment-function parameters here because the intension of the
temperature will be the same function at every world and the other parameters are irrelevant
to the present discussion.
47In PTQ, the down operator, ˇ, shifts the semantic value of its argument to that argument's
extension at the current world.
48See intermediate logical language on page 211 for a definition.
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The datum we need to predict is that Superman leaps over tall buildings but Clark
Kent does not and Superman is Clark Kent are at least jointly satisfiable.49 If the
theory is to predict Superman is Clark Kent to be satisfiable, then there must be a
unique entity JsKM ∈ De as well as a unique entity JkKM ∈ De. But if JsKM = JkKM ,
then it cannot be the case that JLotb′(k)KM 6= JLotb′(s)KM , because we do not allow
any object x ∈ A for any set A if y /∈ A and x = y. Yet, on the assumptions made
so far, it must be that JLotb′(k)KM 6= JLotb′(s)KM if the theory is to predict that
Superman leaps over tall buildings but Clark Kent does not is satisfiable. Suppose
we assign s a different intension from k, as Montague does for his constants with
translate the temperature and ninety in C. The most we can obtain, then, is that
the extension of s or of k varies by world. That is to say, for some w1, w2 ∈ W ,J sˇKM,w1 6= J sˇKM,w2, and likewise for  kˇ at some w3, w4. For the purposes of as-
phrases, both s and k might be rigid, but certain predicates like Lotb′ need to
take different denotations at formally distinct but co-extensive arguments, like s and
k. In terms of our object language, we will need the semantic theory to do justice
to two apparent facts: that Superman and Clark Kent corefer, and that certain
predicates apply only to one of the two names.
The analogy between C and B breaks down here. Montague's translation of C licenses
the correct predictions about C because the individual concept JtKM is the sort of
thing whose extension varies by world. In some worlds, the temperature is ninety;
in others, it is sixty-four. To get the right predictions for B, however, k must
simply make JpP (k)qK = 1 for some instances of P but not others. Likewise for s.
Arguments B and C are both apparent instances of the same inference-pattern. They
are both invalid because they contain ambiguous expressions. Yet the semantics of the
49The second of this pair of sentences should be interpreted to assert that Superman = (is numeri-
cally identical to) Clark Kent.
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ambiguous expressions in B differ from those of the expressions in C. The treatment
of C in PTQ using individual concepts does not apply straightforwardly to B. This
result suggests that the type of intensionality involved in the Superman sentences
differs from that of the temperature, for example.
Asher (2011) argues that the intensional contexts in as-phrases are unlike those in
sentences containing attitude verbs like believe, either. His argument is essentially
that as-phrase complements remain referentially opaque even if the subject of a be-
lieves sentence is already savvy about the identity of Superman and Clark Kent. 28
and 29 are logically consistent.
(28) John believes that Superman bends steel bars but Clark Kent does not.
(29) John believes Superman = Clark Kent.
If it were the verb believes that created the referential opacity which makes 28
satisfiable, then by the laws of thought, as Asher puts it, 28 should not be consistent
with 29. According to Asher's semantic intuition and mine, they are consistent. So
the presence of the attitude-verb cannot be responsible for the opacity we see in 28.
2.3 LOOKING AHEAD
In order for a semantic theory to make the right predictions about the entailment
relations of sentences in B, it must include some mechanism to make JpP (x)qK vary
across instances of x with the same denotation, for special instances of P . In other
words, it must distinguish between different kinds of predication. This is a tall order
for a semantic theory that models all predication using just set-membership. The
theory will treat Superman as Superman leaps over tall buildings but Superman
as Clark Kent does not. It will not treat the reading of Superman leaps over tall
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buildings but Clark Kent does not that is synonymous with the most natural reading
of the previous sentence. Suppose we had a syntactic theory that could structurally
differentiate as-phrases, in Szabó's sense of the term, from other phrases containing
as. With such a theory, we can compositionally interpret the as-phrase. It will shift
the semantic value of the main predicate in the presence of a secondary predicate,
the as-phrase.
Asher (2011) develops a theory along these lines. It makes the desired predictions
about these Superman sentences, and others. It avoids my two major objections to
Szabó's theory as well the Objection From Temporal Relations and the Objection
From Intensionality. Chapter 3 covers the details of Asher's theory, its advantages
over Szabó's theory, and its drawbacks.
In chapter 4, I argue from syntactic and other evidence that, in fact, Asher's theory
over-generalizes. That is, it presupposes that all as-phrase sentences have the same
type of entailment profile and the same type of truth-conditions, as well as one uniform
set of syntactic properties without preliminary investigations of the larger range of
as-phrase sentences.50 I will argue in chapter 4 that there are systematic syntactic
differences within the class of English as-containing sentences. I argue, further, that
for one of the subclasses, an in situ compositional semantic treatment is possible .
Chapter 5 develops one such theory.
50While Szabó's 2003 theory yields incorrect predictions for many as-phrase sentences, his footnote
his footnote f.6, pp.409-410 on tried as an adult indicates that he is well aware of as-phrase
sentences with a markedly different type of truth-conditions and entailment profile from those his
theory treats successfully. He does not provide a typology of as-phrase sentences, or a typology
of English sentences containing as, though he also takes it to be obvious in his footnote remarks
that these two categories are not coextensive.
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3 ASHER'S THEORY
3.1 INTRODUCING ASHER'S PROGRAM AND THEORY
Asher (2011) introduces an ambitious semantic theory of natural language that takes
on many tasks. The aim of this section is to spell out just enough of Asher's semantic
theory and background assumptions to make his treatment of as-phrase sentences
comprehensible. Asher's primary goal is for his theory is to yield accurate entailment
and presupposition-predictions for sentences said to involve type coercion.[Ash11]
Asher borrows his notion of type coercion from his collaborator James Pustejovsky's
research in lexical semantics.[Pus95, Ash06]1 The field of lexical semantics is the study
of those units of meaning for which a compositional semantic theory specifies some
scheme of combination. Pustejovsky's 1995 The Generative Lexicon defines type
coercion as
a semantic operation that converts an argument to the type which is
expected by a function, where it would otherwise result in a type er-
ror.[Pus95]2
Bertrand Russell was one of the first logicians to employ types in this sense.[Rus88b]
He designed a theory of logical types in an attempt to defuse semantic paradoxes
in natural language, for instance, the Liar paradox. In the mid-twentieth century,
Montague and Lewis popularized a style of natural-language semantics based on a
hierarchy of such types, to facilitate compositional interpretation of natural-language
1Since it is Asher's theory I deal with in this chapter, not Pustejovsky's, I will not describe the
latter in any detail. In any case, Asher (2011) points out decisive technical objections to the
theory of the Generative Lexicon presented in Pustejovsky (1995) (Asher (2011), pp.22,72-87).
So Pustejovsky (1995) directly inspired Asher (2011), but is also superseded by it.
2Pustejovsky (1995), p.59.
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sentences, rather than avoid paradoxes. Heim and Kratzer (1998) embodies this style
of semantics.[HK98] A typed, compositional semantic theory in this sense uniformly
maps syntactic word-classes or phrasal categories into semantic types.[Jac02]3 The se-
mantic types of the theory are, respectively, subsets of a function-space defined over
some sets of individuals taken as primitive types.[DWP81, PTW90]4 These primitive
types might include truth-values, situations, worlds, or propositions.[Lew68, CT88,
Lan89, Kra89] The primitive types nearly always include the individual entities, that
is, whatever objects we wish the quantifiers of a first-order language to range over.[10]
A type system consists of this space of functions, of any number of arguments, con-
structed from a basic stock of entities in one or more disjoint sets, equipped with a set
of names.[Mon74a]5[11] A semantic theory can put this type system to work by recur-
sively defining rules that exhaustively determine which combinations of syntactic ob-
jects the theory assigns interpretations, and which it does not. If we have the syntactic
objects a, b, and the semantic theory assigns them the semantic types α and β respec-
tively, then the syntactic object composed of a and b receives an interpretation in the
theory just in case the theory's composition rules assign some interpretation to each
syntactic object O(α, β), where O is some syntactic operator.[Cho95, Bac79, Jac99]6
In this chapter, I'll reserve the term typeR for coarse-grained semantic types like
3The into here is deliberate, since even strong compositionality does not require a bijection
between semantic types and syntactic types. See, e.g., Jacobson (2002).
4Although in principle nothing prevents us from referring to these sets of functions directly in set-
theoretic terms, most typed semantic theories translate natural-language sentences into sentences
of an intermediate logical language (an object-language) equipped with lambda abstracts. Then
we interpret the object-language in structures that support a typed lambda calculus as well as
the first-order quantifiers.
5By functions here, I mean the many-to-one or one-to-one subset of what Montague calls
relations-in-extension in Montague (1969). Relations-in-extension are the relations of math-
ematicians, or what philosophers might call the extensions of relations. They are families of
ordered tuples like {〈a, b〉 , 〈c, d〉}.
6One possible instance of O is the Merge operator from Chomsky (1995). Another is \ (or /) from
categorial grammars, e.g., in Bach (1979) and Jacobson (1999).
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those that Russell introduced.7[12]
By defining such a typeR system, we can minimize the number of composition rules
necessary to interpret a set of sentences large enough to be interesting. Since each new
composition rule adds to the ideology of the semantic theory, in Quine's sense, we gain
some theoretical virtue by eliminating rules without harming the theory's descriptive
adequacy.[Sid12]8 This is what Klein and Sag call type-driven translation.[SK77]9
The particular flavor of type coercion (in Pustejovsky's sense) that a typeR system
facilitates is what has come to be called type-shifting. Quantificational determiners
in natural language like all and most provide grist for the mill of type-shifting
theories. With type-shifting rules, for instance, we can solve some notorious problems
with inverse scope, where a quantificational determiner-phrase appears in the position
of a direct object instead of a subject.[HK98, Jac99][13] Type-shifts like these are not
the sort of type-coercions that Pustejovsky and Asher's theories perform, however.
Their type-coercion is based on what I will call a typeY system.
TypeY systems deal with the sort of fine-grained categories that Aristotle might rec-
ognize. The type of a syntactic object in this sense of type is a category within a
taxonomy of entities that orchestrates the inheritance of properties from higher to
7The mean the R to be mnemonic for Russell, since Bertrand Russell is famous for introducing
a theory of types in roughly this first sense. See Mathematical Logic as Based on The Theory of
Types in Russell (1988). I will also use typeR for both plural and singular, because typeRs
looks and sounds a little awkward. The distinction between coarse and fine-grained types is a
rather fuzzy and practical one. Fine-grained types are those that occupy a property-inheritance
hierarchy, what computing specialists (but not philosophers) sometimes call an ontology. These
hierarchies, which Chomsky (1965)'s s(emantic)-selectional features also imply, tend to include
types like animate, representation, edible, etc.
8We gain the theoretical virtue, that is, provided that we don't add new primitive sorts of entities
to the theory's ontology in the bargain. Sider (2012) is helpful on Quine's ontology/ideology
distinction for evaluating the virtues of empirical theories. Also see descriptive adequacy on
page 209 for my definition of this term in the sense I am using it (in application to semantic
theories).
9Their term translation here just refers to the function that maps syntactic objects into sentences
of some artificial language, which then receives unambiguous interpretation. See the definition
of Intermediate Logical Language on page 211.
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lower levels of the hierarchy. Let's reserve the name typeY for these fine-grained
types.10 Gilbert Ryle wrote about category mistakes, like the most natural reading
of the sentence height is green.[Ryl00]11 These are sentences that seem infelicitous
to just about everyone. If the lexicon and composition rules assign [height] and [is
green] the proper typeR, however, then a typeR system will make its semantic theory
predict the sentence satisfiable.[Bur12]12 Pustejovsky and Asher agree that the notion
of a category error is sound, and that semantic theories of natural language should
not assign category-error sentences any interpretation.[Pus95, Ash11]
For Pustejovsky at least, the initial motivation for a semantic theory that assigns
typeY comes from a hypothesis of Chomsky's.[Pus95] Chomsky (1965) argues that
each lexical entry for an object A includes both syntactic and semantic constraints on
the range of syntactic objects with which A combines in a derivation.[Cho15, Cho95]13
Each of these features has a binary value, stored in the lexical entry. Early exam-
ples of semantic features included Count, Animate, and Human. Mass nouns are
[-Count], phrases denoting inanimate objects are [-Animate], and phrases denoting
non-human organisms would be [-Human,+Animate]. A mismatch between these se-
mantic features on the constituents of colorless green ideas sleep furiously is Chom-
sky's explanation for our uneasy reaction to that sentence, despite agreement that it
is grammatical in a narrow sense.
10I mean the Y to be mnemonic for Ryle, since Gilbert Ryle is known for his claims about
category mistakes. I will pluralize typeY just as I do typeR without changing the form, that
is.
11Ryle never wrote about height is green so far as I know. It's just an example of a category
mistake in his sense.
12Although the intended model that we competent speakers can pick out from the models that such
a semantic theory assigns this sentence on its natural reading might be nonsensical. For example,
if such a theory predicts that height is green on this reading is satisfied in any structure where
the height-property stands in an instantiation relation to some greenness- property, we should
not count this prediction in favor of the theory's descriptive adequacy! See Burgess (2012).
13These types of features are what Chomsky and many generative linguists would later call c-
selectional features and s-selectional features, respectively. See Chomsky (1995), for example.
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Apart from the true category errors, Pustejovsky and Asher agree that some clearly
felicitous sentences pose problems for a semantic theory designed to block category
errors. This shared hypothesis is more pertinent to the study of as-phrases, which
will become clear once we have the basics of Asher's semantic theory in view. The
mechanism that Asher's theory uses to predict entailments for as-phrase sentences is
typeY coercion. Asher lists simple examples of sentences that need typeY coercion.
For instance, he offers the examples 30 and 31.
(30) The lunch was delicious but took forever.
(31) The book has a purple cover and is the most intelligible introduction to cate-
gory theory
The intuition that Pustejovsky and Asher expect us to have here is that 30 and 31 are
felicitous, yet puzzling to our folk-semantics and pragmatics. The line of reasoning
is that if the lunch is a syntactic constituent of 30, then compositionality prevents
a semantic theory from assigning it two different denotations. If J"the lunch"K is an
event, then surely it can't be delicious not literally, in any case. On the other hand,
if J"the lunch"K is a concrete particular object, a meal, it cannot take forever. More
to the point, it cannot have a temporal duration at all. The point is that Lunch
was delicious and took 10 minutes should seem no less puzzling than 30, in the
relevant aspect of its meaning. We are meant to reach the odd conclusion that 30
is felicitous, but seems to contain a category mistake in Gilbert Ryle's sense.[Ash11]
The folk-linguistics proceeds like this. First, suppose that 30 is indeed felicitous, by
which I mean that in the context of use we're imagining here (call it C), it can be
used to make the obvious assertion successfully. Suppose that the predicate was
delicious triggers a presupposition that its argument is edible. Suppose further than
took forever triggers another presupposition that its argument is an event. By
54
compositionality, [the lunch] must be the argument to both of these predicates, based
on a reasonable and straightforward folk-syntactic analysis, e.g., Fig. 3.1.14
X
the lunch
but
Y
was delicious
but Z
took forever
Figure 3.1: Folk-syntactic analysis for "The lunch was delicious but took forever"
If no event is edible, and necessarily so, then we have presupposition failure for 30.
In that case, 30 is infelicitous in C, which contradicts our assumption above that it
is felicitous in C. It follows that at least one of our assumptions is false. Asher will
argue that it's our folk-semantics, since the pragmatic and syntactic picture we've
drawn up here is basically accurate. The essential innovation of his semantic theory,
as it pertains to an example like 30, is that presuppositions that the predicates was
delicious and took forever respectively introduce into the interpretation of 30 in
C jointly cause the interpretation to change routes. Instead of yielding an ILL15
translation like
∃e [Lunch′(e) ∧Delicious′(e) ∧ TookForever′(e)]
this reinterpretation of 30 outputs one like
∃x,m, e[Lunch′(x) ∧Delicious′(m) ∧ oelab(m,x)
∧ oelab(e, x) ∧ TookForever′(e)]
.
The predicate-name oelab is short for object-elaboration and one should under-
stand it to mean that the predicate's first argument is an aspect of its second argu-
14The most obvious constituency-based folk-analysis, at least. See constituency on page 208.
15See intermediate logical language on page 211.
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ment. I am simplifying Asher's logical forms quite a bit here by omitting irrelevant
detail.16 Nevertheless, I base my gloss of Asher's logical forms for 30 on Asher's own
account of the metaphysics he employs.[Ash11]
Asher's semantic theory aims to make Pustejovsky's theory of lexical decomposition
and semantic coercion logically and computationally workable.[Pus95] On the com-
putational side, Asher accomplishes this by abandoning the sketch of a unification-
based approach to semantic composition that Pustejovsky assumed.[Pus95] Asher
replaces it with a simpler and more computationally efficient account of the syntax-
semantics interface, that maps surface-constituency trees to sentences in his interme-
diate logical language, TCL.[Ash11]17
TCL is meant to be a higher-order intensional logic, equipped with a typeY system
like I described above. These types form a semi-lattice under meet-types (greatest
lower bound of two types), and join-types (least upper bound of two types), much like
the typeY system of Pustejovsky (1995).[Ash11]18 In addition to meet and join-types,
Asher's theory provides the so-called dot types, e.g., P • I, pronounced P dot I.19
The role of dot-types in Asher's system is to change the truth-conditions or presup-
positions predicted for a sentence, in a case where two different predicates sharing a
one subject would otherwise lead the theory to predict inconsistent presuppositions
for the sentence. The interpretation of 30 that we saw above is one such case.
Although TCL formulas are ultimately interpreted in set-theoretic structures like any
sentences of a logical language, Asher's type system provides a mechanism for adjust-
16I have also changed the name of Asher's predicate from o − elab to oelab, since the dash is
easy to confuse for the name of a function or relation in infix notation, which is not what I or
Asher intended here.
17Asher (2011), p.79.
18See Asher (2011), pp.103-114.
19Ibid., pp.130-137.
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ing the TCL translation process and for calculating the appropriate presuppositions.20
The most relevant piece of machinery to as-phrase interpretation in Asher's theory is
the pull-back construction in his TCL type system. Essentially, the type system for
TCL is a second semantic interpretation of TCL sentences based on category theory
rather than set theory. Its function is not to spell out satisfaction relations like the the
standard structures for the language, but to specify a range of mathematical objects
one can use to prove soundness and completeness for the type system itself. The type
system is based on a λ-calculus, and Asher exploits the fact that these systems are
known to have categorial models in closed Cartesian categories.[MM92, Gol06]21
A closed Cartesian category is basically a generalization of a universe of sets which
allows for more flexibility than sets in handling transformations between types. The
flexibility needed in this case is an operation in the type system to take the type of a
constituent back and forth from its full •-type α • β, to one of its constituent-types
α or β, as interpretation progresses. This is the role of the pull-back in TCL.[Ash11]22
A pull-back is a categorial generalization of the following set machinery. Suppose we
have sets A,B,C and the Cartesian product A × B. A pull-back with respect to
A,B,C is like a pair of functions f : A × B. −→ C, g : C −→ A × B, that take
classes of 〈a ∈ A, b ∈ B〉 pairs into members of C, and vice versa. One example of
a pull-back, again in the category Set, is any bijective function f with co-domain
C, and f−1, the inverse image of f (with domain C).[Gol06] Since not all pull-backs
20Ibid., pp.121-129.
21See Asher (2011) p.123; Lambek and D. Scott (1986). As Asher notes in this section of his book,
a CCC also provides a model for a certain fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic. It is my
understanding that this fragment corresponds to the λ-calculus in Asher's type system via the
Curry-Howard isomorphism. A category that models an intuitionistic logic is known as a topos.
See Mac Lane and Moerdijk (1992) for more information on topoi and how they link logic with
other maths like geometry and topology. Goldblatt (2006) is also an excellent source on these
topics. Fortunately for us non-mathematicians, the details of a CCC are not very relevant to
understanding how Asher's theory treats as-phrase sentences, or so it appears to me.
22Asher (2011), pp.152-153.
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are pairs of functions on sets in the models for TCL, however, we should not draw
hasty conclusions from these objects about the metaphysical commitments of Asher's
theory, as he rightly cautions. Nothing in the set-theoretic models of TCL corre-
sponds directly to pull-backs. They exist to help the theory handle both aspects of a
constituent of •-type during semantic composition without losing information.
For the present purpose, only a few features of Asher's semantic program are salient.
One, he uses it to predict the entailments of as-phrase sentences in Asher (2011)
and in Asher (2006).[Ash06, Ash11] Two, the account of as-phrase sentences is only a
small part of his work, and the program does not stand or fall with the success of that
account. Third, a theory of aspects lies at the heart of Asher's semantics for as-phrase
sentences. To map his theory's definition of satisfaction to genuine truth-conditions,
we have to write T-sentences that refer to aspects, and the relations that they bear
to non-aspect particulars. Namely, some relation that can fit into the role carved out
by a theoretical definition of Asher's oelab predicate.[Lep81, Ash11]
In summary, Asher (2011) defends a semantic theory of broad empirical reach, in-
tended to cover several diverse classes of sentences whose semantic treatment can
benefit from his object / aspect distinction. Sentences like 30 and 31, examples of
what Asher calls copredication, are just one such class. Another is the class of as-
phrase sentences. Let's come back to the as-phrase sentence 5 and see what denotation
the semantic theory in Asher (2011) assigns to it.
(5) John is corrupt as a judge.
(32) John is not corrupt as a politician.
J5K ∃m [oelab(m, j) ∧ Judge′(m) ∧ Corrupt′(m)]
J32K ∃m [oelab(m, j) ∧ Politician′(m) ∧ ¬Corrupt′(m)]
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The figure below represents, in its relevant details, the sort of structure that satisfies
the as-phrase sentences with two contradictory main predicates under two differ-
ent qualifying predicates, on Asher's theory.[Ash11]23 Saul's Superman sentences are
those examples that motivated my Objection from Intensionality in chapter 2. In
Tab. 3.1, rectangles stand for aspects. A rectangle completely contained within an-
other represents an aspect that bears the relation corresponding to J” ≤ ”K to the
rectangle it contains. The black dot labeled x represents a thin particular. An ar-
row leading from a rectangle to a dot stands for the relation corresponding to JoelabK,
which an aspect bears to its unique thin particular. For example, the structure rep-
resented in the diagram below models the sentences 1-6.
c ≥ b ≥ a 1
a′ ≥ b′ 2
a′ ≥ c′ 3
¬ (b′ ≥ c′ ∨ c′ ≥ b′) 4
oelab(a′, x) 5
oelab(a, x) 6
Table 3.1: Sentences typical of a Superman example and diagram of a partial model
The point of Tab. 3.1 is to show exactly how Asher's semantic theory blocks instances
of the Non-Identity of Discernibles argument pattern I discussed in sec. 2.1. In its
bare essentials, Asher's objection to what he calls the extensional theories of as-
phrase sentences, Landman (1989), Szabó (2003), Jäger (2003), is that their theories
fail to block invalid instances of the Non-Identity of Discernibles.24 They fail to do
so because they each endorse a Persistence Principle for properties over eventualities,
23I have adapted these FOL sentences from the TCL sentence on p.205 in Asher (2011), removing
all of the extra parts in support of the typeY system that become irrelevant once the semantic
derivation is complete.
24It is not clear to me why Asher groups Landman's with the extensional theories of as-phrase
sentences. Landman (1989) contains a very clear and explicit discussion of the graded degrees of
intensionality within the class of as-phrase sentences. The theory also includes properties among
its primitives, an intensional object par excellence.
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and they all hold that each state (i.e., an eventuality) that an individual is in at
some time, is a part of that individual. This mereological claim gets formalized in the
axiom that a single partial order holds over all states of the individual. That is, for
all states s, s′ ∈ S where a is in s and a is in s′, s ≤ s′ ∨ s′ ≤ s, where ≤ is a partial
ordering on S. The Persistence Principle is an axiom-schema like the following: for
any states s ≤ s′, if P (s) then P (s′).
Asher's semantic theory uses the relation that models oelab to set up an indefinite
number of parallel chains of parthood, which I have been calling aspects.[Ash11]25
In the table above, the right-hand diagram shows that a′ − c′ form one parthood-
chain, while a − c form another, parallel one. Since parthood-relations do not link
the a − c chain to a′ − c′ , the theory neutralize the threat of contradiction, even
when as-phrase sentences predicate contradictory predicates of one subject (x in the
diagram).
3.2 CRITICISM
My objections to Asher's 2011 theory fall into two categories. The first might aptly be
called is it worth it? arguments. Suppose Asher's theory needs an assumption p to
meet the reasonable empirical goal, but another theory T meets the same goal without
assuming p. If one would rather not assume p, for reasons independent of its role in
Asher's theory, then is it really worth it to assume p? The is it worth it? arguments
include my objections to Asher's metaphysics of aspects in sec. 3.2.1, his solution to
the Objection from Intensionality in (see chapter 2), his theory's use of Quantifier
Raising in sec. 3.2.3, and his recourse to some controversial metaphysics in sec. 3.2.6.
My second category of criticism involve empirical shortcomings of Asher's theory.
25Asher (2011), p.208.
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This includes his syntactic analysis of as-phrase sentences (sec. 3.2.2), and some as-
phrase sentences that his theory erroneously predicts to be unsatisfiable (sec. 3.2.5).
These objections are not all of equal weight, and none are fatal to his theory. None of
them are completely trivial, either. My point in this section is not to prove Asher's
theory is untenable. Rather, I argue that it is worthwhile to consider a simpler
approach to the semantics of as-phrase sentences.
3.2.1 REIFYING ASPECTS
While ontological commitments to abstracta should never be the only factor in judging
theories, Asher's theory is committed to another type of abstractum that mainstream
semantic theories do not require. His theory is committed to aspects. There is a
small philosophical body of literature that invokes aspects more straightforwardly, to
explain how the simple substitution-failure sentences of Saul (1997) can be made
true.[Sau97, For97, For99, Moo99] Aspect-talk does provide reasonable if awkward
paraphrases for some as-phrase sentences. Consider examples 33a-37c.
(33) a. John is corrupt as a judge.
b. John is corrupt in his judging aspect.
c. ?? John's judging aspect is corrupt.
(34) a. Linda saw the function as a graph.
b. Linda saw the function in its graph aspect.
c. ?? Linda saw the function's graph aspect.
(35) a. Superman bends steel bars as Superman.
b. Superman bends steel bars in his Superman aspect.
c. ?? Superman's Superman aspect bends steel bars.
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(36) a. Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent.
b. ?? Jimmy hit Superman in his Clark Kent aspect.
c. ?? Jimmy hit Superman's Clark Kent aspect.
(37) a. Paul used the book as a paddle.
b. ?? Paul used the book in its paddle aspect.
c. ?? Paul used the books' paddle aspect.
Jennifer Saul objects to these theories in Saul (2007), citing many of the same rea-
sons why Russell's early theory of propositions comes in for criticism.[Sau07, Rus88a,
Soa12a]26[14] It's not clear how we can count aspects or how we can have knowledge
about them at all. Further, how are aspects related to the particulars they are aspects
of ? Naturally, by a sui generis relation, like the relation between universals and their
instances. Nevertheless, the relation is not identical to particulars' instantiation of
universals, which only compounds the mystery: what relation should we say that
JoelabK is?
In contrast to Asher, the theory I will defend in chapter 5 is only committed to one
exotic kind of abstract entity: the situation. In terms of situations, one can define
both eventualities in Emmon Bach and Terence Parsons' sense, and worlds in David
Lewis's sense.[Bac86b, Par90, Kra14, Lew68]27 Asher's semantic theory is commit-
ted to eventualities, worlds, and aspects.[Ash11]28 Asher claims that the aspects of
26See Russell (1988), Logic and Knowledge, for Russell's early theory of propositions (prior to his
multiple relations theory of judgment).
27See sec. 5.3 in chapter 5 for a full explanation of how to derive eventualities and worlds from
Kratzer's situations. See eventuality on page 210 for a more concise definition of eventuality
in its technical sense.
28The semantic theory on display in Asher (2011) is committed to worlds because it is a higher-
order intensional logic if we are to believe that David Lewis's arguments against all forms of
modal non-realism are sound (Lewis (1986)). It is committed to aspects because the logical forms
it assigns to as-phrase sentences (among others) involve first-order quantification over entities
that are stand in
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his theory are just what Kratzer (1989) calls thick particulars.[Ash11] I argue in
sec. 3.2.6 below that this interpretation is untenable. Aspects might be similar to
Kratzer's thick particulars, but they cannot be those same entities.
One could argue that the key to descriptive adequacy in Asher's theory is that it
predicts 5 and 32 consistent through the prediction that both sentences are true in a
case where John's judge-aspect has the property of corruption though his politician-
aspect lacks it. On this interpretation of Asher's theory, it doesn't predict in this
truth-case that John per se has a property of corruption at all. This is a tenuous sort
of objection, of course, because Asher's is a model theory for as-phrase sentences,
not a direct truth-theory in the style of Ludwig and Lepore (2007).[LL07] As Burgess
(2012) reminds us, model theories for artificial languages do not all provide us with
a manual for extracting some intended interpretation of the language's sentences,
but only place certain set-theoretic constraints on the range of these interpretations.
Nevertheless, Asher confronts the problem of his intended model, and it conforms to
my interpretation here. Section sec. 3.2.6 discusses some of the metaphysical questions
that this interpretation raises.
Apart from the usual objections to the central use of abstracta to explain sentence-
meaning, there is an objection to Asher's theory in the service of Quine's metaphys-
ical agenda. Quine's work on the semantics of dispositional sentences like Sarah
smokes when nervous is supposed to remove any ontological commitment to disposi-
tions in our talk, by giving extensionally-correct truth-conditions for any dispositional
sentence.[Was11] That is to say, Quine tries to show that dispositions are dispensable
entities. Our scientific theories do not commit us to the existence of dispositions
because all apparent references to dispositions can be logically paraphrased into sen-
tences that do not quantify over dispositions. For Quine, this makes dispositions
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dispensable. A Quine-minded philosopher, Q.M., might concede to Asher that we
talk about aspects in our colloquial paraphrases of as-phrase sentences. She would
agree with Asher that counting aspects is sort of like counting sakes.[Ash11] From
Q.M.'s point of view, the concerns with individuation, counting, identity and epis-
temic access to aspects that this expression raises do not provide the best objection to
Asher, though. If we had another descriptively adequate semantic theory of as-phrase
sentences, Q.M. reasons, one that didn't quantify over aspects, then we would know
that aspects are dispensable. This supersedes an aspect-based theory like Asher's,
according to Q.M.
3.2.2 AS-PHRASE CONSTITUENT STRUCTURES
Asher's chapter on as-phrase sentences in Asher (2011) draws no distinction between
two different syntactic types of as-phrase sentence. In chapter 4, I will introduce
the Type A / Type B Hypothesis: that there are at least two syntactically different
types within the class of as-phrase sentences. In that chapter, I will argue on the
basis of that hypothesis that Asher's theory does not distinguish the two. Indeed, the
conflation affects the descriptive adequacy of his theory, and leads to a more complex,
controversial intended model than would otherwise be necessary. In sec. 3.2.5 below,
I show by counter-examples that, Although Asher intends his theory to treat all as-
phrase sentences, it only generates correct predictions for one of the two syntactic
types of as-phrase sentence. The adequacy of the theory I will defend in chapter 5
shows that aspects are not necessary to achieve the same descriptive adequacy as
Asher's theory. Thus Asher's lack of distinction between the two types also leads him
to reify aspects, which I explained in sec. 3.2.1 above.
Although my detailed syntactic arguments for the hypothesis of two different struc-
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CP
DP
Q(xi)
IP
PP
as DP
φ
IP
DP
< xi >
I'
VP
< Q >
Figure 3.2: Syntactic structure for all as-phrase sentences in Asher (2011)
tures within the class of as-phrase sentences must wait until chapter 4, I will sketch in
this section the distinction I intend to draw. I will also show exactly why Asher's syn-
tactic analysis of as-phrase sentences does not capture this distinction. Asher (2011)
uses the schema φ as ψ χ to identify as-phrase sentences.[Ash11]29 The syntactic
analysis that he proposes for all such sentences is Fig. 3.2.
The empirical support for Asher's analysis comes from his conclusion that the as-
phrase is can move freely within the sentence, and from his analogy between com-
parative constructions and as-phrases, citing the analysis of comparatives in Kennedy
(1997). 30 The basic syntactic role of the as-phrase is an adjunct to an inflection-
phrase (IP) in Asher's proposal.31 I am uncertain why Asher infers that the as-phrase
adjoins to IP from his conclusion that it is freely movable. Studies of left-dislocation
and fronting, for example, caution that the overt position of the moved constituent
29Asher (2011), p.192. His exact statement is I'll be concerned with sentences of the form φ as ψχ,
where χ is a predicate on an argument introduced by φ.
30See Asher (2011), p.205 I am not sure why Asher claims that the as appearing in an as-phrase is
a preposition, though Szabó (2003) also labels the as-phrase this way. It must be a preposition,
in his analysis, because as is the head of a PP (the DP labeled φ is its complement). I will
argue against this categorization in chapter 4 and defend an alternative phrasal category for this
as.
31See adjunct on page 207 and X-bar theory on page 214 for definitions of these terms.
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need not reflect its dominance relations within the constituent structure.[Coh04]
Asher does not present sufficient evidence to the contrary, but doesn't spell out his
argument that the as-phrase adjoins as high as IP, either. In light of the distributional
arguments in Szabó (2003) that the as-phrase adjoins lower (VP), and that it appears
to share semantic properties with other VP-adjunct modifiers like depictive secondary
predicates, the burden of proof would seem to be on Asher here.[HSB06, Sza03]
What is more pertinent, however, is that Asher gives several examples of as-phrase
sentences in his chapter in Asher (2011) that have a different basic constituent-
structure from the one diagrammed in Fig. 3.2. In his Chapter 7 on as-phrases, Asher
gives the examples 38, 39 and 40.
(38) Chris hit Superman as Clark Kent, but he never hit Superman as Clark Kent.
(39) Lois slept with Superman as Clark Kent before she slept with Clark Kent as
Clark Kent.
(40) John gave the book as a present to Mary.
None of these sentences' as-phrase is an adjunct. For one, none of their as-phrases can
freely move throughout the sentence (respecting constituent boundaries of course),
as Asher claims that as-phrases can. Although the correlation is not absolute, syn-
tactic complements, defined in strictly structural terms, usually contain arguments
to predicates that c-command them, and adjuncts usually do not.[KSS14]. Each of
the as-phrases in 38-40 however, forms a constituent with a nominal argument to the
sentence's main predicate (a transitive verb in these cases). I would not place much
weight on these apparent problems with Asher's syntactic analysis if Asher (2011)
did not emphasize, against Szabó (2003), that examples like 38-40 contain opaque
contexts. He presents these examples in his critique of Szabó's extensional theory of
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as-phrase sentences. It appears, however, that neither Szabó nor Asher's syntactic
and semantic analyses of as-phrase sentences are equipped to predict accurate seman-
tic properties for all those examples with the structure of 38-40. Having made this
case against Szabó's theory on page 22, I argue on page 69 below that Asher's theory
does not handle all of these as-phrase sentences correctly, either.
3.2.3 WHY RAISE?
Asher's semantic theory of as-phrase sentences requires two constituents to move in
order to take scope over the entire clause that contains them. Specifically, the sentence
subject in the specifier of the lower IP (”xi in Tab. 3.1), and the main predicate in
complement to the lower IP (Q in Tab. 3.1), must both raise and restructure to
form and the LF term Q(xi), which lands in the specifier of a CP adjoined to
the higher IP in the structure. His semantic theory therefore depends on a level of
LF, a syntactic representation that fully disambiguates semantic scope-relations that
remain ambiguous at Spell-Out.[Adg03, Jac02]32
This is certainly the case if we allow covert movement in the syntax and don't allow
type-shifting or continuization in the semantics and composition rules, two means
of interpreting the structure in situ.[Jac99, Bar02, BS14] Whatever kind of operator
forms the core of the sentence's denotation on Asher's view, it needs information
from the main predicate and from the qualifying predicate. Under a variable-based
semantic theory in Jacobson's sense, one that allows free variables in the lexical
entries, this requires both predicates to be within the as-operator's syntactic binding
domain.[Car13, KSS14] A necessary condition for an object b to be inside an object
a's binding domain is that a symmetrically c-commands b. The as operator c-
32This use of LF puts Asher's theory in Pauline Jacobson's group C of compositional semantic
theories, the weakest sort of compositionality she discusses there.
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commands both predicate phrases only if it dominates both of them and appears to
the left of both of them or they dominate it and appear to its left in the tree diagram.33
Thus one of the two must raise from Spell-Out position: either the as-operator, or
its arguments. But on Minimalist assumptions about movement, Quantifier Raising
is the only movement of its type that is not feature-driven, and is not heard in the
output of PF.[BC10] According to Bianchi and Chesi (2010), Quantifier Raising and
wh-movement, which moves phrases to form questions in English, are the only two
cases of non-head movement recognized in recent syntax research. Head movements
and wh-movement are both heard at PF however, unlike Quantifier Raising.
I do not know of any strictly syntactic motivation for quantifier raising in the case
of Asher's theory. That motivation, as Chomsky (1995) notes, would have to be a
c-selectional feature, given the copy theory of movement via internal Merge.[Cho95]
Because it is not feature-driven or heard at PF, Quantifier Raising is notoriously
difficult to defend on Minimalist assumption even in the standard case where it
moves an obviously quantificational DP.[BC10] Asher offers no principled account
of why Quantifier Raising applies to the specifier of the lower IP in an as-phrase
sentence, or the I' of the lower IP. His theory has this first constituent contribute
a variable over individuals to the sentence's LF, and it has the second constituent
contribute a first-order predicate to LF. Neither of these constituents contributes an
operator at LF, which is what Quantifier Raising is supposed to affect. An adjunct
PP in his analysis, the as-phrase shares neither a lexical category nor a c-selectional
feature nor a structural position with the quantification DPs like many, all and
some that motivated the theory of Quantifier Raising.
33Assuming an asymmetric definition of c-command. See c-command  on on page 207 for the
definition I have in mind here.
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3.2.4 A SIMPLER WAY TO HANDLE OPACITY
In its essential features, Asher's explanation of the referential opacity in Superman
sentences is not unique in the philosophical literature. In the wake of J. Saul (2007),
the philosophers Forbes and Moore both proposed aspect-based semantic accounts
of Saul's simple substitution-failures, of much narrower scope than Asher's [For99,
Moo99] Still, all of these semantic theories forgo any integration with mainstream
semantic accounts of opaque contexts, based on a silent modal operator or quantifier
over possibilia.[Elb13, Dum73, Dum78a] If my account of opaque contexts in Type
A sentences in on page 133 is correct , then these can be explained without reifying
aspects as Asher, Forbes and Moore do. Once we recognize that as phrase sentence
is a disjunctive folk category, and treat Type A separately from Type B, the main
motivation for Asher's reification of aspects drops out, and we can predict the relevant
Type A readings without recourse to aspects.
3.2.5 PROBLEMS WITH DESCRIPTIVE ADEQUACY
Asher's theory is not descriptively adequate for all as-phrase sentences, though he
expresses none of Szabó's reservations that logical forms vary among instances of the
as-phrase schema. In fact, his theory predicts incorrect entailments for one of the
sentences he uses to motivate his theory of as-phrases. Asher notes that his theory
validates all of Landman's axiom-schemata except perhaps for 1.[Ash11] Putting aside
axiom-schema 1 for now, recall schema 5 from Landman (1989):
5. if a as G is F , then a is G.
Everyone agrees that there are as-phrase sentences with main predicates that are
not copular constructions, so presumably we can delete is from 5 without con-
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troversy. And Asher argues that the as-phrase is freely movable in all as-phrase
sentences.[Ash11] In that case, every instance of Landman's schema 5 should be inter-
substitutable salva veritate with 5'.
5'. if a F as G, then a is G.
Let's grant that Asher's theory validates 5'. Then the theory predicts that 42 entails
43.
(41) Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent but he never hit Superman as Superman.
(42) Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent.
(43) Jimmy is Clark Kent.
(44) Lawrence interpreted the sentence as a rhetorical question.
(45) # Lawrence is a rhetorical question.
I explained above in Asher's theory is designed to avoid predicting a sentence is
satisfiable if it contains a category-mistake must predict many sentences unsatisfiable
e.g., Tyler saw the paper as a proof of the decidability of invalidity for any arbitrary
formula of first-order logic. Asher's theory fails because there is no witness to proof
of the decidability of invalidity... in any world. Since Asher requires consistency
within the individual aspects (partially-ordered a la Szabo's states), if not consistency
among aspects (a la Szabó), his theory will crash on these sentences. The problem
here is not that any theory of as phrase sentences should cover both Type A and
Type B. Indeed, I argue to the contrary in chapter 4 and chapter 5. Rather, the
problem is that support for Type B sentences would have to be a major motivation for
accepting the added complexity, metaphysical commitments, and lack of integration
with mainstream semantic frameworks. If his theory is not descriptively adequate for
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Type B sentences, then this motivation is much weaker, and Asher's semantic theory
of as-phrase sentences is under-powered for its price.
3.2.6 CONTROVERSIAL METAPHYSICS AND A CONFUSION
By the design of his theory and by his own admission, Asher's semantic theory requires
us to endorse some controversial metaphysics, at least for the intended models of many
TCL sentences. His endorsement of Kratzer's use of thick particulars in Kratzer
(1989) is also in tension with the rest of the metaphysics involved in his intended
model of •-type instances.
3.2.6.1 TCL QUANTIFIER DOMAIN, •-TYPE INSTANCES AND
RELATIVE IDENTITY
Any consistent •-type might have instances, as Asher notes.[Ash11]34 What are these
instances? They are not typeY but particulars. They must therefore be part of the
models of some TCL sentences. Asher calls these models external, because they are
composed of sets containing things, while he uses internal models of TCL sentences,
in support of the TCL typeY system. 35 Asher (2011) considers and rejects three
candidates for the role of a •-type instance, before settling on what he calls the
relational model.36
34Whether a given •-type has an instance depends on the structure in which we evaluate some TCL
sentence containing a term that takes that typeY, of course. See structure on page 213 for a
definition.
35Ibid., p.156. The internal models, serving the type system of TCL, are the closed Cartesian
categories I referred to in sec. 3.1. The salient difference here between the internal and external
models of TCL is that the external models are structures in the traditional sense of the term,
i.e., objects in the category Set. The internal models, those used to prove properties of the
type system, are not composed of sets. They are set-like objects, with inclusion, some analog
to the empty set, and analogs of cartesian products, but they are not all individuated by their
extensions alone as sets are. See Asher (2011) and Goldblatt (2006) on the differences between
these two categories.
36Ibid., p.149.
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The first candidate is an instance of a meet type, a greatest lower bound of two types
in the lattice of Asher's typeY system. The most sensible way to define such a meet
type is to take the intersection of the sets of necessary properties that each constituent
type prescribes for its instances. The meet type's fatal flaw for Asher is that TCL
terms of •-type appear to need all of the essential properties of one of their constituent
types in one context, and all of those of their other type in other contexts. We can see
this distinctly by applying the meet-type idea to my example 30 above in on page 50.
Suppose the typeY of the lunch is HUMAN_EDIBLE in one context and EVENTUALITY
in the other. The took forever context will require the essential property of running
time from the EVENTUALITY typeY, but that essential property of eventualities is not
shared by all (or any) things edible by humans. So if HUMAN_EDIBLE • EVENTUALITY
is the meet HUMAN_EDIBLE ∧ EVENTUALITY (in this sense) of the two types, the TCL
translation of 30 will surely result in incorrect semantic predictions. Namely, the
theory will predict that 30 is unsatisfiable, because the typeY system cannot justify
applying the TCL predicate that translates took forever to a term whose semantic
value is of type HUMAN_EDIBLE ∧ EVENTUALITY. Also, since the TCL system of types
forms only a semi-lattice, for some types α, b, a greatest lower bound (meet-type)
a ∧ β might not exist.37
Asher's second candidate for •-type instances is the pair object. These are just
ordered pairs 〈a, b〉, where a is an instance of typeY α and b is an instance of typeY
β. As Asher rightly points out, sets cannot be delicious (not to imply that they're
disgusting!), nor can they have a running time. Moreover, the sensible principle of
identity for these objects is the extensional one we use for all ordered pairs: 〈a, b〉 =
〈c, d〉 just in case a = c and b = d.[End77] Assuming that we count these objects using
37The TCL type hierarchy, that is, forms a join-semilattice (every two elements have a least upper
bound) but not a meet-semilattice (every two elements have a greatest lower bound).
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identity, Asher's theory would yield incorrect counts for groups of •-type instances.
On to the parthood interpretation, Asher's last not so good candidate for a •-
type-instance model-structure. The parthood interpretation of a •-type instance is
just the partially-ordered parthood relation over states that Asher criticizes in Szabó
and Jäger, with aspects standing in for states. Since this interpretation assumes
the Persistence Principle and interprets the ≤ predicate as a parthood relation (i.e.,
parts of the individual who has those aspects), the parthood interpretation cannot
do the job Asher requires without contradiction, for reasons we have seen throughout
chapter 2 and the earlier sections of this chapter.
Asher's official structure to model •-type instances is the relational model.[Ash11]38
This is the one represented in Tab. 3.1. The individual stands in special relations to its
aspects. One individual might have several≤-maximal aspects, unlike in the parthood
interpretation. Even the relational interpretation has some drawbacks. Suppose that
Asher has a fixed, denumerably infinite set of aspects, A, and a set of thin particulars
T . Suppose, with Asher, that each thick particular has a unique thin particular y ∈ T
and a unique set of aspects S ⊆ A. Suppose that in fact, every thick particular we
can construct from A and T exists and is a member of K. Then we have a bijection
f : ℘(A) −→ K. We also have some function g : K −→ T onto T . But then
K is non-denumerably infinite. Since g maps K onto T, it must be that T is non-
denumerably infinite. So if every possible thick particular exists, as Asher strongly
suggests, then the cardinality of the domain of these thick particulars is that of the
real numbers.[Ash11]39
To avoid the problems inherent in each of these not so good candidate structures,
and concerns over the enormous cardinality that TCL seems to require for its quan-
38Asher (2011), pp.143-156.
39See Asher (2011), p.160.
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tifier domain, Asher reaches the surprising conclusion that the domain varies. The
cardinality of the quantifier domain will vary with the criterion of individuation that
applies to the types of objects in a model of a given sentence.
This surprising result helps to move Asher to accept the doctrine of relative identity
in his intended models for some sets of TCL sentences. Relative identity is a highly
contested metaphysical view because it challenges the necessity of identity, a princi-
ple that is almost a truism.[Ash11] Relative identity is the claim that there are some
things x and y such that x = y but not necessarily so. The hedge is usually that x,
described with some predicate F , is such that x = y, but for x described with a dif-
ferent predicate G, x 6= y. One might object that, if his semantic theory presupposes
relative identity, Asher could forgo the entire theory and aspects as well. Why not
skip the semantic theory, and argue that argument B is invalid because identity is
description-dependent for objects like Superman? (recall sec. 2.1).
1 Superman is a leaper-over-tall-buildings
2 Clark Kent is not a leaper-over-tall-buildings
B
3 Superman 6= Clark Kent
Asher might reply that this explains the invalidity of B and all similar arguments, but
it fails to predict that the schemata of Landman (1989) are all valid, which his theory
does. So do Landman, Jäger and Szabó's semantic theories of as-phrase sentences,
however. If Asher's explanation for the unusual sort of intensionality found in some
as-phrase sentences is essentially relative identity, then it would be more economical
to integrate relative identity into a simpler semantic theory like those of the other
three theorists than to keep all of the machinery involved in Asher's theory.
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3.2.6.2 THIN PARTICULARS
The implementation of dot-types in TCL depends on thin or bare particulars [Ash11].
He arrives at this sort of structure for modeling dot-types by elimination, after crit-
icizing two other models (the pair model, and the mereological model). The meta-
physics of thin particulars is also controversial. The view that thin particulars exist
is met with wide-spread doubt in contemporary philosophy, as their advocate Sider
agrees.[Sid06]40
My objection to Asher here is not based on the fact that some structures for TCL
contain thin particulars as Sider describes them. Rather, my objection grants Asher
the assumption that all models of TCL contain thin particulars.41 I will not argue
that thin particulars could not exist, or do not exist. As Sider convincingly argues,
many of these contra arguments are either weak or based on a verbal confusion.[Sid06]
Rather, my objection to Asher on this subject is that it's unlikely that a true semantic
theory of even a part of natural language should be ontologically committed to thin
particulars. This follows from a stronger claim: the various projects to deduce an
underlying ontology or metaphysics, in Sider's sense, from semantic theories of
natural language, are subject to serious objections. The idea of likelihood that I have
in mind here is subjective, and relates to claims (truth-apt things), and of course,
subjects (minds). It is the kind of likelihood according to which a claim not-p is more
likely than p for S if S knows of more good arguments against p than good arguments
for p. The claim p that I have in mind is that some true semantic theory of natural
language entails the existence of thin particulars.
For me, and for anyone sharing my limited semantic knowledge, p is less likely than
40David Liebesman, pc. See Sider (2006) for a defense of thin particulars (which he calls bare
particulars).
41See the definition of structure (and indirectly, model) on 5.6.
75
not-p in this case. This is so for two sorts of reasons. One of these consists in the fact
that I know of more good arguments against p than for p. There are simply more
semantic theories likely to be true that do not entail the existence of thin particulars.
The other sort of reason for the likelihood of not-p is more general. I know of fewer
good arguments that some semantic theory of natural language entails the existence
of any object x, for any x of metaphysical interest, than the good arguments against
that entailment.[Bur12, Bro09, Bac86b, Wal10, Lud99, CT88] Good pro arguments
here include Chierchia and Turner (1988) concerning properties, and maybe Ludlow
(1999) concerning the structure of time. In contrast, Burgess (2012), Brown (2009),
Bach (1986), and Wallace (2010) present good contra arguments.
Neither I nor Asher have ruled out the possibility that there are models of TCL that
don't contain the sort of thin particulars that concern Asher.42 If such models exist,
then my point in this section is moot, since it offers no objection against Asher's
semantic theory. Since I know of no such models, and Asher (2011) considers his
relational model the standard or canonical one, I propose that its resort to thin
particulars should count against Asher's theory.
3.2.6.3 ASHER'S THIN PARTICULARS
Independent of the dispute over thin particulars, Asher (2011) claims that the indi-
viduals that TCL quantifiers range over are thick particulars, in the sense of Kratzer
(1989), which he cites in this context. There seems to be some confusion in this view,
however. Kratzer's thick particulars consist of a thin particular and a mereological
hierarchy of situations which that thin particular is involved in.[Kra89] A thin par-
ticular, in this sense, plays the metaphysical role of a substance, clothed in different
42See the next section, sec. 3.2.6.3 for more on the nature of these thin particulars that Asher takes
his theory to entail the existence of.
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situations, each of which is the bearer of some cluster of properties. In the 1989 paper
of Kratzer's that Asher cites in his discussion of models for •-type instances, she holds
that propositions and properties are upward persistent with respect to the situation
parthood-relation. Further, Kratzer's situation theory is a conservative extension of
Lewis's counterpart theory, so the theory is incompatible with trans-world individuals
of any kind.[Lew68, Lew86a] Each thin particular has a unique maximal situation,
the world it is part of, on Kratzer's situation theory.[Kra14]
The point at issue is Asher's claim that aspects are thick particulars, in Kratzer's
sense. Now, the entire point of an aspect-based theory, for the purposes of as-phrase
semantics, is that one thin particular can be related by oelab to several different
aspects a, b where P (a) but ¬P (b). One and the same man leaps over tall buildings
in his Superman-aspect but lacks this property in his Clark Kent-aspect. Kratzer
endorses Persistence, however, and her set of situations is closed under arbitrary
mereological sums.[vF95]43 For any two situations a, b, a+b = a ≤ d ≥ b. Suppose a, b
are world-mates. It immediately follows by Persistence and by my earlier assumption
that P (d) and ¬P (d). Neither Asher nor Kratzer wants to reject the Principle of
Non-Contradiction in even one instance (and there will be far more than one instance
of this kind). The only consistent way that a, b could be distinct thick particulars
of one thin particular, c, is for a and b to exist in different worlds. The worlds, for
Kratzer, are just the unique ≤-maximal situations. So properties cannot persist from
one world to another. Suppose that a is in one world, b in another. Then one of
the two must not have c for its thin particular. The oelab relation is what makes c
the thin particular of an aspect, however. No aspect can bear the oelab relation
to more than one thin particular. So a, b cannot both be aspects of one particular,
43Von Fintel (1995), clarifying Kratzer (1989), makes this assumption about the mereology of situ-
ations explicit.
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e.g., Superman. That being the case, they fail to do the work that Asher's account
of Superman sentences requires. Again we hit a contradiction.
I can see several ways out of this inconsistency. One option is for Asher simply to
reject the Persistence principle for his aspects. Without Persistence, though, the
partial orders over aspects do not make up much of a mereology. We have objects
composed of incompatible parts. Asher could also deny that aspects are closed under
merological sums like Kratzerian situations are, which entails giving up the claim
that aspects are thick particulars (since thick particulars are Kratzerian situations).
In summary, Asher's most promising options for avoiding the inconsistent account of
aspects I described above are to reject Persistence, or to reject arbitrary mereological
sums over aspects. Both of those principles, however, are central to the notion of
thick particular that Kratzer and fellow-travelers of situation semantics assume. Thus
Asher's notion of an aspect ends up sharing little in common with Kratzer's notion
of a thick particular, when we compare the two concepts.
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4 AS-PHRASE SENTENCES AND THEIR TYPOLOGY
4.1 THE CONCEPT OF AN APS
4.1.1 A NEW PROBLEM
There is a troubling problem with our understanding of as-phrase sentences.1 It is true
that we lack a single, empirically adequate semantic theory of as-phrase sentences, as
I have argued in chapter 1 through chapter 3. Yet the troubling problem is more basic
than this. Two observations will suffice to point out this problem. The literature I
have reviewed contains no clear and universally accepted criteria for identifying an
as-phrase sentence.2 Yet the use of this term, as-phrase sentence, defines this small
literature, starting with Landman's and ending with Asher's work on the subject.
It defines the literature in the sense that the term is nowhere to be found in other
syntax and semantics publications originating from the field of linguistics, or from
that of philosophy.3 Even those few other works of linguistics that deal with APS
do not use the term, as-phrase sentence, to refer to them.[Nap89, Bow93, Lev93,
Bak95, Bow01, den06, Roy13]4
This state of affairs demands attention. On the one hand, no agreed-upon criteria
exist for a sentence to be an APS in the syntax and semantics literature. On the
1Pete Alrenga and Juliet Floyd first pointed out this problem to me in December, 2013. I am
grateful for their careful reading and criticism.
2In this chapter and those that follow, I will often use APS instead of as-phrase sentence, for
the sake of brevity.
3I certainly don't want to suggest that as-phrase sentences themselves are nowhere to be found
in philosophy publications. Rather, the term that has come to refer to them in this semantics
literature appears to be uncommon if not absent in other philosophy or linguistics publications.
4A recent exception to this trend is Schein (2017), 'And': Conjunction Reduction Redux, which
engages with much of the as-phrase literature, including Landman (1989), Szabó (2003), and
Saul (1997), (2007). As-phrase semantics is peripheral to Schein's concerns in this work, though.
He endorses the account of their truth-conditions given in Forbes (1997), (1999).
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other, the term as-phrase unexpectedly lacks currency in precisely those same fields
of research that one would expect to deal with APS. Jointly, these two facts naturally
suggests the question: does the concept of APS (whatever it is) track any important
property of sentences? From a syntactic, semantic or philosophical point of view, is
there any good reason to take APS for a subject of study? Or is the APS just a
disjunctive kind in a pejorative sense, arbitrarily combining better-motivated kinds?
This question has theoretical stakes. If this second possible answer to the question
is true, then as semanticists, we ought to take a different approach to the concept.
Chiefly, we should stop trying to support theoretically substantial generalizations
about APS per se. For the same reason that chemists avoid the assumption that
fool's gold is a type of gold, semanticists ought to avoid the term as-phrase unless
they specify the intended class of sentences. Instead of searching for empirical gener-
alizations about all APS, we ought to devote our attention to the different types of
constructions found within the class of APS. Or so I will argue.
In summary, I have asked a series of questions.
1. How have the semanticists who study APS indicated the class of sentences that
concerned them? (sec. 4.1.2)
2. Is there a clear and consistent account of the concept of APS to be found in the
literature that uses this term? (sec. 4.1.2)
3. If not, why should semanticists want one? (sec. 4.1.3)
4. What is an APS? That is to ask: which account of APS is accurate? (sec. 4.1.4)
The remainder of this section supports particular answers to each of these questions
1-4. In support of my answer to 4, I will test my account of the concept of APS against
relatively pre-theoretic intuitions about which sentences are APS and which are not.
I will show that the particular extension of the concept of APS that follows from my
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account includes all examples of APS that the theorists in the as-phrase literature have
cited. It also excludes those that theorists have explicitly excluded from the domains
of their theories. Further, it excludes those sentences that some of these theorists
have implicitly excluded.5 I will consider a range of English constructions containing
as that theorists have explicitly or implicitly excluded. For each construction, I will
show that my account of the concept of APS excludes it, too.
I also asked whether the kind APS is disjunctive in a pejorative sense. I claimed that
if it is, then semanticists ought to stop studying it, unless they specify which APS they
mean. sec. 4.2 of this chapter elaborates what I mean by disjunctive in a pejorative
sense. It defends my conditional claim about what semanticists should work on,
drawing on a recent proposal in the philosophy of natural-language semantics. It
argues, on the basis of my account of the concept of APS, that the kind, as-phrase,
is not disjunctive in this pejorative sense (though APS is). I support this claim
with evidence from the distribution of as-phrases in different examples of APS. I
draw further support for this claim from recent work on the nature of predication in
natural language, at the interface between syntax and semantics.
However, I argue that the kind, as-phrase sentence, is pejoratively disjunctive in this
same sense. Therefore if my account is correct, then we semanticists should always
speak of as-phrase sentences of one sub-type or other, in our statements of empirical
generalizations, for example. Finally, I identify two such syntactically defined sub-
types of APS, which I call Type A and Type B. I offer strictly syntactic definitions
of simple Type A sentence and simple Type B sentence, which give these terms
disjoint extensions. I then argue, from distributional evidence alone, that there are
5Some of these theorists (Szabó, Asher) define the empirical domain of their theories using schemata
over natural-language sentences. In their cited examples, however, certain classes of sentences
that are substitution-instances of the schema are conspicuously absent. I call these class of
sentences implicitly excluded from the domains of their theories.
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some simple Type A sentences, and some simple Type B sentences. Finally, I argue
that Type A and Type B exhaust the class of simple APS. Each simple APS is either
Type A or Type B.
So far, I have said nothing about the meanings of simple Type A and of simple Type
B APS. This is quite intentional. It turns out, as I will argue in chapter 5, that all
Simple Type A sentences share a single, core semantic type. It is less clear whether
all Type B sentences share a semantic type. Further, some Simple Type B sentences
have semantic properties that no Simple Type A sentence has.6 Jointly, these claims
amount to a semantic typology of APS.7 These are risky, empirical claims which
could have been falsified by distributional evidence or entailment evidence. As I will
argue in this chapter, an unclear distinction between one's account of the concept of
APS and one's empirical hypotheses about APS syntax or semantics can obscure the
difference between such risky claims and those that just follow from some intuitive
account of APS.
Moreover, this one-to-one mapping from the syntactic types of APS to their semantic
types does one more thing for us. It provides the necessary methodological justifica-
tion for a compositional theory of Type A APS to exclude Type B sentences from its
domain. This justification itself represents an advance over earlier theories of APS
for at least two reasons.
1. It allows us to exclude Type B sentences from the domain of the theory on
principle. This is important because no existing semantic theory of APS makes
correct predictions for every Type B sentence.8 Yet none of the theorists who
6I will explain more thoroughly what I mean by semantic type in chapter 5.
7That is, they determine a function from the set of syntactic types of simple APS to the set of
semantic types of simple APS. The rest of the set of APS is then generated by the closure of (Type
A ∪ Type B) under a certain small set of syntactic transformations (functions from sentences to
sentences).
8It will become clear that this is the case in the course of this chapter, given my definition of simple
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propose them adequately explain why that is, or offer any principled reason to
exclude them from the domain of a semantic theory of APS.
2. We can use this justification to define the domain of our semantic theory over
syntactic structures rather than sentences. Notoriously, many sentences of nat-
ural languages are ambiguous. However, assuming even a weak principle of
compositionality, the input to semantic interpretation must be an unambigu-
ous structure.[Kra95, CMG00][15] For this reason, no adequate, compositional
semantic theory defines its domain over sentences themselves.
The only other empirically adequate, compositional semantic theory of simple Type
A APS is that of Asher (2011). As I argue in chapter 3, however, there is room for
improvement on his theory, both in his syntactic analysis of the sentences and in
the technical means he employs to predict their entailments. Therefore, the theory
I will develop in chapter 5 is the first compositional semantic theory of APS that is
consistent with independently-motivated syntactic theory. In sec. 4.2, I will specify
exactly which syntactic theory I have in mind.
4.1.2 HOW PREVIOUS AS-PHRASE THEORISTS HAVE SPECIFIED
THEIR DOMAIN OF INTEREST
As I detailed in sec. 1.1, Landman (1989) defines the domain of his theory of as-
phrase sentences, using the schema a as F G.[Lan89] He essentially stipulates that
he only intends his theory to treat sentences in which the as-phrase is part of a
nominal phrase. He calls sentences containing these nominal phrases term-oriented
as-phrase sentences. What these sentences have in common with other, so-called
predicate-oriented sentences, he leaves an open question. He stipulates a syntactic
Type B sentence, and the objections to prior theories of APS that I raised in chapter 1 through
chapter 3.
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structure for the sentences his theory is intended to treat, but considers them as-
phrase sentences. But is that claim supposed to be true by definition, or a contingent
empirical generalization? Are there any term-oriented APS in Landman's sense, in
fact? Or did he not intend his syntactic analysis to agree with empirically-motivated
syntactic theory? One could argue that Landman's paper was too early and prelimi-
nary a theory of APS to expect perfect clarity on these issues, which have only become
evident in hindsight. Similar problems persist in later APS literature, however.
Szabó uses a schema of the form a F as G to specify the domain of his theory,
which he explicitly takes to be that of as-phrase sentences.[Sza03] There are several
problems with this definition. One problem is that the definition includes many
sentences which, intuitively, involve none of the semantic features of interest in an
APS. For instance, Laurel groaned as the large dog broke its leash.9 Many of
these non-APS instances of the schema also lack the syntactic properties that Szabó
proposes for the APS his theory is supposed to treat (see sec. 4.1.4). Szabó argues
that the basic structural schema of the sentences his theory is supposed to treat is
[DP [I [VP [asDP]PP]VP]I']IP. In this schema, each bold-printed element which spells
out the name of a phrasal category X, or its maximal projection XP, is a variable
ranging over only the phrases or constituents of the category whose name it spells out.
The as-phrase is a PP that adjoins to VP, according to this analysis. The previous
example's constituent structure is not an instance of this schema, because regardless
of its position in the structure, [the large dog broke its leash] is a full clause, not a
PP.
Another problem with Szabó's definition is that it includes sentences that, accord-
ing to him, have a very different logical form from those he intends his theory to
9In sec. 4.1.4, I consider this and a number of other types of English sentences containing as that
are intuitively not APS.
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treat.[Sza03] In a footnote, he considers an example based on tried as an adult, e.g.,
the court tried the sixteen year-old as an adult. This sentence indeed has a different
semantic type from those sentences he intends his theory to treat. It does not have
the syntax that Szabó's structural schema prescribes, either.[KSS14]10
Asher (2011) uses the schema a as F G. It turns out, for purely syntactic reasons
I will explain in sec. 4.2, that this schema does not include every APS among its
substitution-instances. It does, however, include all those whose syntactic structure
is close to that which Asher proposes for all instances of his schema.11 This alone
is an improvement upon Szabó's schema, which has instances with entirely different
structures from the one he proposes for all of those instances. It suggests an insight
into the systematic relationship between structure and meaning within the class of
APS, which I will develop in sec. 4.2.
Since Asher explicitly restricts his attention, and the domain of his theory, to in-
stances of his schema, however, what could be problematic about his approach? One
problem is that among his examples of the kind of sentences his theory treats, he in-
cludes three that fall outside his schema, and indeed outside the class of sentences his
theory seems designed to handle. These sentences do not have the constituent struc-
ture that he proposes, nor does his semantic theory handle them correctly. Asher's
inclusion of this sentence is apparently not an isolated oversight, either. Asher (2011)
displays two other examples of sentences that the theory is supposed to treat, though
their syntactic structure is not the one Asher proposes, and the semantic theory
10Specifically, the as-phrase in this example is not adjoined to the verbal projection or any higher
constituent. Rather, it appears to be part of a complement to the main verb. I will argue for this
claim in sec. 4.2.1, where I will consider in more detail the structural position of the as-phrase in
different APS.
11Asher (2011) claims that in all APS, or at least all substitution-instances of his schema, the as-
phrase is an adjunct to VP at surface structure, though it raises into a CP above the main
clause's maximal projection.
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yields the wrong predictions for them. Asher's 2011 theory is essentially a technical
improvement of his 2006 theory of APS.[Ash06, Ash11] The theories do not differ in
the empirical domain of sentences they are intended to treat. Asher (2006) opens
with 46.[Ash06] It is repeated in Asher (2011). There we also find 39 and 40, which
I pointed out in passing in chapter 3.
(46) Jimmy hit Clark Kent but he never hit Superman.
(39) Lois slept with Superman as Clark Kent before she slept with Clark Kent as
Clark Kent.
(40) John gave the book as a present to Mary.
Asher paraphrases this sentence with the example of present interest, Jimmy hit
Superman as Clark Kent but he never hit Superman as Superman. Consider a
simpler sentence, which is, however, identical to 46 in the relevant respect, 47.12
(47) Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent.
As I will argue in sec. 4.2 below, 47 is neither an instance of Asher's schema, a as F
G, nor a paraphrase of any instance of his schema. For example, consider 48 which
results from moving the as-phrase as Clark Kent into the necessary position for
Asher's schema to comprehend the sentence.
(48) Jimmy as Superman hit Clark Kent.
48 has no available reading on which it's synonymous with the most natural reading
of 47. A further modification of 48, 49, shows that this is the case.
12We obtain this second sentence simply by dropping the clause after but, which amounts to simple
conjunction at logical form. One could support my point here on the basis of either conjoined
clause. Therefore, nothing is lost for my purposes here by considering the simpler sentence rather
than Asher's original.
86
(49) # The car as Superman hit Clark Kent.
Notice that 49 results from moving as Superman between the subject and the main
predicate of The car hit Superman as Clark Kent. This sentence with as Superman
moved to post-verbal position has an obvious truth-condition the case in which a car
hit a Superman expressing his Clark Kent persona. 49, however, has no obvious truth-
condition. In any case, it does not have the truth-condition that the car hit Superman
as Clark Kent does, which is enough to establish that they are not synonymous.
Further, 47 and 48 are non-synonymous for the same reason: their truth-conditions
differ. Asher, however, explicitly claims that as-phrases in all sentences that his theory
treats are freely movable.[Ash11] What it means to call a constituent c of a sentence
s freely movable is that any movement of c within that doesn't place it inside another
constituent results in a grammatically acceptable sentence of substantially the same
meaning (at least, of identical truth-conditions). The above 47 - 49, however, show
that as Superman is not freely movable, by that definition. Thus several of Asher's
prime examples of sentences his theory is supposed to treat are neither instances of his
schema, nor paraphrases of instances of his schema. They also lack a distributional
property, free movability of the as-phrase, that Asher ascribes to all sentences that
his theory is supposed to treat.
As I will argue in sec. 4.2, there is a simple syntactic reason why these examples
of Asher's lack the distributional properties he ascribes to them. The as-phrases in
these examples are complements to the verb hit at surface structure. They are not
adjuncts at all. As I will argue in chapter 5, these sentences also systematically differ
in meaning with those that Asher presumably intends his theory to treat.
One explanation for the presence of these stray examples in Asher's work is that he
considers them APS. If they aren't substitution-instances of his schema, however, and
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his theory is intended only to treat its instances, then it is beside the point whether
they are APS or not. This is a point of tension in Asher's work. If his theory is
indeed intended to treat all APS, or even some subclass of APS non-identical to the
comprehension of his schema, then his schema is a less than satisfactory definition of
the domain of his theory.
Finally, Jäger (2003) explicitly cites examples similar to 47 alongside examples that
Szabó intends his theory to treat. Sentences like 47 are syntactically dissimilar to the
VP-adjunct sentences Szabó highlights, as I have argued. Jäger attempts to give both
classes of sentences the same type of semantic interpretation. This incurs problems
I have already described in sec. 1.1. For example, many instances of a sees x as
F have readings on which it is not possible that px is F q is true, though Jäger's
semantic theory assumes px as F q to denote a possible situation. Sentences like
Szabó's examples uniformly lack these readings.13 Jäger's examples include sentences
of intuitively diverse types, given these differences in the truth-conditions of their
respective available readings. Which of the sentences Jäger intends his theory to
treat are the true APS? Whichever they are, why treat the rest with the same theory,
especially since it predicts that some sentences in its domain are unsatisfiable when
they clearly are satisfiable (on the same reading)? This all remains somewhat unclear
in Jäger (2003).
4.1.3 WHY WE NEED AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPT OF APS
The lack of a clear, shared account of the concept of APS could have a number of
foreseeable consequences in any complex discussion comparing semantic theories of
APS.
13I will provide additional evidence for this last claim in chapter 5.
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1. It could allow ad-hoc dismissals of data. Suppose a theorist A, whose theory
can't deal with example s, says to theorist B, whose theory can deal with s: but
s isn't an as-phrase sentence! My theory only deals with as-phrase sentences.
2. It could allow ad-hoc inclusions of data. Suppose a theorist A has a theory that
deals with sentences intuitively like s, and sentences intuitively like s′, where s
and s′ are not the same type of sentence by theorist B's intuition.
3. A strictly intuitive conception of APS could hide equivocations on as-phrase
or as-phrase sentence. It could also makes conflation of the following more
likely:
a) the concept of APS (as it's used in the literature or among linguists and
philosophers),
b) an account of the concept of APS,
c) a theoretical term or concept defined by stipulation, or
d) an empirical generalization about APS.
But it's always bad method to slur any pair of these together, unless you and
your audience know that you are doing it and why.
These are no mere hypotheticals, either. These foreseeable consequences 1-3 are
precisely those at play in the problems that sec. 4.1.2 describes.
Purely intuitive conceptions of the concept of APS are inherently fuzzy: they offer
no clear objective criteria for being an APS. Attempts to define the class of sentences
of interest by enumerating examples suffer from the same disadvantage. Yet the
problems Section 4.1.2 describes suggest that clear, objective criteria for being an
APS would at least improve the dialectical situation for future theorists working with
the as-phrase literature. We can't hope to eliminate completely the fuzziness of the
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concept of APS. It is a folk concept, not a theoretical concept. If it were a theoretical
concept, it would either have to be defined within one theory of APS or other. But
one major motivation for using an intuitive concept of APS is to allow theorists to
evaluate how successful these theories respectively are, precisely in the predictions
they make about APS.
If we cannot eliminate the fuzziness of the concept, but we cannot do without it, then
perhaps we can somewhat sharpen our account of the concept. Perhaps we could
do so in such a way that we can better arbitrate disputes among APS theorists on
the empirical facts about APS. If we can analyze this concept into simpler but more
familiar folk concepts, we could meet both of these desiderata. Such an analysis would
sharpen our understanding of APS, because native speakers have a better intuitive
grip on what predicates are than they have on the question: what is an as-phrase
sentence? Bowers (2001), in his review of syntactic theories of predication, confronts
a similar problem with the notion of a predicate.[Bow01] He proposes a broadly
Fregean account of the concept (as opposed to an empirical theory of predicates) that
seems hard to improve very much. A predicate, according to Bowers, is the syntactic
realization of an unsaturated semantic object like a function.
Semanticists encountering the APS literature for the first time, and even those work-
ing within it, can benefit from a clearer account of the concept of APS in two ways,
at least:
1. by avoiding merely verbal disputes over APS in future research
2. by obtaining the basis for a pretty compelling explanation of why this literature
has developed in the way it did.
The next section, 4.1.4, proposes and evaluates an analysis of the concept of APS
along these lines.
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4.1.4 WHAT IS AN APS? AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPT
A preliminary definition in support of the desired analysis is (SAPSo).
(SAPSo) s is a simple APS iffdef s is an English sentence and s
contains two predicates, one of which is realized by a
non-clausal syntactic constituent whose head is such
that in s, phonological rules require it to be written or
pronounced as.
14
The term simple APS is new. It is not yet clear why I have not analyzed the concept
of APS straight away. Without yet explaining the distinction between simple APS
and APS that I have in mind: all simple APS are APS, but not all APS are simple
APS.15 We can now proceed to the analysis of the concept of (APS).
(APS) s is an APS iffdef s is a simple APS or s is an acceptable
transformation of some simple APS or s embeds some
simple APS.
By acceptable transformation here, I mean one that results in another grammatically
acceptable sentence, or the pair of an acceptable question and acceptable reply. I
assume that this list of acceptable transformations will be tightly constrained by
a broadly Minimalist syntactic theory. An acceptable transformation moves only
whole constituents and deletes only whole constituents. An acceptable transformation
also inserts no syntactic objects unless there is some theoretical motivation for that
14I named this analysis (SAPSo) to evoke Simple as-phrase Sentence, overt, for reasons that I will
explain more fully in sec. 4.2 (but I sketch them in this section).
15This is an important distinction for me, because I'll only claim to offer a compositional semantic
theory of simple APS (and only one sub-type at that). A compositional theory of APS in
general (even just Type A) would require a lot of work integrating existing semantic theories with
mine, which I just won't do. E.g., : APS embedded in constructions that take complementizers
(indirect discourse). I will, however, deal with the semantics of some classes of non-simple APS
in chapter 5 namely, APS that result from adding tense or modal morphosyntax to simple APS.
Mainly because I complained in Chapters 1 and 2 about Szabó's and Jäger's theory not being
able to deal with these. So my theory needs to deal with them.
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insertion. These theoretical motivations include the need to check selectional features
of the original sentence's constituents, and the need to satisfy last-resort principles,
that save a derivation from crashing (e.g., do-support in 50 below). They include
the need to check selectional features of the original sentence's constituents. They
also include the need to check selectional features of items that the transformation
inserts, like modal and auxiliary verbs (e.g., 52, 53 below). Thus the acceptable
transformations also include passivization and wh-question formation (e.g., 50, 51).
The following sentences 50 - 54 are examples of non-simple APS, according to the
definition (APS) above. Examples 50 - 53 all result from an acceptable transformation
of some simple APS, while 54 embeds a simple APS.
(50) What did John win the race as?  A representative of his church.
(51) John as a judge is obeyed by the jurors.
(52) John would be vigilant as a security guard.
(53) John will be mistreated as an employee of IniTech.
(54) Alice wonders if John is corrupt as a judge.
I want to reply to a serious objection, involving the concept of a predicate, on which
(APS) relies. One might object that either (APS) is not a genuine account of the
APS concept, or it simply substitutes one mystery for another. Let's look at the first
horn of this dilemma. If my analysis (APS) successfully demystifies the concept of
APS, then it is not the account of the APS concept that I have advocated. For if it
does successfully demystify that concept, then it presupposes a particular empirical
theory of predication. But if it presupposes such a theory of predication, then it is not
an account of the APS concept in the sense ofsec. 4.1.3. In any case, if the analysis
presupposes such a theory, then it does not do what I argued that a conceptual
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analysis of the APS concept should do for us (sec. 4.1.3).
Now consider the second horn of the dilemma. (APS), below, purports to analyze the
concept of an APS. But (APS) involves the technical concept of simple APS, which
(SAPSo) defines. In (SAPSo), we find a reference to predicates. It is notoriously
difficult to analyze the concept of a natural-language predicate. (APS) succeeds only
if it offers us a precise understanding of the APS concept. We cannot understand
the analysis (APS) without understanding (SAPSo). But to understand (SAPSo),
we must understand precisely what a predicate is. But we have no such precise
understanding of that concept. Therefore, (APS) buys us only an illusory gain in
clarity.
This is a false dilemma, however, because neither disjunct is true. Indeed, (APS)
would not be a genuine account of the APS concept if it presupposed an empiri-
cal theory of natural-language predication. It presupposes no such theory, though.
By predicate in (SAPSo) above, I mean nothing more than the standard Fregean
idea of a natural-language expression that denotes an unsaturated entity, like a
function.[Bow01]16 The second disjunct only appears true because of an ambiguity
in the conditional statements leading up to it. Certainly, (APS) would be guilty
of substituting one mystery for another if it made our understanding of the APS
concept no more precise than it was before. Suppose (APS) falls short of making
our understanding of the APS concept perfectly precise, because of difficulties in our
account of natural-language predication. It is quite consistent with this supposition
that (APS) still makes our understanding more precise than it was without (APS).
But (APS) does accomplish that, at least. For example, for many concepts, a more
precise account of them makes the existence of difficult edge-cases more obvious. If
16Bowers' introduction to his review article, Predication (2001), proposes just this account of the
concept of natural-language predication, as I noted in sec. 4.1.3 above.
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these edge-cases turn out to be counter-examples to the account, then this increased
precision often leads us to a more accurate account of the concept.
Let's consider one such difficult edge-case of an APS. This case does amount to
a counter-example to (APS). A sentence is a counter-example to (APS) if (APS)
excludes it, but the concept of as-phrase sentence makes it an as-phrase sentence.17
One clear counter-example to (APS) is 55. (APS) relies on (SAPSo), which specifies
that as must appear in the sentence. (SAPSo) requires, that is, that the string as
actually be a substring of the sentence. There is no token of as in 55, but the loose
concept of APS found in the literature does make 55 an as-phrase sentence. For these
reasons, 55 is a clear counter-example to (APS).
(55) John, the judge, is corrupt.
We have a couple of options at this point. We can reject the claim that the loose
concept of APS found in the literature makes 55 an APS. Alternatively, we can
revise (APS) or (SAPSo) to include 55, and any sentence like 55 in the relevant
way. Intuitively, sentences like 55 are good paraphrases of uncontroversial APS, and
systematically so. A good semantic theory of APS ought to handle these sentences,
too.18
The obvious difference between a sentence like 55 and the APS considered in the
literature is that 55 does not contain as. Some property makes 55 an APS, but
17Here, by the concept of as-phrase sentence, I mean the concept of as-phrase sentence found in the
literature running from Landman (1989) to Asher (2011). I consider this literature in chapter 1
through chapter 3. sec. 4.1.2 and sec. 4.1.3 argue that such a concept does in fact motivate the
semantic theories in this literature. It also provides the criteria for testing the empirical adequacy
of these theories, as I argue in these previous sections.
18Note that the theory presented in Asher (2011) cannot handle sentences like (8). On this theory,
as simply denotes a certain function, according to the lexical entry for this word. If as is not
a substring of the sentence s, then Asher's theory will not assign that function to any constituent
of s.
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it's not the property of containing as. To make (APS) include all sentences like 55,
we need to add a requirement that a sentence s contain some element with a certain
property P, such that all APS contain a similar element with P. Suppose there is a
covert as in 55, and in all sentences like 55 in the relevant way. Suppose, that is,
that a functional head intervenes between is corrupt and the judge in the structure
of 55. This functional head is realized by the string as in some APS. In other APS,
like 55, the head is phonologically null, and is not a substring of written instances
of the sentence. With this hypothesis in hand, we can now revise the definition of
simple APS, to accommodate sentences like 55.
(SAPSco) s is a simple APS iffdef s is an English sentence that
contains more than one predicate, one of which, p, is
realized by a non-clausal syntactic constituent whose
head, h, is such that there exists some class of contexts
in which interface rules would require h to be written or
pronounced as.
19
It turns out that there are strong considerations in favor of a hypothesis like this one,
apart from its convenience for my purposes. I will return to this covert as hypothesis
in sec. 4.2 and offer independent empirical support for it.
Since (APS) is an analysis of a concept, not just a stipulated definition, it remains to
be shown that (APS) is a good analysis of that concept. The necessary evidence for or
against (APS) consists of just two sets of sentences: those that are APS according to
the loose concept of APS from the literature, and those that are non-APS according
to that concept. English dialects offer plentiful examples in each of these sets. First,
19Similarly, I named this one (SAPSco) to evoke Simple as-phrase Sentence, covert. By interface
rules, here, I mean the rules that supposedly map syntactic representations (S-structures) at
the A-P interface to writing and pronunciation instructions, according to Minimalist theories of
writing and speech-production. See Chomsky (1995) on the details of such theories.[Cho95]
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I will consider a series of examples (and their sentence-types) that clearly are non-
APS. For each type of sentence that these sentences exemplify, I will explain why
(SAPSco) above entails that no example of that type is a simple APS. Second, I will
look at a number of sentences that clearly are simple APS, according to the concept
found in the literature. I will argue, likewise, that (SAPSco) entails that each of these
sentences is a simple APS.
COMPARATIVES
(56) A wink is as good as a nod.
There is a class of sentences like 56 above, each member of which contains as. If any
sentence in this class is an APS, then it is an APS in virtue of an actual as-phrase
that it contains, as in 57.
(57) Clark Kent flies as fast as a plane as Superman.
But it is not controversial that 57 is an APS. My revised (APS) above entails that 56 is
an APS only if it is a simple APS, or an acceptable transformation of a simple APS, or
it embeds a simple APS. (SAPSco) entails that 56 is a simple APS only if 56 contains
two predicates. But 56 contains only one predicate: is as good as a nod. Thus (APS)
entails that 56 is not a simple APS. Since 56 is not an acceptable transformation of a
simple APS, and 56 does not embed a simple APS, (APS) correctly entails that 56 is
not an APS. One can run this argument for any sentence of the same syntactic type
as 56. Therefore, (APS) correctly entails that no sentence of the same syntactic type
as 56 is an APS.
TEMPORAL ADVERBIALS
(58) As the car pulled into the driveway, the cat escaped.
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Unlike 56 above 58 does contain two predicates: pulled into the driveway and es-
caped. Each of these predicates, however, is a constituents of an independent clause:
the cat escaped and the car pulled into the driveway. Adger (2003) argues that
in sentences like 58, one of the clauses is best analyzed as a CP adjunct to the main
clause.[Adg03]20 (APS) correctly entails that 58 is not an APS specifically because
there is no context in which A-P interface rules would require either of its predicates'
heads to be written or pronounced as. There is no acceptable English sentence,
for example, containing the string as pulled into the driveway, where that string is
actually a predicate on the relevant reading. This argument also generalizes to all
sentences like 58. That is, it generalizes to every sentence in which a CP adjunct to
the main clause acts as a modifier to the main clause.
SYNONYMS FOR LIKE OR HOW
(59) John woke at 7:00am as he does every day.
(60) John acted as a judge should.
In 59 and 60, as is a synonym for the like in John woke at 7:00am like he does
every day and John acted like a judge should. Neither as a judge should nor
as he does every day are predicates. If they were predicates, then they could be
made the main predicate of a sentence. This can be done in one of two ways. For
some predicates, it can be done simply by appending them to some expression that
is saturated in the Fregean sense, e.g, John. For other predicates, it can be done
by joining them to some saturated expression with a copular construction. Neither
John a judge should nor John is a judge should are acceptable or meaningful,
though. Thus, neither as a judge should nor as he does every day are predicates.
20See Adger (2003), pp.327-328.
97
Assuming that the head of these two expressions is, in fact, as, it follows from (APS)
that neither 59 nor 60 is an APS. This argument generalizes to all sentences similar
to 59 and 60 in the relevant respect. That is, it generalize to all sentences in which
as is synonymous with like or how.
SYNONYMS FOR WH- WHICH
(61) Danny grew up poor, as you know.
(62) Danny grew up poor, which you know.
(63) You know that Danny grew up poor.
As is a synonym for which in 61. 61 is synonymous with 62, which features
a relative clause introduced by which. Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014)
consider the overt form of a sentence like 61 to be the result of wh-movement.[KSS14]21
They propose that there's a trace of the raised clausal constituent, [Danny grew up
poor], under [know] in the tree. The complement to this as is nothing that can
be interpreted as a predicate, though its S-structure appears not to be that of a full
clause, either. Since as you know derives by movement from a clause dominating
another clause, i.e., 63, its selectional features have been checked already before S-
structure. Thus the overt form of 61 is not a reliable guide to the syntactic derivation
of its supposed as-phrase, as you know.
SYNONYMS FOR SINCE OR BECAUSE
(64) Lewis is absent, as he worked until 4:00am this morning.
Adjunct CP's have two common types of interpretation, according to Adger (2003):
temporal modifier and indicator of a causal or explanatory relation.[Adg03]22 58 above
21Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014), p.418.
22Adger (2003), p.327.
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is an example of a temporal modifier CP adjunct, and 64 is a case of an indicator of
explanatory relation between the two clauses in the sentence. Since the syntax of 64
and 58 are so similar, despite their different meanings, the argument under above 58
suffices to explain why (APS) correctly predicts that no sentence like 64 is an APS.
4.2 TYPOLOGY OF APS
4.2.1 THE TYPE A / TYPE B HYPOTHESIS
sec. 4.1.2 reviewed Szabó and Asher's respective proposals for the syntax of APS.
Each theorist argues that there is some particular constituent structure that every
APS has. I argue in that section, however, that Szabó would like to exclude from the
domain of his theory some sentences that are substitution-instances of his as-phrase
schema. Szabó explicitly claims that one such excluded sentence has a different logical
form from the sentences he expects his theory to treat. Szabó's example is Johnny
is prosecuted as an adult.[Sza03]23 I have simplified his example to yield 65 below,
in order to exclude irrelevant complexity.24
(65) The D.A. prosecuted Johnny as an adult.
(66) Who prosecuted Johnny?  * The D.A. did as an adult.
(67) * The D.A. did so as an adult.
Consider 66. The reply only sounds acceptable if we insert a pause between did
and as, or insert a dash or comma there in the written sentence. The fact that
66's reply requires a pause or comma to sound acceptable suggests that its structural
representation differs from that of its original sentence, when a speaker uses the pause
23Szabó (2003), f.6.
24Namely, the passive voice in the original example.
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or inserts the comma. But if that is the case, then the acceptability of the reply under
that pronunciation (but not the pause-free one) is no evidence for the hypothesis that
we are testing: that the as-phrase in 65 is adjoined to VP. [KSS14] If the reply
sounds unacceptable, on the other hand, then this judgment provides some evidence
against the hypothesis that 65's as-phrase is adjoined to the VP. Szabó claims that
all as-phrases do occupy this structural position.
We can also substitute an appropriate form of do so for some substring of a sentence
to test the hypothesis that that substring forms a whole VP.25 If as an adult were
a VP-adjunct in 65, then it would be sister to another whole VP, and its sister could
only be the constituent formed by prosecuted Johnny. Do so-substitution for
prosecuted Johnny in 65 yields the unacceptable 67. Moving the as-phrase in 65
past V also yields unacceptable sentences,68 and 69. If as an adult were adjoined
to VP in 65, 68 would be acceptable. If as an adult were adjoined to VP or higher
in (18), then 69 would be acceptable. While 68 and 69 both have readings on which
they are acceptable, those readings are not logically equivalent to the natural reading
of 65 we have been working with. Namely, the readings necessary to make 68 and
69 acceptable make the D.A. the subject of as an adult, rather than Johnny.
Thus rightward movement of the as-phrase in 65 doesn't actually yield acceptable
sentences.
(68) * The D.A. as an adult prosecuted Johnny.
(69) * As an adult the D.A. prosecuted Johnny.
Generally, a negative result from just one diagnostic test does not constitute evidence
for the denial of the hypothesis tested. Jointly, however, these three negative results
25See Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014), p.61. To avoid false negatives with this test, one
must insert a form of do so with tense and number appropriate to the context.
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constitute evidence that as an adult is not adjoined to VP, or adjoined to any higher
constituent, in (18). Yet the sentence is a substitution-instance of Szabó's as-phrase
schema, a F as G. 65 is indeed an APS, according to (APS) above. Furthermore,
the as-phrase adjoins to the VP in the structural schema that Szabó proposes for all
APS. On those assumptions, these results in 66 - 69 suggest that Szabó's example is
evidence against his hypothesis that all APS constituent-structures are instances of
his structural schema.
Asher (2006) and Asher (2011) also prominently display an example, (2), whose
constituent structure is unlikely to be consistent with the structure he hypothesizes
for all APS.[Ash06, Ash11]26
(70) Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent.
Asher, unlike Szabó, does not point out any difference of syntactic or semantic type
between this example and the sentences that have the constituent structure he hy-
pothesizes. Nevertheless, the syntactic type of 70 does differ from the one Asher
hypothesizes for all APS. According to (APS), my account of the concept of APS in
sec. 4.1.4 above, both 70 and 65 are APS.27 They both contain two predicates. In both
sentences, one of these predicates is headed by some object that is realized by as,
according to interface rules that determine how a speaker pronounces or writes either
sentence. Suppose that the class of APS includes both these two sentences, and the
more straightforward examples that Asher and Szabó treat.28 They are, according to
my analysis (APS) above. Taken in conjunction, these assumptions raise a question:
if that is the case, why should we pursue a compositional semantic theory of APS at
26I argue for this conclusion in sec. 4.1.2 above.
27Since Szabó and Asher prominently display these sentences in their respective work on the seman-
tics of APS, this result also favors (APS).
28More straightforward examples: for instance, take any of the examples from Szabó that I cite in
Chapter 2, or any of the examples from Asher I cite in chapter 3
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all? If 70 and 65 and John is corrupt as a judge are all APS, then the concept of
APS extends over sentences with different basic structures.29 As I use the term above
in sec. 4.1.1, this makes the kind which this concept of APS extends over disjunctive
in a pejorative sense.
Compositional semantics is essentially a scientific pursuit, which requires that seman-
ticists in this field construct empirical theories.[vB86][16] At the stage of basic research,
this kind of empirical theories ought to be about some basic kind, K. That kind might
be gold, or the as-phrase sentence. The early chemist studying gold had no choice
but to assume that he knew a sample of gold when he encountered one. Likewise,
the semanticist has no choice but to assume that native speakers of a language can
identify an individual of her basic kind K if they hear one.30
None of this implies that the scientist must stick to the taxonomy that this folk-
concept of her basic kind imposes on the things she studies.31 Rather, there is an
important difference between the taxonomy that a mature empirical theory entails,
and the one that the scientist started with. The mature theory orders things according
to their basic structures. Call folk-gold the basic kind that the early chemist started
with, when he began to research metals. Suppose he conducts research, properly, and
the research suggests that some folk-gold is composed of iron pyrite. He could proceed
29By different basic structures I just mean the syntactic types of the simplest sentences that are
similar to each of these sentences, respectively, in the relevant sense. The syntactic type of the
simplest sentences similar to (18), for example, is that of sentences whose as-phrases are not
complements to V. The syntactic type of the simplest sentences similar to (2) is that of sentences
whose as-phrases are or are part of some complement to V.
30For the concept of as-phrase sentence, perhaps a little prompting is necessary for the semanticist
to familiarize a native English speaker with the kind she is talking about. But the same is true
of the kinds picked out by the folk-concepts of gerund, clause and predicate, as any teacher of
secondary-school English knows.
31By folk-concept here, I just mean a concept that non-specialists have, which is not a theoretical
concept. That is, a concept that enables non-specialists to identify examples of it correctly, when
they encounter them, though it plays no role in mature scientific theories of the things that fall
within the folk-concept's extension.
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to set up a consistent theory of folk-gold, which entails that the basic structure of any
sample of folk-gold is either that of Au or that of iron pyrite. But that conclusion
would abandon one of the things that we find valuable in mature, empirical theories:
that their taxonomies grow according to what we know about the basic structures of
the things we study.
Granted, a weak principle of compositionality permits several different syntactic types
to take objects of a single semantic type for their respective denotations. Granted,
one could design a compositional semantic theory to handle all sentences in this
hodgepodge set. Such a theory would be internally consistent and compositional
(other things being equal). If it should turn out that the class of simple APS includes
sentences with different basic structures, our compositional semantic theory of APS
will amount to one big disjunction. This theory is analogous to a compositional
semantic theory of every homophone of to in the English language.32 It is also
analogous to a theory of folk-gold. No doubt, such a theory is possible in principle.
But clearly, it assumes a wrong-headed classification of things.
It would be better to avoid this kind of methodological pitfall, if possible. In order to
avoid it, suppose we define two (mutually- exclusive) syntactic types, A and B, such
that no simple APS is both Type A and Type B.
(TA) A sentence s is Type A iffdef: s is a simple APS and the
V of the highest VP of s does not c-command the
as-phrase of s.
(TB) A sentence s is Type B iffdef: s is a simple APS and the
V of the highest VP of s c-commands the as-phrase of s.
From (TA) and (TB), it is clear that the set of Type A sentences and the set of Type
32E.g., to, the preposition, and to, the marker of non-finite tense.
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B sentences are disjoint. With these definitions in hand, let's entertain the following
three hypotheses.33 On these assumptions, H1, H2, and H3 below are non-trivial,
empirical claims.
H1 Some APS are of Type A.
H2 Some APS are of Type B.
H3 Every simple APS is either Type A or Type B.
Consider what (TB) requires of Type B sentences' constituent structure. If the V
of the sentence's highest VP c-commands the sentence's as-phrase, then either V is
sister to the as-phrase or V is sister to a node that dominates the sentence's as-
phrase.[Adg03, KSS14]34 From this requirement, it follows that the as-phrase of a
Type B sentence must either be a complement to V or be a constituent of a com-
plement to V.35 Now consider what (TA) requires of Type A sentences. According
to (TA), a Type A sentence's as-phrase must not satisfy the requirement we saw in
(TB). That is to say that a Type A sentence's as-phrase is either not a complement
of V or not part of any constituent that is a complement to V. Contemporary X-bar
theory allows only the following structural positions within any projection of X (XP):
specifier of XP, X itself, complement to X, adjunct to XP.36 The as-phrase is clearly
not in specifier position, nor is it itself X (in this case, V, the verb). (TA) requires
that the as-phrase not be in complement position, either, as I argue above. Only two
possibilities remain for the structural position of the as-phrase in a Type A sentence.
33From (APS) and the definition of Type A and Type B below, and the assumption that there are
some Type A and some Type B APS, it does follow that there are some APS of Type A and B.
This follows because of the disjunct in (APS) which says that any sentence that embeds a simple
APS is an APS. For instance, the sentence John as a father sees his son as his successor is an
APS of Type A and B.
34This follows from the definition of c-command. For this definition of c-command, see Sportiche,
Koopman and Stabler (2014), pp.161-162. Adger (2003) offers an equivalent definition.
35That is, the Type B as-phrase must either be a complement to V or be dominated by a complement
to V.
36On the possible structural positions in an XP according to X-bar theory, see Sportiche, Koopman,
and Stabler (2014), p.132.
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One, the as-phrase is an adjunct to VP. Two, the as-phrase is outside the VP.
Without adding any further constraints on the higher structure of Type A sentences,
we may conclude the following from the arguments above. In any Type B sentence,
the as-phrase must either be a sister of V or dominated by a sister of V. In any Type
A sentence, the as-phrase must either by adjoined to VP, or outside the VP entirely.
Thus we can see that (TA) and (TB) impose requirements on sentences that we can
test using diagnostics for complementhood. If the results of these diagnostics suggest
that some simple APS' as-phrases are constituents of a complement to V, then it's
likely that there are some Type B APS. If the results suggest that some simple APS'
as-phrases are not in one of those positions, then (assuming the arguments above), it
follows that the as-phrases are VP adjuncts or outside the VP. From that information,
we may conclude that these sentences are likely of Type A. From this we may conclude
that, most likely, there are some Type A APS. I will now turn to some diagnostic
tests for complementhood, and the results of applying them to a small, representative
set of simple APS.
THE SENTENCES
(71) a. Ernest works a double shift as a janitor.
b. Ernest as a janitor works a double shift.
c. Ernest does so as a janitor.
(72) a. John is corrupt as a judge.
b. John as a judge is corrupt.
c. John does so as a judge.
(73) a. Louise as a tiger cub will be an adult tiger.
b. Louise as a tiger cub will be an adult tiger.
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c. Louise as a tiger cub will do so.
(74) a. Tim saw the book as a challenge.
b. * Tim as a challenge saw the book.
c. * Tim did so as a challenge.
(75) a. Jimmy hit Superman as Clark Kent.
b. * Jimmy as Clark Kent hit Superman.
c. * Jimmy did so as Clark Kent.
(76) a. John used the book as a paddle.
b. * John as a paddle used the book.
c. * John did so as a paddle.
(77) a. Peter saw the paper as a proof of the twin primes conjecture.
b. * Peter as a proof of the twin primes conjecture saw the paper.
c. * Peter did so as a proof.
(78) a. The boys regarded Tim as a traitor.
b. * The boys as a traitor regarded Tim.
c. * The boys did so as a traitor.
(79) a. The court tried the boy as an adult.
b. * The court as an adult tried the boy.
c. * The court did so as an adult.
(80) a. John raised his hand as a judge.
b. John as a judge raised his hand.
c. John did so as a judge.
(81) a. John loves his children as a father.
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b. John as a father loves his children.
c. John does so as a father.
CONCLUSIONS
For each sentence s labeled a. above under a number n, the sentence labeled b.
under n is the result of applying Test 1 to s. Call the sentence labeled a. immedi-
ately below a number n the a-variant of n. Likewise, call the sentence labeled b.
immediately under the a-variant for a number n the b-variant. Define the c-variant
for a number in the same fashion.The c-variant for n is the result of applying Test
2 to the a-variant for n. If a b-variant under n is marked, call the result of Test 1
for n negative; likewise for Test 2 and the c-variant. Call every non-negative result
positive.
We observe that for every sentence above, the b-variant is marked if and only if the
c-variant is marked. Each marked sentence is marked unacceptable (*). We observe
negative results on both tests for 6 out of the 11 sentences.
Both Test 1 and Test 2 are diagnostics for the complementhood of the as-phrase.
Above I noted that leftward movement past V and did so substitution provide
evidence against the complementhood of the moved or substituted substring. The
5 positive results on either test for 71a - 73a and 81a strongly suggest that the
respective as-phrases of these sentences are not complements to V. The 6 negative
results on either tests for 74a - 79a weakly suggest that the respective as-phrases of
these sentences are complements to V. As previously mentioned, each a-variant shows
a positive result for Test 1 if and only if it shows a positive result on Test 2. This
suggests that the negative results across both tests provide stronger evidence for the
denial of the hypothesis tested than they would if we had only considered the results
of one test.
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In light of these results, it is likely that the as-phrases in sentences 71a - 73a and 81a
are not complements to V. It is also likely that the as-phrases in sentences 74a - 79a
are complements to V. Thus we have relatively strong support for H1, and relatively
weaker support for H2.
Suppose that H1 and H2 are true. Further suppose that no Type A sentence has
the same basic structure as any Type B sentence, which follows from the definition
of Type A, (TA), and the definition of Type B, (TB). From these assumptions, it
follows that the kind APS is disjunctive in a pejorative sense. In keeping with the
methodological virtues I discuss above, I propose the following three morals.
1. The compositional semanticist should develop theories of Type A sentences and
theories of Type B sentences, but not theories of APS per se, unless by theories
here we just mean the result of appending the Type B theory to the Type A
theory.
2. It is consistent with the claim that the kind, APS, is disjunctive (in a pejorative
sense) that the kind, as-phrase, is not.
3. In light of 1 and 2 above, the compositional semanticist should seek distri-
butional evidence for a non-disjunctive kind that the syntactic type of all as-
phrases picks out.
I will argue in sec. 4.2.4 below that the kind, as-phrase, is not pejoratively disjunctive.
There is mounting empirical evidence from outside the as-phrase literature that a
novel functional category exists, and every as-phrase has that functional category
as its syntactic type. This evidence suggests that seemingly diverse constructions
in different languages are actually instances of this syntactic type. Fortunately for
compositional semanticists, it is also quite plausible that that novel category uniquely
determines a single semantic type, wherever it appears within individual languages
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and across languages.
4.2.2 THE TYPE A STRUCTURAL SCHEMA
Szabó (2003) and Asher (2011) each present compelling distributional evidence for
several claims about the phrase introduced by as, in all of the examples they
consider.[Ash11, Sza03]
1. It is an adjunct, not a complement.
2. It is on the right-hand side of the tree (at S-structure).37
I will take these two conclusions for granted in the following sections. Section 4.2.1
above lays out the case for 1. It is worthwhile, though, to to review the established
evidence for 2. If the as-phrase were on the left-hand side of the tree at S-structure,
in a Simple APS, it would have to be in [Spec, TP] or constitute part of the object
in that position, i.e., the position of the semantic subject of these sentences at S-
structure. The main evidence that Szabó (2003) presents against that conclusion
is from coordination.[Sza03] Substrings of an APS consisting of a DP immediately
followed by an as-phrase (e.g., John as a judge) result in an unacceptable sentence
when coordinated (across and) with other DP's. Native English speakers find John
as a judge and Bill went skiing, for instance, unacceptable. These results suggest
that no as-phrase within any of Szabó's examples forms a DP with another DP. Since
this is the only plausible position for an as-phrase on the left-hand side of the tree
for any of these examples, he concludes that no as-phrase occupies that position in
an APS. Thus, the as-phrase must be on the right-hand side of the tree in every such
case.
37With respect to the root node. Here I assume that constituency structures are at most binary
branching. That is, every node immediately dominates no more than two other nodes.
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One might object that Szabó and Asher arrive at these conclusions about the con-
stituent structure of APS by unreliable methods. I argue above in Section 4.1.2 that
both theorists present sentence-schemata that they suppose to cover all APS, but
consider examples that are not instances of it (Asher), or consider instances of it
that are counter-examples to their structural schemata for all APS (Szabó). I am
only concerned with Type A sentences in this section, however. The vast majority
of examples that either theorist considers are Type A sentences. The non-Type A
sentences that each considers are irrelevant to my present purpose, because the in-
ferences they draw from their base of Type A examples do strongly support claims 1
and 2 above, for Type A sentences.
I will also take a third claim for granted, which Asher argues for in Asher (2011).
This is the claim that the as-phrase in his examples adjoins higher than the VP.38
He claims that for each of his example sentences s, there exist several acceptable
transformations of s, each generated by moving the as-phrase leftward past the main
verb, V.[Ash11] Although Asher does not spell it out in this way, his argument here
relies on the implicit premise that any expression within a sentence that is freely
movable adjoins in the highest available position in the structure of the sentence that
contains it an IP, by his analysis. This contradicts Szabó's structural schema for
all APS, which requires that the as-phrase adjoin to VP but no higher. I grant that
leftward movement to some positions past V yield acceptable results for all Type A
sentences. Asher (2011), however, draws from these results the stronger conclusion
moving as-phrase in any APS to any position yields a sentence as acceptable as the
original. That is to say that there is no position respecting constituent-boundaries to
38It follows from the structural schema for APS proposed in Asher (2011) that this claim holds with
respect to S-structures and LF structures for all APS. Asher's schema has the as-phrase originate
in a VP-adjunct position at S-structure, and raise to a position above the main clause to form
the sentence's LF.
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which the as-phrase cannot be moved to yield an acceptable sentence. He concludes
that the as-phrase in every APS adjoins in the highest position possible within its
containing sentence; namely, to the IP (or TP) above VP.
4.2.2.1 EVIDENCE AGAINST TP-ADJUNCTION FROM PROSODY
Asher's argument here concludes that every as-phrase adjoins to the IP above
VP.[Ash11]39 For every as-phrase is freely movable, in the sense I explained above.
Furthermore, any expression that is freely movable in this sense adjoins to the highest
possible position within its sentence's constituent structure. This argument is sound
only if any expression within a sentence that is freely movable adjoins in the highest
available position in the structure of the sentence that contains it. There is a less in-
teresting sense of freely movable on which this premise is at least plausible. Namely,
this is a sense of freely movable that would allow prosodic differences between an
utterance of the original sentence s, and an utterance of the transformed sentence s′
with the moved as-phrase.
This sense of freely movable is less interesting because there is good reason to doubt
that the acceptability of a transformed sentence s′ produced by leftward moment of
an as-phrase is reliable evidence of the structural position of that as-phrase when
prosody is allowed to vary freely (from an utterance of s to an utterance of s′). In their
introduction to tests for syntactic structure, Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014)
warn us that the acceptability of some s′ formed from s by movement of an expression
e is unreliable evidence that e attaches higher than the material to its right in s′ when
s′ is only acceptable if we offset e with pauses.[KSS14] This warning is well-founded.
Research on the prosody-syntax interface suggests that all competent speakers rely
39Asher (2011), pp.205-206. Also see my sec. 3.2.2 in chapter 3.
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on information about prosodic boundaries to select between alternative structures for
a sentence s when the attachment site of an expression e is ambiguous in s, and no
other disambiguating information is available.[POSHF91, CCF01, Fod02, SC10]
Where the attachment-site of e in s is singly ambiguous for a speaker, between a lower
and a higher position, the speaker will rely on prosodic cues like pauses, tone, and
comma-offset to parse s: either e adjoins high or e adjoins low.[POSHF91, CCF01]40 In
the example 8241 from Snedeker and Casserly (2010), the attachment of the expression
with the flower is ambiguous between a low site, within the complement to point,
and a high site, adjoined above the complement to point.
(82) You can point [A] at the dog [B] with the flower.
There is agreement within prosody research that speakers use prosodic boundaries to
disambiguate sentences like 82 in spoken utterance or in print.[Fod02, SC10] There
is also agreement that certain cues cause speakers to perceive a prosodic boundary
within a spoken or written sentence, other things being equal. It is still an open
question, however, exactly which algorithm or set of heuristic rules speakers use to
disambiguate sentences, given this prosodic information.
Snedeker and Casserly divide experimental results in this prosody-syntax area of psy-
cholinguistics into those that support the Absolute Boundary Hypothesis and those
that support the (mutually-exclusive) Relative Boundary Hypothesis. While there is
widespread agreement in the literature that speakers use prosodic cues at the posi-
tions marked [A] and [B] to disambiguate a sentence like 82, it is an open question
how exactly they use them. I will assume Snedeker and Casserly's Absolute Boundary
40In the absence of other disambiguating information.
41This is the second example listed under Critical sentences in Carlson, Clifton and Frazier's
Appendix A: Sentences For Study 2 in Carlson, Clifton and Frazier (2001).
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Hypothesis for the purpose of my argument against Asher here, because it is the most
recent relevant result that I know. The Absolute Boundary Hypothesis (ABH) pre-
dicts that any competent speaker is most likely to parse any ambiguous-attachment
sentence s (like 82) high when the prosodic prosodic boundary marked by [B] is
greatest, regardless of the magnitude of the boundary marked by [A]. Snedeker and
Casserly (2010) find that ABH receives stronger support than the Relative Bound-
ary Hypothesis, contra Carlson, Clifton and Frazier (2001). The latter predicts that
any competent speaker is most likely to parse any ambiguous-attachment sentence s
high when the ratio between the magnitude of the boundary marked by [B] and
that of the boundary marked by [A] is greatest.
These statements of the ABH and RBH raise an important question of how we are to
operationalize the notion of a prosodic boundary, in order to test hypotheses about
the effect of prosodic information on parsing of sentences. Snedeker and Casserly
(2010) use the Tones and Break Indices coding system (ToBI) to do this.[SC10] ToBI
consists of a theory of prosody and a notation for representing the prosodic structure
of an utterance. The theory of prosody claims that whole utterances structured into
Intonation Phrases, notated IP, and intermediate phrases, notated ip. Snedeker
and Casserly explain that
each intermediate phrase (or ip) contains at least one pitch accent and
ends in a high or low phrase tone. Intermediate phrases are grouped to-
gether into intonational phrases (or IP's). An intonational phrase contains
at least one intermediate phrase and ends in a high or low boundary tone
(which follows the phrase tone of the final intermediate phrase).[SC10]42
If ABH is true, then any Type A sentence with two possible attachments-sites for its
42Snedeker et al. (2010), p.8.
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as-phrase is most likely to be parsed with the as-phrase high when the ambiguously-
attached expression (the material after [B]) constitutes an Intonation Phrase. A
speaker can increase the magnitude of this prosodic boundary by pausing longer be-
tween as and the preceding material, by varying pitch between as and the preced-
ing material, or by offsetting the whole as-phrase with commas in writing.[POSHF91,
Fod02] Snedeker and Casserly use an ordered-pair notation to notate the status of two
prosodic boundaries in an utterance of a sentence. For instance, (0,0) represents an
utterance with no ip or IP beginning at either boundary, while (ip,IP) represents
on where the first boundary introduces an ip and the second an IP, and so forth.
There are relatively few positions left for the as-phrase to occupy in the structure
for a Type A sentence, so far as the definition (TA) constrains the properties of that
structure. There are three possible positions. First, the as-phrase could be adjoined
to the main clause of the sentence: its TP, or in Asher's analysis, its IP. This is Asher's
hypothesis. Second, the as-phrase could be adjoined to VP. This is Szabó's hypothesis.
Third, the as-phrase could be adjoined to some phrase intervening between VP and
TP. Asher's examples that I cited above, of APS with as-phrase moved leftward past
V, makes the second possibility unlikely. This leaves only two possible attachment-
sites for the as-phrase in a Simple Type A sentence: adjoined to the main clause, or
adjoined to a phrase intervening between VP and the main clause. Assuming Snedeker
and Casserly's ABH, we can use prosodic variation to obtain indirect evidence about
the attachment-site of the as-phrase in Type A APS. Toward that end, consider 83 -
88.
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Example Transformation Prosodic
effect
(83) Danny saw some horrors as a
child.
None
N/A
(84) Danny as a child saw some
horrors.
Move left past V
N/A
(85) * As a child Danny saw some
horrors.
Front
(0,0)
(86) [1] AS a child [2] Danny saw some
horrors.
Front + Accent on
as
(IP,0)
(87) [1] As a CHILD [2] Danny saw
some horrors.
Front + Accent on
child
(0,IP)
(88) [1] As a child, [2] Danny saw some
horrors.
Front + Pause after
child
(0,IP)
Table 4.1: Transformations used in examples 84-88
Asher (2011) argues that the as-phrase in every APS adjoins to the main clause (IP)
at S-structure. The empirical evidence he offers for this claim is that the as-phrase in
every APS s can be fronted to yield an acceptable and synonymous sentence s′. Many
of these s′ sound bad to me, however. 85 for instance sounds much worse to me than
83 or 84. To me, the latter two examples sound equally good. If I vary the prosody
for an utterance of such an s′, however, I can make it sound perfectly acceptable.
The prosody-variations that improve the sound of these sentences for me are exactly
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those which the prosody-syntax literature find to be associated with perception of a
prosodic boundary at [1] or [2]: pauses, changes of tone, and in writing, comma-offsets
immediately preceding or following the as-phrase.
We have already established that there are two possible attachment sites for the as-
phrase in these sentences: adjunction to a phrase between VP and TP (low), or
adjunction to TP (high). The ABH predicts in these cases that my perception
of a prosodic boundary immediately before the as-phrase (at [1]) will increase the
likelihood that I parse the sentence with the as-phrase attached high. 87 sounds
better to me than 85. One hypothesis that explains the difference in acceptability
between 87 and 85 in light of the ABH, is that all as-phrases in Simple Type A
sentences adjoin low at S-structure unless the hearer perceives the as-phrase as an
IP. Call this hypothesis DL (default low). This is to say that the as-phrase in Simple
Type A sentences is freely movable only in the less interesting sense that it can be
fronted acceptably when the hearer perceives the as-phrase as an IP. It is not freely
movable in the sense that fronting of the as-phrase produces an equally-acceptable
sentence from any Simple Type A sentence, in the absence of prosodic boundaries
around the as-phrase.
87 and 88 also sound (equally) acceptable to me, in contrast to 85. If [1] and [2]
in 87 and 88 mark the beginning and end of a single IP (Intonational Phrase), then
the hypothesis DL above explains this difference between 85 and 87-88.
If DL is correct, then Asher's observation that all as-phrases are freely movable
supports, at most, the claim that every Simple Type A sentence is syntactically am-
biguous between a high and a low-attachment structure. Since prosodic bound-
aries around the as-phrase are necessary to make a Type A sentence with fronted
as-phrase sound as acceptable as its non-fronted counterpart, it is unlikely that the
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high-attachment structure represents the default way for competent speakers to
parse a Type A sentence.
4.2.2.2 EVIDENCE AGAINST VP-ADJUNCTION FROM
SENTENTIAL NEGATION
Sentential negation might provide additional evidence against the hypothesis that the
Type A as-phrase adjoins to VP. In a discussion of conditionals, Haegeman (2010)
argues that a conditional operator could not move past a sentential negation if it were
dominated by VP before the movement.[Hae10] The theoretical basis for this claim is
that the presence of NegP creates an inner island from which no VP-adjunct can be
extracted.43 On these assumptions, we should not be able to extract the complement
to as in a Type A sentence with a NegP, if the as-phrase is a VP-adjunct. For
example, notice that 90 is fine, while 92 is marked.[17] 91 and 93 are felicitous replies
to 90 and 92, respectively. These replies fix a discourse context which naturally gives
90 and 91 the readings I have in mind.
(89) Ed did not greet the customer as an employee.
(90) As what did you say that Ed didn't greet the customer?
(91)  As an employee. I don't care what he does on his own time, but it's his job
to greet the customer.
(92) * How did you say that Ed didn't greet the customer?
(93)  Warmly. It's his job to greet each customer warmly.
I've intentionally modeled 90 - 93 after Haegeman (2010)'s example 33a. Suppose that
Haegeman and Rizzi's hypothesis about extraction from VP-adjuncts across negation
43Per Haegeman, see Rizzi (1990) on the relationship between islands and extraction from adjuncts.
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is true. If 90 is indeed unmarked on the intended reading fixed by 91, while 92 is
marked on the reading fixed by 93, then it is unlikely that the as-phrase in 89 has
moved out of a VP-internal position to produce 90.
4.2.2.3 PHRASAL CATEGORY OF THE ADJUNCTION SITE AND
SUBJECT CONTROL
Two more problems now become relevant. First, if the as-phrase of every Type A
sentence adjoins to a constituent intervening between VP and TP, what is the phrasal
category of that constituent? Second, if the as-phrase of every Type A sentence is a
second predicate taking the same thing for its subject that the VP predicate does,
then the position I propose for the Type A as-phrase seems to violate locality of (c-
)selection. This is a problem for Szabó's theory as well, but it remains an unsolved
problem in Szabó (2003). If a constituent functions as a predicate, then presumably,
it assigns a theta-role. Under Minimalist assumptions, the derivation of constituent
structure from a set of lexical entries proceeds by repeated composition of the Merge
function. But two objects a and b drawn from the lexicon have a Merge c =
Merge(a, b) only if b is specified with some c-selectional feature that checks some
such feature on a, or the contrary. The lexical entry for any object that functions
as a predicate specifies a set of theta-roles. For an object to function as a predicate,
therefore, that object must assign a theta-role, and that theta-role can only be filled
by an object local to that object in the tree. That is, a theta-role assigned by a
predicate a can only be filled by an object b that is specifier, complement or adjunct to
a.[Kra96, Wil95, KSS14, Bow01][18] Call this last requirement the Locality of Selection
Principle (LoS).
The most straightforward way to solve this second problem, that is consistent with
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the structure I propose for Type A sentences, is binding theory. Binding theory is
(among other things) a means of explaining apparent violations of LoS. These are
sentences for which there is evidence that one constituent appears in a position where
it cannot fill a certain theta-role, though it is the only object in the sentence able
to fill that role.[KSS14] Binding theory explains these apparent violations with two
hypotheses. One, there is an object of an empty category local to the object assigning
the theta-role. Two, that empty-category object has an index attached to it, which,
for syntactic purposes, makes it act like the (only) other object in the tree which
bears that index.
Subject-control sentences, which also contain two predicates, appear to violate LoS.
Their second predicate takes the same object for its subject as the main predicate,
though the second predicate is not local to its subject.[KSS14]44 Binding theory pro-
vides one attractive solution to the LoS problem posed by subject control. According
to the binding approach to subject control, there is an object of empty category called
PRO which is local to the secondary predicate. This PRO bears the same index as
the subject of that secondary predicate in [Spec, TP]. Thus, it fills the theta-role
that the secondary predicate assigns for its subject. 94 - 95 below are subject-control
sentences.
(94) Johni expects [PROi to work]CP.
(95) Johni hopes [PROi to move to Pennsylvania]CP.
Since subject-control sentences appear so similar to Type A sentences, for syntac-
tic purposes, we ought to ask whether Type A sentences just are subject-control
sentences. This is unlikely for several reasons. Classic examples of subject-control
44It is not local to the overt position of its subject, that is. See Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler
(2014), pp.240-242.
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sentences have main verbs that take a clausal complement, a CP or TP.[KSS14]45
Whatever the phrasal category of the Type A as-phrase is, however, it's not a CP or
TP.
(96) * John expects that it will rain tomorrow and as a judge.
(97) * John expects to work and as a judge.
Coordination is a powerful test of a known constituent's phrasal category. 96 and 97
each coordinates a known CP with an as-phrase (across and). Neither is acceptable.
97 might sound acceptable at first. On closer consideration, 97 is only acceptable if
as a judge is elliptical for to work as a judge. But to work as a judge, though
a CP, is not an as-phrase; rather, it is a clause that contains an as-phrase. Finally,
subject-control sentences' secondary predicates are complements to the control verb
V, in each case. Type A as-phrases are not complements, however, as established by
Szabó and by Asher.
Type A sentences pose a problem for LoS, and I propose that we solve that problem
with a hypothesis similar to that used in subject-control sentences (subject-coindexed
PRO). Yet Type A sentences are not just subject-control sentences, for the two
reasons cited above. In this section, I have concluded that Type A as-phrases are
adjuncts on the right-hand side of their sentences' trees, intervening between VP and
T'. I propose further that an empty-category object (likely to be PRO), coindexed
with the subject in [Spec, TP] at S-structure, appears in the specifier position of
the as-phrase.46 Thus, I propose that the following structural schema describes the
45See Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014), pp.241.
46If the Predicate-Internal Subject Hypothesis is correct, then the subject in [Spec,TP] at S-structure
has actually raised from the specifier position of the XP whose X' the as-phrase adjoins to.
Though this hypothesis is highly plausible and attractive for independent reasons, it is not
essential to presenting my own hypothesis about the basic structure of Type A sentences. I have
represented this movement in Fig. 4.1 below, however, with angled brackets, representing the
trace of a moved object.
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TP
DPi T'
∅ XP
XP1
PROi X1'
X1 DP
XP2
<DPi> X2'
X2 VP
Figure 4.1: Structural schema of Simple Type A sentences
syntactic structure of for all Type A sentences:
[DPi [Ø [ [PROi [X1 DP]X1']XP1 [<DPi> [X2 VP]X2' ]XP2 ]XP ]T' ]TP.
47
Fig. 4.1 presents the same information in a tree diagram. In Fig. 4.1, alphabetic
subscripts (e.g., i) represent binding relations. When an the label of an object, a,
appears in one position p, and a appears between < and > in another position,
q, the object that a labels has moved from p to q. The null-set symbol Ø indicates
that the position where it appears is empty.
One major question introduced in this section remains unanswered. I have not pro-
posed any hypothesis about the phrasal category of the Type A as-phrase. In Fig. 4.1,
I represented the unknown phrasal category of the as-phrase with XP, and the cat-
egory of as itself (the head of the phrase) with X. These stand for the actual
category-markers associated with the phrasal category of the as-phrase, which I have
not yet proposed. Unlike the bold-printed VP, etc., in the bracketed schema above,
47By syntactic structure here, I mean both constituent structure and binding. The schema diagram
4.1 also represents movement, a relevant syntactic property of these sentences, though it is not
itself a structure.
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X and XP and X ' do not name variables ranging over instances of phrasal cate-
gories. I return to the question of the phrasal category of XP in sec. 4.2.4 below.
4.2.3 THE TYPE B STRUCTURAL SCHEMA
There are fewer established conclusions about Type B sentences than Type A, in
regard to their syntax. While Asher considers what I call Type B sentences among his
other examples, he draws no distinction between the two types of APS. Furthermore,
neither his syntactic nor semantic hypotheses yield accurate predictions about these
sentences. Szabó (2003) has little to say about the sentences I call Type B, beyond
pointing out that such sentences differ from all other examples he considers.[Sza12b]48
In this section, I will present evidence in support of my own structural schema for
Type B sentences. This schema I propose for Type B sentence-structure is based
on Bowers' analyses in Bowers (1993) and (2001).[Bow93, Bow01] In my argument
for the schema I propose, I will draw upon my definition of Type B sentence, (TB),
diagnostic tests, and independent syntax research on similar sentences.
My definition of Type B sentence, (TB), provides some basic constraints on any anal-
ysis of Type B sentences. It follows from my definition (TB) and from the definition
of c-command that the Type B as-phrase lies on the right side of its sentence's tree.49
Type B sentences share this property with Type A sentences. It also follows from
these two definitions that there is a small, finite number of possible configurations for
the subtree that V c-commands. One such possibility is that both the as-phrase and
the direct object of the main verb are complements to the main verb. That is to say
48Szabó (2012b) deals with the sentences I call Type B, though briefly and indirectly. He discusses
the phrasal category of the as-phrase's head, however, rather than the sentences' constituent
structure. Since constituent structure is my concern in this section, I will return to Szabó
(2012b) in sec. 4.2.4 below.
49Unless the sentence's main verb is on the left side of the tree. I know of no positive evidence for
that hypothesis.
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that each forms a separate constituent, both of which are sisters of V: [V .. [obj] ..
[as DP]]V'.50 This first possibility presupposes that there are some ternary-branching
structures in natural language. A second possibility, which contradicts the first, is
that the as-phrase forms a single constituent with the direct object of V, and this
constituent (but not the as-phrase itself) is sister to V: [V.. [obj .. [as DP]]XP]V'.
This second possibility is consistent with a number of different hypotheses about the
lower structure of this single sister to V.
I assume that constituent structure in natural language is at most binary-branching.
If Merge is a function of exactly two arguments, and all syntactic representations
are the product of just two functions, Merge and Move, then there are no ternary
branches in any syntactic representations.[Cho95, Adg03, KSS14][19] Since our first
possible configuration for the subtree to the right of V presupposes that there are
ternary branches in natural language, this assumption rules out the first possible
configuration. Within the constraints of the second configuration, the lower structure
of the complement to V remains to be worked out. Call this second configuration the
gross structure of Type B.
There are two better-understood types of sentence that share this gross structure
with Type B. It is worthwhile to investigate whether Type B is identical to one
of these better-understood types. One such type of sentence is that of ditransitive
constructions, like Lisa gave the dog to John.[Adg03] A ditransitive construction is
a sentence built from a main verb that assigns two theta-roles, e.g., a Theme (the
dog) and a Goal (to John).[Adg03] In ditransitive constructions, V raises from its
original position in VP into a higher verbal projection, vP. There, V combines with
50The ellipses (..) I use to write these sentence-frames represent other phrases that intervene
between the phrases that flank them. I am not claiming that there are such intervening phrases
by using the ellipses. Rather, I mean to specify what I mean by gross structure, here, which is
mainly concerned with c-command and linear precedence relations.
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v (little v), which is interpreted as a special operator CAUS for building change-
of-state predicates. It seems that not all Type B sentences' truth-conditions require
the referent of the sentence subject to bring about a change of state in this object
of V, which already casts some doubt on the hypothesis that Type B sentences are
ditransitive constructions.51 I will limit myself to talking about syntactic properties
of Type B sentences to motivate this point, though. Though the gross structure of
ditransitive constructions is that of Type B sentences, the constituents involved are
of different phrasal categories than those in Type B sentences. The only place that
as could fit into the S-structure of a ditransitive construction is under VP, in the
position of the trace of the moved V. Whatever it is, Type B sentences' as is not
a verb. It does not project the VP that dominates it in this hypothetical structure.
Thus, it must have been moved or inserted there before S-structure. Apart from the
semantic mismatch, then, the ditransitive phrase-labeling creates a new mystery for
Type B syntax rather than dispelling one.
Another sentence type sharing the gross structure of Type B is the object-control
sentence. The main verb in these sentences takes both a nominal argument and an
infinitival clause argument.[Car13, KSS14] The gross structure is identical to that of
the ditransitive construction: V has one complement, a constituent containing both
the first and second argument. By (TB), the Type B as-phrase is not a clause, how-
ever. As in the case of ditransitive, the Type B sentence differs from the object-control
sentence in the category-labeling of its gross structure, rather than the structure itself.
Bowers is one of the few syntactic theorists who takes on APS directly. He analyzes
a Type B sentence, they represented Mary seriously as a genuine linguist in the
course of developing his main contribution of his Predication (2001).[Bow01] That
51For example, Sam recognized Jim as his colleague can be true though Sam's recognition causes
no change of Jim's state.
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is a novel and well-supported theory of predication in natural language. Essentially,
Bowers' insight there is that a great deal of syntactic data point towards the existence
of a functional category that represents predication in all natural languages. This
predication function had previously been conflated with tense-related functions in
the category I and its projection IP (inflection phrase). Small clauses, however,
carry no tense information, though they surely contain predicates. Bowers' theory of
predication is attractive for the following main reasons:
1. It proposes a phrasal category for the XP in my structural schema for Type A
sentences (Fig. 4.1), as well the XP complement to V in my schema for Type B
sentences Fig. 4.2. There is a great deal of independent support for the existence
of the phrasal category it hypothesizes. Namely,
2. This phrasal category is the one coordinated across and in cases where the
coordination of phrases from different categories is acceptable.52
3. It preserves the attractive features of the VP-Shell analysis of ditransitives,
but generalizes them to handle sentences with similar structure (e.g., the Type
B sentence). It preserves the VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis in a more gen-
eral form, hypothesizing that subjects of predicates uniformly originate in the
specifier position of their predicate phrases.
4. It explains what small clauses and main clauses have in common: a predicate
phrase.
5. It provides a more adequate theory of the long-distance predication seen in
subject-control sentences (see sec. 4.2.2 above).[Bow01]
6. It explains how long-distance predication (an apparent LoS violation) is pos-
52This advantage appears to be unique to Bowers' theory of predication, which makes it especially
strong evidence for his theory (personal communication; Byron Ahn).
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sible in subject-control sentences as well as Type A APS. Thus, it explains
theoretically the intuitive similarity between subject-control and Type A.
7. It entails that a very simple and strict form of X-bar theory holds, at least, at
the level of representation where selectional features are checked.[Bow93, Bow01]
The theory accomplishes this with two hypotheses. First, the objects of verbs
are uniformly generated in the specifier position of the verb-phrase. As in the
VP-Shell analysis, the verb raises to produce the linear precedence of verb and
object observed in the sentence's overt form.53 Second, the subject of every
predicate originates in the specifier position of its predicate phrase.
Advantage 7 above explains the less common elements of my structural schema of
Type B sentences (represented in Fig. 4.2). This schema says that a simple Type B
APS consists of a main clause with a VP whose V selects a bare predicate-phrase
complement. Every VP that constitutes a predicate, according to Bowers' theory,
is immediately dominated by a predicate phrase. This explains why there is an XP
above VP as well as below V in Fig. 4.2.
4.2.4 WHY AS IS PR IN ALL SIMPLE APS
Bowers' theory of predication is not only consistent with the two structural schemata
represented in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 above. It also entails that the predicate phrases
labeled XP there have a specific phrasal category: PrP.[Bow93, Bow01] This is not a
vacuous claim. It is an empirical hypothesis. Thus, it requires support from familiar
sources of syntactic evidence. This section provides some of that support, and argues
that Pr, the head of the hypothesized PrP, is the as found in Type A and Type B
sentences' as-phrases.
53For instance, John kicked the ball instead of *John the ball kicked.
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TP
DPi T'
∅ XP2
<DPi> X2'
X2
X2 V
VP
DPj V'
<V> XP1
PROj X1'
X1 DP
Figure 4.2: Structural schema of Simple Type B sentence
Bowers (1993) and (2001) provide a number of good arguments for the existence of
Pr, some of which I enumerate in 1-7 above in sec. 4.2.3. Many of these arguments,
however, are highly dependent on the assumptions of existing syntactic theory, e.g.,
X-bar theory. There is an accumulating body of evidence for Pr from comparative
studies of syntax and morphology, however.[AR03, Bal14, Cit08, Myl14]54 Eide and
Åfarli (1999) presents some of this empirical evidence.[EÅ99] They also make an
important theory-internal argument for the existence of Pr, however, that does not
appear in Bowers' work.
Eide and Åfarli repeat Bowers' criterion for dividing predication theories into two
camps: the configurational camp and the functional camp.[EÅ99] A purely config-
urational theory of predication asserts that the semantic relation between subject
54Chapter 5 deals with more current hypotheses about the functional heads that realize predication
in natural language, especially ??subsec:2ndIteration-Discussion on page 192.
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and predicate is always represented by some particular constituent structure, e.g.,
the simple relation between a node and its sister. Functional theories of predica-
tion hypothesize that there is a unique syntactic object whose projections (e.g., PrP)
represent the semantic predication relation wherever it occurs. Bowers' predication
theory is not the only theory in the functional camp. In fact, Bowers' theory requires
extra evidence in its favor, compared with other functional theories, because it hy-
pothesizes a novel functional head to represent predication. But how do we know that
some known type of functional head is not also responsible for representing predica-
tion in the syntax? Eide and Åfarli focus on one such familiar functional head that
might be the syntactic representative of predication: Agr.
The hypothesis that AgrP represents predication is subject to many counter-examples,
though. Mainland Scandinavian provides several.[EÅ99] Determiners agree with nom-
inal phrases in DP's, in this language, and Agr ostensibly represents this relation. But
these DP's clearly do not denote propositions. If Agr were the unique representative of
predication in natural language, though, then it would be necessary and sufficient for
two objects to form a predicate that they be joined by an AgrP. An AgrP does join the
agreeing Scandinavian determiner with its nominal phrase. But it does not serve the
semantic function we should expect if the presence of AgrP were sufficient for predica-
tion. In fact, any highly inflected language with similar obligatory agreement within
non-predicate phrases would apparently provide similar counter-examples. There are
also counter-examples to the AgrP's necessity for predication. In the same language,
the verb of an ordinary main clause need not agree with its subject.[EÅ99] Thus,
these verb phrases clearly bear the semantic predication relation to their subjects,
despite the complete absence of Agr from the syntactic representation of the clause
they form together.
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Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the existence of Pr, independent of APS
syntax, is the diversity of languages that lexicalize Pr itself. In several languages,
that is, there is a word or construction that fulfills the same syntactic and semantic
functions that the as-phrase as does in English. Norwegian som, German als, and
Russian kak, are each lexicalizations of Pr, according to Eide and Åfarli.[EÅ99] Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, in the Norwegian equivalents of what I call Type A and
Type B sentences, respectively, the equivalent of the as-phrase is introduced by som,
the Norwegian lexicalization of Pr. This fact further substantiates my hypothesis
that as is Pr in both Type A and Type B English sentences, as well as the existence
of Pr per se.
There are at least two reasonable arguments that the as-phrase as is Pr in both
Type A and Type B sentences. First, as in these (simple APS) sentences is likely
either a preposition or Pr, and it's unlikely to be a preposition.55 Second, sentences
like (8) above, with no as in their overt form at all, are systematically synonymous
with Type A sentences. There does not appear to be another good explanation for
this fact apart from the hypothesis that this as is an unpronounced instance of Pr.
Szabó (2012b) explicitly agrees with Bowers that as and its projected phrase are
Pr and PrP in what I call Type B sentences.[Sza12b] Since he does not retract his
structural schema for APS in Szabó (2003), though, he implicitly denies in (2012b)
that as is Pr in all other APS, which I call Type A. Szabó (2003) hypothesizes
that as is a P (preposition) and that the as-phrase is a PP (the projection of that
P). But if Pr exists, then it is unlikely that the as-phrase is a P. For instance, the
as-phrase as fails the 'right PP' test for prepositional phrases. The vast majority
of prepositional phrases yield acceptable phrases when appended to right. No other
55Evidence for these two claims appears below.
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category of phrase in natural language has this property. For instance, the known
PP's [into the trash], [above my head] and [around the world] combine with right
to yield right into the trash,right above my head, and right around the world,
respectively. The known AP beautiful combines with right in the same way to
yield the unacceptable the bowl is right beautiful. The known VP [went home]
yields the unacceptable John right went home. The known DP the dog yields
John walked right the dog. Yet John used the book right as a paddle, John raised
a question right as a judge, and similar examples are unacceptable.
Eide and Åfarli (1999) present a different argument that the as-phrase as is not
a preposition. They cite evidence from languages like German and Russian, which
mark case morphologically.[EÅ99] All prepositions, in these languages, license the
case-marking of their nominal complements. But in the Russian equivalents of Type
B sentences, the only case-agreement one finds is between the subject of the secondary
predicate and the complement to kak (the Russian lexicalization of Pr). If English
marked case morphologically, we could observe these data in English as follows. Con-
sider a sentence in Menglish, identical to English but with morphological markers of
case-agreement on nominal phrases: Bill spoke of Johnm and disparaged him as a
traitorm. The accusative case of John is marked on the pronoun it binds, him, as
in English. It is also marked by the m affix on [John] and [traitor]. The equivalent
observation in Menglish to the one that Eide and Åfarli make about Russian is the
following. Bill spoke of Johnm and disparaged he as a traitor, while unacceptable
to a Menglish speaker, is unacceptable just because the case-markers of Johnm and
he fail to match. The second predicate's as does nothing to impose case-agreement
between its subject he and the antecedent of the pronoun he, i.e. Johnm. But
if as were a preposition of Menglish, it would do so. Thus, as is not a preposition
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of Menglish. Thus, by analogy, kak is not a preposition of Russian. In light of the
right test and the evidence from Russian, it is unlikely that the as-phrase as is a
preposition, contra Szabó (2003) and Asher (2011). P and Pr, however, are the only
remotely promising candidates for the distributional category of this as.
As I noted in sec. 4.1.4 above, example (8) (John, the judge, is corrupt) and the
like are good paraphrases for Type A sentences. We have a simple and compelling
explanation for this observed fact if as is just an overt realization of a head (Pr)
intervening between judge and the main predicate of the sentence.
4.3 LOOKING AHEAD
One might take exception to the claim that Type A and Type B simple APS have dra-
matically different semantics, given my hypothesis that Type A and Type B as-phrases
are in the same phrasal category (PrP). These two claims appear difficult to square
with compositionality. Where does the systematic difference in truth-conditions be-
tween Type A and Type B sentences come from, if not from their as-phrases? This
objection is based on two unwarranted assumptions: that Type B sentences show
no more selectivity for their main predicates than Type A sentences do, and that
there is only one head in the phrasal category PrP. It is likely that the special truth-
conditions of Type B sentences are mostly due to the lexical semantics of the more
limited class of verbs that can form Type B sentences. Levin (1993) gives us an initial
guide to these verbs.[Lev93] They bear important semantic similarities to verbs that
take clausal complements, of which Bonevac (1984) makes a systematic study.[Bon84]
The second unwarranted assumption, that there is only one head in the PrP category,
neglects the diversity of heads within each of several functional categories: CP con-
tains several complementizers, TP has a number of tenses. Bowers (2010) concludes
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with a sketch of a compositional semantics for PrP structures.[Bow10] There, he re-
jects his earlier hypothesis in Bowers (1993) and (2001) that Pr uniformly denotes a
simple type-lifter from properties to propositional functions. [Bow93, Bow01] Rather,
he hypothesizes that the category PrP contains a variety of heads, all of which are
quantifiers over events, semantically speaking.[Bow10] They are A-quantifiers rather
than D-quantifiers, in the vocabulary of Westerståhl and Peters (2006), since they
are not determiners, and they quantify over entities of a more abstract sort than
determiner-phrases usually denote. I will provisionally adopt Bowers' later hypothe-
sis that, for the purposes of semantics, Pr heads are A-quantifiers. Chapter 5 lends
support to this assumption by developing a simple and powerful semantic theory of
Type A sentences on its basis.
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5 THE SEMANTIC THEORY
5.1 TYPE A AND TYPE B AGAIN
Chapter 4 introduced two classes of sentences, Type A and Type B. As argued in
that chapter, they are defined by syntactic types. Syntactic properties alone define
the extension of each of these classes.
(TA) A sentence s is Type A iffdef: s is a simple APS and the
V of the highest VP of s does not c-command the
as-phrase of s.
(TB) A sentence s is Type B iffdef: s is a simple APS and the
V of the highest VP of s c-commands the as-phrase of s.
With these definitions (TA) and (TB) in hand, I presented distributional evidence for
the hypotheses H1-H3 in chapter 4.
H1 Some APS are of Type A.
H2 Some APS are of Type B.
H3 Every simple APS is either Type A or Type B.
I also assumed a fairly mundane methodological principle for any compositional se-
mantic theory. The principle is mundane in that it follows from a more general
principle of empirical science. The principle is couched in terms of the kinds that
our theoretical and non-theoretical background assumptions recognize. A chemical
analogy will help to clarify what I mean by kinds here. People used to consider
any heavy, yellow, shiny, metallic material to be gold. It turned out that more than
one natural kind in the human environment displays all of these properties, though.
Chemistry has shown that the range of examples people considered gold includes
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examples of several natural kinds. Many samples regarded as gold in the past are
composed of iron pyrite. The idea I mean to highlight is that our old concept of gold
encompasses chemically diverse samples with observable properties like shininess, yel-
lowness in common.[20]
Let's return to the methodological principle mentioned above. In its general form,
this principle says: given evidence that a kind is pejoratively disjunctive, design the-
ories of the disjunct kinds that compose it, not the disjunctive kind itself.[Sid06]1[21]
Let's assume that empirical syntactic theories are theories of syntactic kinds. I grant
that there is not substantial consensus on the nature of these kinds, if they are in-
deed the objects of syntactic theory.[SPP15]2 These syntactic kinds might be various
types of psychological representation, instantiated in all human minds.[Cho15]3 Per-
haps the syntactic kinds are equivalence-classes over syntagmatic relations between
word-classes, constituted by the social norms of speech within a community at one
moment.[de 98, Har70]4 It might even be that they are only instantiated in minds
or community norms by accident, since they predated these human realities. For my
purposes, it doesn't matter exactly which kinds empirical syntax is about. It just
matters that there are mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes of elements of a
language, defined independent of their semantic properties. These classes, we hope,
track the syntactic kinds. Then the syntactic types are just the members of that
set of the theory's phrasal categories, closed under each of the theory's primitive
syntactic relations or operations.[Mon74b]5 Applied to semantics, then, the mundane
1See my definition of pejoratively disjunctive in chapter 4, sec. 4.1.1 and sec. 4.1.2.
2Consider the variety among working linguists' conceptions of their discipline reported in Scholz,
Pelletier and Pullum (2015), Philosophy of Linguistics.
3E.g., Chomsky (1965) and all research that hypothesizes a Universal Grammar that is mostly the
genetic inheritance of all homo sapiens.
4For instance, de Saussure suggested this view (and terminology); Z.S. Harris pursued this approach
in more fully worked-out analyses, e.g., Immediate-constituent Formulation of English Syntax
in Harris (1970).
5What I have in mind here is the notion of a syntactic algebra, presented in Montague (1970),
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methodological principle amounts to this. Call it (PD).
(PD) Any compositional semantic theory should assign
denotations only to the members of syntactic types that
aren't pejoratively disjunctive.
More simply put: if you're designing a compositional semantic theory, make it assign
denotations only to the syntactic types most likely to track syntactic kinds. Those
types found in the best-supported and most theoretically-virtuous syntactic theories
are most likely to track the syntactic kinds, in this sense.6
From this principle (PD) and from H1-H3, I inferred in chapter 4 that a composi-
tional semanticist ought not design a theory of APS (As-Phrase Sentences) per se.
Rather, she should design a theory of Type A sentences or a theory of Type B. For
a semanticist who accepts (PD), though, all of these syntactic and methodological
scruples would be uninteresting if Type A turned out to have the same semantic type
as Type B.7 In sec. 5.1 below I will suggest that this is not the case. The entailment
profiles of Type B sentences share little, in fact, with those of Type A sentences. The
two syntactic types also differ in some other typological respects, to be discussed.
This conclusion, that Type A and B differ in semantic type, cuts two ways. First,
it bolsters my argument that a semanticist accepting (PD) ought to design distinct
theories of Type A or of Type B. My own contribution in this chapter is a new semantic
theory of Simple Type A sentence that does not treat Type B sentences. Thus it
stands in some need of the justification I take the above argument to provide. Second,
the claim that the class of APS divides cleanly into Type A and B motivates my first
Universal Grammar. The notion is abstract enough to encompass all of the specific accounts
of syntactic type I mention above.
6It's likely that there are many cases where this principle picks no clear winner among several
competing hypotheses. In these cases, the force of the principle is to keep out empirically doubtful
hypotheses, and the compositional semanticist has to decide her list of syntactic types on other
grounds.
7Despite their different syntactic types (see Section 4.2.1).
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approach to a new semantic theory of Type A sentences. Excluding Type B sentences,
I construct an analogy between Type A sentences and two classes of sentences more
closely studied by linguists. These two classes are the Q-adverb sentences, and the
generics known as dispositional sentences or I-generics.[vF95, KPC+95, Hin08] This
analogy, once established on the basis of syntactic and semantic similarities, motivates
my use of the semantic techniques that my theory employs.
In this chapter, I present my semantic theory of Simple Type A sentences. Instead
of starting with the theory in the final form that I endorse, I will begin with a
simpler theory, the First Iteration. This First Iteration of my theory is drawn from
the literature on Q-adverb semantics. I criticize its inadequacies for the purpose of
predicting the semantic properties of Type A sentences. I offer objections to this
First Iteration that both justify and explain the significant changes that the Second
Iteration introduces. The First Iteration arises from my argument by analogy between
Type A sentences to the one side, and Q-adverb and I-generic sentences to the other.
It is based on Kai von Fintel's 1995 semantic theory of Q-adverb sentences, couched
in terms of Angelika Kratzer's possibilistic situation semantics.[vF95]
The Second Iteration replaces this Q-adverb analysis of Type A sentences with a
variant of Ariel Cohen's probabilistic analysis of the silent generic quantifier, Gen.
The Second Iteration also proposes that there is another generalized quantifier over
the set of situations, present in every Type A sentence. The second quantifier is based
on a principal ultrafilter. I argue that this second quantifier is the denotation of the Pr
head of the Simple Type A sentence's as-phrase. Its definition is based on the almost
all quantifier that Carnielli and Veloso (1997) introduce in their Ultrafilter Logic.
[CV97, VV04] This modification restores the important class of boolean entailments
to my theory, which the theories of Landman (1989b), Szabó (2003) and Asher (2011)
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all predict. It also avoids common counter-examples to any analysis of Gen based on
a simple Most quantifier. The First Iteration's major flaw is that it fails to predict
these boolean entailments. The Second Iteration also overcomes the Objection from
Temporal Relations, Objection from Intensionality, and the problem of Exception
Tolerance, which I introduced in sec. 2.2. I now turn to a more detailed summary of
each section of this chapter.
In sec. 5.2 I develop an argument from the entailments and structure of Type A sen-
tences to their semantic similarity to Q-adverb and I-generic sentences.[KPC+95,
CP95] An important subclass of Type A sentence, which has gained a disproportion-
ate amount of attention in the as-phrase literature, share key properties with the most
natural readings of these Q-adverb and I-generic sentences.8 There is a well-developed
semantic literature treating I-generic sentences and Q-adverb sentences using situa-
tions as semantic primitives.[Kra12, Kra14, Hin08, vF95] In sec. 5.2 I infer, by analogy,
that the most promising semantics for Type A sentences will be situation-based. The
specific variant of situation theory I use is the possibilistic situation semantics of
Kratzer (1989), based on the counterpart theory of Lewis (1968), and developed fur-
ther by Kratzer, Berman, von Fintl, Elbourne, and Hinterwimmer.[Lew68] In sec. 5.3,
I briefly explain what this situation theory is. It is based on Kai von Fintel's mini-
mal semantics for Q-adverb sentences.[vF95] sec. 5.3 sets out the basic parts of the
theory: lexical entries, composition rules, and details about the intended model and
the ontology it entails.
In sec. 5.4.4 I revisit my three main objections to Szabó (2003) from chapter 2: the
Objection from Intensionality, Exception Tolerance, and the Objection from Tem-
8As I briefly argue in Section 5.2, there are good empirical and theoretical reasons for treating
all of these classes of sentences with one semantic framework and roughly one logical form:
possibilistic situation semantics, and generalized quantifiers over situations, respectively.
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poral Relations. This First Iteration of the theory avoids all three the second two
straightforwardly, and the first more indirectly. The theory avoids the Objection from
Intensionality using an adaptation of Burge's semantic theory of names, influenced by
Elbourne (2005), (2013).[Bur73, Elb05, Elb13] To obtain an appropriate restrictor set
for the ultrafilter quantifier, however, we must give up a mainstream Millian view of
proper names' semantic values. I explain why this treatment of names is not subject
to the most common objections against other description-based theories of proper
names.
In sec. 5.5 I raise a decisive objection against this First Iteration of the semantic
theory. All Simple Type A sentences show the pattern of entailments that Landman
(1989) introduced, and Szabó (2003) and Asher (2011) assume. The First Iteration
of my theory does not predict this entailment-pattern. I will call this pattern the
boolean entailments, after their resemblance to the defining properties of a boolean
algebra.[BS97, BM77] I propose a Second Iteration of the theory in reply to this
objection. It is based on the ultrafilter logic of Carnielli and Veloso (1997), originally
designed to formalize reasoning about kind-generics (D-generics).9[CV97, KPC+95]
To take advantage of this insight, I will introduce a replacement for the quantifier
at the core of the First Iteration, based on the almost all quantifier of Carnielli
and Veloso (1997). The Second Iteration of my theory retains support for Exception
Tolerance, and like the first, it avoids both the Objection from Intensionality and the
Objection from Temporal Relations. Unlike the First Iteration, however, it correctly
predicts the boolean entailments that Landman, Szabó, and Asher correctly assume.
Further, the Second Iteration draws on a probability-based quantificational theory
of generics from Cohen (1999), in order to adapt the main insight of Carnielli and
9Here I assume the I-generic/D-generic distinction discussed in the long introductory chapter to
Krifka et al. (1995).
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Veloso's ultrafilter logic to the context of natural-language semantics.
5.1.1 DIFFERENT SYNTACTIC TYPES, DIFFERENT SEMANTIC
TYPES
Type A and Type B sentences have different semantic properties, correlated with
their different constituent structures. In chapter 4, I argued that simple sentences
containing as-phrases cleanly divide into two syntactic types, Type A and Type B.
To establish that claim, I intentionally avoided citing any semantic differences be-
tween sentences in these two classes. There are, however, important and systematic
differences between the truth-conditions and entailment-profiles of Type A and Type
B sentences, among other typological properties. Before turning to the semantic ev-
idence for that claim, I will consider a few further distributional differences between
the two classes, and an important difference at the interface between syntax and
semantics. These include differences in the ways that predicate-argument structure
maps onto the sentence's constituent structure, different phrasal categories allowed
in the as-phrase predicate, and differences between the classes of verbs found in Type
A and B sentences, respectively.
In this section, when I write apparent Type A or apparent Type B I mean, unless
otherwise noted, the sentences that I claim are Type A or the sentences that I
claim are Type B, respectively. Since I defined the terms Type A and Type B in
chapter 4, to include such syntactic properties as the as phrase forming a constituent
with the verb, it would be circular and uninformative for me to write, e.g., All Type
B sentences' as phrases form a constituent with their verb. It is non-circular and
informative for me to write, for example, each apparent Type B sentences has an
as-phrase that forms a constituent with its main verb.
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5.1.1.1 DISTRIBUTIONAL AND TYPOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
SUBJECT AND PREDICATE POSITIONS
The as-phrase predicate takes the object in [Spec,TP] for its subject in any Simple
Type A sentence. In contrast, the as-phrase predicate in any Simple Type B sentence
takes the item in [Comp, V] for its subject. Moving the as-phrase in a Simple Type
B past the main verb changes the available readings, effectively switching the item
that the as-phrase predicate takes for its subject. I presented evidence for this claim
in chapter 4, sec. 4.1.2.[22] Himmelmann and Schultze-Berndt (2006) construct a ty-
pology of adjunct predicates, classifying these predicates based on the objects they
modify in the constituent structure of the sentences. In their terms, Simple Type
A sentences are participant-oriented adjunct predicates.[HSB06] This means that the
adjunct predicate such a sentence takes the Agent for its subject, rather than, for
instance a Theme role-player that is an argument to the main verb.
LEVIN'S AS ALTERNATION
Levin (1993) documents a transformation she calls the As Alternation.[Lev93] All
sentences that participate in this alternation are Type B, in my terms, though not all
Type B sentences support the As Alternation.10 A sentence shows the As Alterna-
tion if its main verb is an intentional verb that takes a complement headed by as,
but yields a sentence with the same truth-conditions when as is simply deleted from
the sentence. Whether a sentence participates in the As Alternation is determined
by its main verb, Levin argues.
(98) a. The committee appointed Ms. Waters as its spokesperson.
10Levin (1993) also proposes that the as phrase in each of these sentences is a small clause. This
hypothesis agrees with Bowers' Pr hypothesis, since Bowers (1993), (2000) analyzes the notion
of small clause in terms of the PrP. Bowers complicates this analysis of small clauses in Bowers
(2010), but the hypothesis remains substantially the same.
140
b. The committee appointed Ms. Waters its spokesperson.
(99) a. An independent investigation confirmed Johnson as the secret informant.
b. An independent investigation confirmed Johnson the secret informant.
(100) a. The committee confirmed Ms. Waters as its spokesperson.
b. * The committee confirmed Ms. Waters its spokesperson.
(101) a. I regarded him as an officer and a gentleman.
b. * I regarded him an officer and a gentleman.
(102) a. I considered him an officer and a gentleman.
b. ?? I considered him as an officer and a gentleman.
(103) a. CERN regarded the study as a great success.
b. CERN regarded the study a great success.
(104) a. CERN regarded him as a great success.
b. ? CERN regarded him a great success.
(105) a. I regarded him as a great success.
b. ?? I regarded him a great success.
Examples 98a-105b however raise doubts about the claim that the main verb alone
decides whether Type B sentences based on it participate in Levin's As Alternation.11
If that were so, then 99b and 100b would be equally acceptable, or equally unaccept-
able, since both pairs of sentences has the main verb [confirm]. Likewise, examples
102a and 103b should show the same degree of acceptability if it is the sentence's main
11I have heard and seen instances of this type of sentence, but it is not part of my own idiolect. It is
a problem for future research to figure out what systematically differs between my idiolect and
those of speakers who judge this acceptable.
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verb alone that decides participation in the As Alternation, since they are based on
the same verb, [regard].
The most likely explanation for this observed difference in acceptability between ex-
amples based on the same verb is that the verb appears in different contexts. To test
which sentential context is responsible, we need some minimal pairs, which 99a and
100a, 101a and 103a are not.[KSS14]12 1 and 5 are identical except for their main
verbs, and their paired sentences 2 and 6 do indeed differ in acceptability. This only
suggests (at best) that a change of main verb is sufficient to determine participation
in the As Alternation. Examples 103a and 104a form a minimal pair, differing only in
the particular phrase that occurs in object position ([him] / [the study]) and other-
wise identical. Yet 103b sounds perfectly acceptable to me, while 104b does not. This
difference in As-Alternation acceptability in the minimal pair 103a, 104a is evidence
that a change of main verb is not necessary to produce a change in As-Alternation
participation.
I won't pursue this argument much further, since the differences in As-Alternation
properties among Type B sentences is very peripheral to my aims in this chapter.
Given the evidence above, however, two approaches to explaining these differences
within Type B sentences are plausible. Since the evidence above shows that changing
the phrase in object-position alone can change the As-Alternation properties of a
Type B sentence, it is possible that the apparently Type-B sentences showing As
Alternation are actually idiom chunks. This would explain their otherwise-puzzling
sensitivity to a change of the object-position phrase, which is prima facie likely to
be a semantic argument, and thus not part of the material that composes the main
predicate of the sentence, logically speaking. Likewise, the snake is out of the bag
12On the methodological idea of a minimal pair in linguistics, see Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler
(2014).
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does not retain the idiomatic meaning of the cat is out of the bag, even though the
two sentences differ only in one semantic argument: the one in subject-position.
Another line of thinking would suggest that examples like 103a and 104a require
semantic reconstruction to produce their most natural readings. 103a, for instance,
would be reconstructed at LF into a predicate-argument term F (s), where F applies
to just those things that CERN regards as a great success.13 Perhaps F cannot
apply to an argument that denotes an individual person, for typing reasons (recall
chapter 3). Alternatively, perhaps reconstruction maps 104a to the LF F (s) and
105a to G(s), where G applies to just those things that the speaker of 105a regards
as a great success. For typing reasons, perhaps F can apply to a study but not an
individual person.14
A serious objection to this second explanation is that the examples above provide
evidence of differences in acceptability; they are not evidence for differences in sat-
isfiability. In fact, some of the examples above suggest that there is no difference
in satisfiability. I find it hard to imagine a competent speaker of English unable to
grasp any claim that could possibly be true from an utterance of 105b, for example,
though he grasps such a claim from an utterance of 105a without issue. Nevertheless,
for some competent speakers including me, 105b sounds worse than 105a.
13Note that a level of representation like LF is sufficient but not necessary to explain a case of
semantic reconstruction like these. Another explanation interprets the sentences' Spell-Out rep-
resentation directly might use function composition and a categorial grammar opportunistically
to form a function that maps to truth just those things which CERN regards as a great success,
or a different function that maps to truth just those things that regard the study as a great
success. An account based on continuations could explain the same data, as well. On these
different approaches to the semantic derivation of complex predicates, Jacobson (1999), Barker
(2002), and Barker and Shan (2014), respectively.
14Here, I mean to use the description the speaker of 14 rigidly. In other words, whoever utters 14
actually, at a particular time and place the reconstructed predicate G applies to an argument s
just in case s denotes something which that very speaker regards as a great success.
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ADJECTIVAL COMPLEMENTS TO PR
Type B sentences' as PrPs allow adjectival complements to as, but Type A sen-
tences as PrPs do not.
(106) John regarded the man as silly.
(107) John derided James as devious.
(108) Ernest dismissed the observations as erroneous.
(109) Lina criticized the book as misleading.
(110) * Superman leapt over the tall building as heroic.
(111) * John raised a question as curious.
(112) * The robot processes data as artificial.
(113) * Émile supports the bill as civilian.
At first, these data 106 - 113 seem hard to explain, given my syntactic analysis in
chapter 4. It would seem that, to uphold my syntactic hypotheses from chapter 4, I
need to argue that this distributional difference is driven by features of the particular
main verb in a Type B sentence, not by the selectional features of Pr itself. This
hypothesis has some motivation, though. Not all Type B sentences allow adjectival
complements to as. For instance, 114 - 119 below:
(114) * John used the book as educational.
(115) John used the book as an educational resource.
(116) * Superman uses his power as beneficial.
(117) Superman uses his power as a beneficial tool.
(118) ? John treated the man as stupid.
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(119) John treated the man as a stupid person.
In each pair of examples above, the main verb and the adjective in the complement to
as are held constant. In each pair, one of the sentences has its adjective embedded
in a DP: an educational resource, a beneficial tool, etc. Finally, I constructed each
sentence to allow a (strained) felicitous interpretation, to control for the influence
of an infelicity intuition rather than a syntactic intuition. The sentences with DP
complements to as are all acceptable, while every sentence with a bare adjective
phrase in complement to as is much worse. In conjunction with the previous set
of examples, these data suggest that the acceptability of an AP complement to as
in APS is determined by selectional features of the verb, rather than the semantic
features of the complement to as.
One will immediately ask: what if the systematic difference in acceptability observed
in 106 - 113 is due to selectional features of the Pr heads themselves, not just those
of the verbs? This hypothesis requires that there is not one but several heads in
the Pr category. That is, it requires that several instances of the Pr category differ
in their c-selectional features, not just their semantic features. There is independent
evidence for this additional assumption, though. Bowers (2010), Balusu (2014), Adger
and Ramchand (2003), and Myler (2014) argue for at least two different heads in a
phrasal category whose sole syntactic function is to represent predication, variously
labeled PrP, PredP, or piP. [Myl14, AR03, Bow10, Bal14]
Even more promisingly, Citko (2008) argues for at least two different predication
heads, one of which selects for nominal complements only. Citko cites evidence from
Polish. She argues that in Polish, one of these heads realizes verbal copular con-
structions, and the other is found in pronomial small-clause predicates.[Cit08] The
pronomial small-clause predicates in Polish are unacceptable with all adjectival com-
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plements, like the as Pr head in a Simple Type A sentence. The predicational head
that Citko argues is present in Polish verbal copular constructions allows adjectival
and nominal complements. Citko also observes different semantic typology in these
verbal and small-clause predicates: the verbal predicates are stage-level while the
small-clause predicates are strictly individual-level.15 This typological semantic dif-
ference closely resembles the one that we observe in Simple Type A and Simple Type
B sentences: Type A as PrPs are never stage-level predicates.
I tentatively conclude that interaction between c-selectional features of the verb and
those of the particular Pr head found in a Type B sentence explains the acceptabil-
ity of adjectival complements to as in these sentences. The precise nature of this
interaction offers a fascinating topic for future research.
MENTAL AND SOCIAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF TYPE BMAIN PRED-
ICATES
All Type B sentences' truth-conditions involve some mind or social context or rep-
resentation e.g., describe as, register as, denigrate as, treat as, use as, etc. There
are some Type A sentences, on the other hand, that are true even if no such mental,
social, representational things exist e.g., the statue/clay examples from Szabó and
Fine.
Given the verbs usually found in Type B main predicates (intentional or perceptual
verbs), we might expect them to create non-extensional contexts (substitution of co-
extensive expressions fails to preserve truth-value in context). Some do. They also
create hyperintensional contexts (substitution of intensionally equivalent expressions
fails to preserve truth-value in context). The intentional verbs in Type B sentences'
main predicates provide a likely explanation for these substitution-failures, though.
15This is all to be found in Citko (2008) p. 275.
146
They present no mystery for compositional semantics, unlike Saul's simple substi-
tution failures and, perhaps, the substitution-failures found in Type A sentences.
Rather, they simply point to the well-known mystery of the semantics of intentional
predicates. While fascinating, this mystery deserves an investigation of its own, and
falls outside the scope of the present work.
5.1.1.2 CORE SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF TYPE A SENTENCES
BOOLEAN ENTAILMENTS
Landman (1989), Szabó (2003), and Asher (2011) provide compelling evidence that
all of what I call Type A sentences have this entailment pattern, which I review in
sec. 1.1.1, Landman's theory.[Lan89, Sza03, Ash11] I won't add to their arguments
here.
FACTIVITY IN QUALIFYING PREDICATE
By factivity here, I mean a semantic property of a sentence s of natural language
such that if a predicate F of that sentence truly applies to its subject under a qualifica-
tion G, then the predicate F also truly applies to its subject in s without qualification.
In virtue of its structure alone, a Type A sentence might be factive in its qualifying
predicate, its qualified predicate, or both. A Type A sentence is factive in its qualify-
ing predicate just in case if pa F as Gq is true (in a given context), then pa Gq must
be true in the same context. Likewise, a Type A sentence is factive in its qualified
predicate just in case if pa F as Gq is true in a context, then pa F q must be true in
the same context.
In fact, it appears likely that all Simple Type A sentences are factive in their qualifying
predicates, but only some Type A are factive in their qualified predicate. Szabó (2003)
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adequately defends Landman's claim that each of the sentences I call Simple Type A
is factive in its qualifying predicate. Non-Simple Type A sentences are not all factive
in their qualifying predicates, e.g., those with overt modals.
(120) a. Andy would be vigilant as a hall-monitor.
b. Andy is a hall-monitor.
Not all Simple Type B sentences, however, are factive in their qualifying predicates:
(121) a. Annie saw the uniformed man as a police officer.
b. The uniformed man Annie saw is a police officer.
(122) a. John used the book as a paddle.
b. The book John used is a paddle.
(123) a. Edward slandered James as a liar.
b. James is a liar.
5.1.1.3 IMPORTANT SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF MANY TYPE A
SENTENCES
EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE QUALIFIED PREDICATE
Not every Type A sentence is factive in its qualified predicate. For example,
(124) a. John is efficient as an employee.
b. John is efficient.
The first sentence might be true in a context where John cares a great deal about
his job, but cares relatively less about the organization of his magazine collection, for
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instance. However, it appears likely that every Simple Type A sentence does exemplify
its qualified predicate. In the sense I mean it to have here, exemplification refers to
the property of a Type A sentence s, pa F as Gq, such that if s is true in a context,
then there exists at least one witness to the fact that the qualified predicate of s,
G, truly applies to its subject a, in that context.16 In other words, s exemplifies
its qualified predicate iff there exists some example of a case that supports the truth
of pa F q. If this definition of exemplifies is too theory-laden, a simple test might
reveal the contrast I have in mind.
Test for exemplification of predicates in Type A sentences:
(EP) Change the tense of one predicate, H, in s to simple
(perfective) past, and insert once immediately to the
left of the predicate, yielding s′.
Interpretation of result If s entails s', then s is likely to exemplify H.
For each pair of sentences in 125a - 128a labeled a. and b. below, b. results from
applying (ET) to a. Intuitively, a. entails b. in each pair below.
(125) a. John raises questions as a judge.
b. John once raised a question as a judge.
(126) a. Superman leaps over tall buildings as Superman.
b. Superman once leapt over a tall building as Superman.
(127) a. John earns $100, 000 as a developer.
b. John once earned $100, 000 as a developer.
(128) a. John opens the shop as the supervisor.
16My apologies for giving this term a new sense. If there is an established term for the property
I mean here, I would welcome it. Exemplification appears, e.g., in Kratzer (2012) with an
entirely different sense, pertaining to the way in which a situation supports a proposition.
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b. John once opened the shop as the supervisor.
Simple Type A sentences like 129a below are degenerate cases of Type A sentences
that exemplify their qualified predicates, so to speak. The tense is already simple per-
fective past, and the insertion of once appears semantically inert for such sentences.
129a clearly entails 129b.
(129) a. John raised a question as a judge.
b. John once raised a question as a judge.
EXCEPTION TOLERANCE
Exception tolerance is a known property of many sentences under generic
readings.[KPC+95] Here I use another simple test which indicates exception tolerance.
(ET) If s is a Type A sentence, insert sometimes at the
front of s and negate the qualified predicate of s.
17
(130) a. Superman leaps over tall buildings as Superman.
b. Sometimes Superman does not leap over tall buildings as Superman.
(131) a. John is corrupt as a judge.
b. Sometimes John is non-corrupt as a judge.
(132) a. Janine sweeps the gym floor as a janitor.
b. Sometimes Janine doesn't sweep the gym floor as a janitor.
Degenerate case:
17The notion of negating a natural-language predicate is vague. It closely resembles complementation
in categorical logic or in generalized quantifier theory. Sentential negation seems not to produce
the contrasting sentence I have in mind. E.g., applying sentential negation to Superman leaps
over tall buildings as Superman yields It's not the case that Superman leaps over tall buildings
as Superman. Intuitively, this pair of sentences is inconsistent. Yet the first sentence is exception-
tolerant in the sense I intend. I would welcome a better test for exception tolerance than (ET).
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(133) John raised a question as a judge.
(134) Sometimes John doesn't raise a question as a judge.
One simple objection to Szabó's 2003 theory shows that it cannot predict the ex-
ception tolerance of those Type A sentences that have it, assuming straightforward
analyses of the Q-adverb sometimes and of negation. This result is more or less pre-
dictable from the course-grained eventualities (states) that his theory uses to model
APS entailments, and the parthood relation that he imposes on these states. Recall
Szabó's basic logical form for an APS pa G as F q:
p∃s [∃σ [In(a, s) ∧ F (s) ∧G(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]q.[Sza03]
Szabó's theory assigns the following logical form (a) to 133:
(a) ∃s [∃σ [In(j, s) ∧ Janitor′(s) ∧ SweepsF loor′(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]
The only way I see to implement the Q-adverb sometimes in an event-semantics like
Szabó's is to have sometimes introduce an existential closure of an event-variable,
perhaps with the addition of some other conjoined predicate to the matrix of the
quantifier. Then sometimes introduces no changes into the logical form Szabó's
theory assigns to 133. Due to scope, we have at least two options for implementing
the negation in ??. The negation can take wide scope over both quantifiers (1 below),
middle scope over the inner quantifier only (2 below), or narrow scope over the term
SweepsF loor′(σ) only (3 below).
1 ¬∃s [∃σ [In(j, s) ∧ Janitor′(s) ∧ SweepsF loor′(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]
2 ∃s [¬∃σ [In(j, s) ∧ Janitor′(s) ∧ SweepsF loor′(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]
3 ∃s [∃σ [In(j, s) ∧ Janitor′(s) ∧ ¬SweepsF loor′(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]
Every one of the three sentences 1-3 above is inconsistent with (a), however. Thus
Szabó's theory, extended with straightforward implementations of sometimes and
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the negation in 135, predicts that 135 is unsatisfiable.
(135) Janine sweeps the gym floor as a janitor but sometimes Janine doesn't sweep
the gym floor as a janitor.
Thus, on straightforward additional assumptions, and by definition of (ET) above,
Szabó's theory does not support Exception Tolerance. Based on the discussion of
Asher's theory in sec. 3.1, it is clear that Asher's 2011 semantic theory of APS does
not support Exception Tolerance either.
This lack of support for Exception Tolerance among major theories of APS is sur-
prising, because of the main predicates of commonly-used Type A sentences. First,
it appears likely that Type A sentences with individual-level main predicates are the
most commonly-used subset of Type A sentences. If the main function of Type A
sentences in actual discourse is to block contradictions among incompatible predi-
cates of one subject, then the semantics of stage-level predicates makes them unlikely
candidates for the main predicates of actually used Type A sentences. Stage-level
predicates apply to their subjects just in case they apply to some relatively fleet-
ing temporal stage of that subject, or a short-lived eventuality that serves the same
semantic function.[Kra95] Few pairs composed of a stage-level predicate and its nega-
tion lead to contradiction when applied to the same subject, due to their inherently
small durations that support their application to the subject.
Second, many semanticists believe that all sentences containing an individual-level
main predicate have a generic reading.[Car77, Kra95, Chi95, KPC+95] If these se-
manticists are correct, then given the argument above, it follows that the Type A
sentences most likely to be most commonly used have generic readings. Since excep-
tion tolerance is a hallmark of genericity, it also follows that the Type A sentences
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most likely to be most commonly used have readings on which they are exception-
tolerant. The lack of support for Exception Tolerance among major theories of APS
is therefore more than surprising; it should be an important area of focus for semantic
research.
SUBSTITUTION FAILURES18
(136) a. Superman leaps over tall buildings as Superman.
b. Superman doesn't leap over tall buildings as Clark Kent.
(137) a. Samuel Clemens publishes novels as Mark Twain.
b. Samuel Clemens doesn't publish novels as Samuel Clemens.
(138) a. Anna Kushchyenko confers with Russian intelligence officials as Anna
Kushchyenko.
b. Anna Kushchyenko doesn't confer with Russian intelligence officials as
Anna Chapman.
Landman (1989) and Asher (2006),(2011) point out that some APS show substitution
failures.[Lan89, Ash06, Ash11] Well-known from the semantics of attitude-contexts,
these are cases in which a sentence s of natural language is true in some context
C, but a sentence s′ produced simply by substituting co-referential expressions for
constituents of s is false in C. Saul (1997), (2007) calls substitution failures in a
sentence containing no overt modal operator (including attitudes) simple substitution
failure. The failures of (truth-preserving) substitution in the cases she studies result
from the substitution of co-referential names, specifically.
18Like the Mark Twain example, this example is factual. See
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Chapman> for details on this individual's double
life.
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Theorists attempt to explain these substitution failures using semantic, pragmatic, or
psychological theories.[Sau07, Pit01, Moo99]19 This literature on simple substitution
failures is a rich source of data for a semantic theory of APS. As Szabó (2003) ob-
served, for each sentence showing a simple substitution failure, there appears to have
an APS with the same truth-conditions.[Sza03] Saul (2007) also liberally employs as-
phrase sentences to paraphrase sentences showing simple substitution-failures, with-
out remark.[Sau07]
For my purpose here, it is enough to note that there is a large and interesting class
of apparent Type A sentences that show substitution failures. A semantic theory of
Type A sentences ought to interface with the semantic machinery used to predict and
explain these phenomena. I have argued in chapter 2 and chapter 3 that Szabó and
Asher's semantic theories each face difficult objections in their treatment of this data.
To summarize my interpretation of the semantic data displayed in this section, all
Type A sentences have the boolean entailments. All Simple Type A sentence are
factive in their qualifying predicates. All Simple Type A sentences exemplify their
qualified predicates (in the sense defined above). An important subset of Type A
sentences are exception-tolerant. Another important subset of Type A sentences with
proper names in their subject or their complement to as position fail to preserve
truth under substitution for co-referential expressions.
No one ought to expect a semantic theory of quantificational nominal expressions
to handle tense as well. This divide-and-conquer approach is wise. Nevertheless,
integration of semantic theories developed separately is often a worthwhile and non-
trivial task.
19I will not discuss these
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5.2 TYPE A, Q-ADVERB, AND I-GENERIC SENTENCES
Semantic theories based on a quantifier over situations make good predictions about
the intuitive truth-conditions of I-generics and Q-adverb sentences.[dS93, KPC+95,
vF95, Hin08, GF12]20 Many I-generics and Q-adverb sentences share four semantic
properties with the two important subsets of Type A sentences I discussed above in
sec. 5.1.1.3. By analogy, it is likely that a semantic theory based on a quantifier over
situations will make good predictions about the truth-conditions of Type A sentences.
The four properties that these two important subsets of Type A sentences share
with Q-adverb and I-generic sentences are substitution-failures, exception tolerance,
tripartite structure, and the quantificational variability effect (QVE).
Many Q-adverb sentences and I-generics are exception-tolerant, e.g., 139, 140, both
of which are consistent with 141.[KPC+95]
(139) Anne smokes when nervous.
(140) Anne usually smokes when nervous
(141) Sometimes Anne does not smoke when nervous.
(142) Most of the cases in which Anne smokes are cases in which Anne is nervous.
Some Q-adverb sentences and I-generics contain opaque contexts. Graff-Fara's Ad-
verbs (2012) points out this problem, arguing that we need an intensional theory
of adverbs based on situations, from evidence of opaque contexts in the Theme-
positions of verbal predicates in sentences with certain adverbs.[GF12, vF95]21 Fi-
nally, many of I-generics and Q-adverb sentences show QVE, the quantificational
20This stream of research on semantics for Q-adverbs in situation semantics begins with de Swart
(1993), and continues in Krifka et al. (1995), Von Fintel (1995), and Hinterwimmer (2008). More
recently, Graff-Fara (2012) comments in passing on the importance of situation semantics in this
literature on Q-adverbs.
21Von Fintel (1995) also points out the problem of intensional Q-adverbs in passing, p.6.
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variability effect.[vF95, Hin08] QVE is the phenomenon in which a Q-adverb sen-
tence has a rather exact paraphrase in a sentence containing a determiner quantifier
but no Q-adverb. I-generic sentences also show QVE.22 For instance, 142 is a good
paraphrase for both 139, an I-generic sentence, and 140, a Q-adverb sentence.
Both Q-adverb and I-generic sentences also have three-part structures. A compo-
sitional derivation of truth-conditions for a Q-adverb or I-generic sentence's truth-
conditions requires a quantifier, overt or unpronounced, and two additional elements
(arguments): a restrictor, and a scope, also called the matrix. The representation
below shows the three-part structure of both 139 and 140. A subscripted Q marks
the quantifier, while R and M mark the restrictor and matrix, respectively.
MostQ (s) [Anne is nervous in s]R [Anne smokes in s]M .
Annei XP
ZP
<Most>
XP
YP
shei is nervous
XP
<she>i smokes
Figure 5.1: Structure of a simple Q-adverb sentence
This is the same tripartite structure found in a compositional derivation of Type A
sentences' truth-conditions, as seen in Asher's 2011 theory, for example (see sec. 3.2.2).
Type A sentences have a wide variety of subtly different contexts of use, whether
overt as in embedded tenses or modals, or unpronounced (generic readings). Eide
22See Von Fintel (1995), p.27 for more on QVE.
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and Åfarli (1999) in passing list a cross-section of this variety of readings in some
examples, all Type A.[EÅ99] Recall that my syntactic analysis of Type A sentences
hypothesizes two Pr heads in each Type A sentences, and that all Pr heads denote
quantifiers, after Bowers (2010). In light of my syntactic analysis, of the variety
of readings that Eide and Åfarli display, and the fact that exception tolerance and
substitution-failures appear only in a subset of Type A sentences, it is likely that
two distinct elements of the Type A sentences interact to yield the observed variety
of readings. Plausibly, one of them is responsible for the strictly extensional and
exception-intolerant logical profile that Szabó's theory handles well. Then the other
such element accounts for those exceptions to the semantic profile of Szabó's examples
that are nevertheless Type A rather than Type B sentences. Based on my analogy
between Type A sentences and I-generic or Q-adverb sentences, we would expect one
of these two interacting elements to be a generic quantifier or adverbial quantifier.
There are many empirically plausible ways that the syntax-semantics interface might
bear out my hypothesis that the mixed semantic profile of Type A is the result of
two different elements interacting. Many aspects of the syntax-semantics interface
are also highly controversial, the subject of active research among linguistics and
philosophers.[Kra]23 The framework I have argued for in chapter 4, based on Bowers'
PrP hypothesis, suggests one such view of the syntax-semantics interface is consistent
with my previous hypothesis. Bowers' view of the interface has the advantage of
substantial, independent empirical support from purely syntactic concerns.[Bow10]
Bowers (2010) also suggests the form of a compositional semantics consistent with his
PrP hypothesis. Departing form his earlier view of the matter (e.g., Bowers (1993),
23The syntax-semantics interface is the subject of an unpublished (but long in-progress) manuscript
by Angelika Kratzer on event arguments. Debates on the semantic implications of θ-roles and
argument-structure continue in many of the most recent publications in the MIT Press Mono-
graphs in Linguistics series, for example.
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(2000)) he argues in Bowers (2010) that Pr is a class of heads, each member of which
denotes a quantifier ranging over eventualities. I will assume this view of the syntax-
semantics interface, with a slight modification, in the following sections. In order to
accommodate the First Iteration of my theory, inspired by I-generics and Q-adverb
sentences, I will substitute situations for eventualities. In the next section, I briefly
introduce the particular situation-semantic framework that the rest of this chapter
assumes.
5.3 POSSIBILISTIC SITUATION SEMANTICS
Possibilistic situation semantics (PSS) is a framework for semantic theorizing. Kratzer,
Berman, Heim, von Fintel, and Elbourne made the chief contributions to its develop-
ment.24 Much of the rationale for using this framework comes from a bold claim, ac-
cepted by many of its creators, that several constructions in natural language are trou-
blesome for truth-conditional analysis because unexpectedly, they play the logical role
of quantifiers. Indefinite descriptions, conditional expressions and many adverbials are
all quantifiers, according to this assumption.[dS93, vF95, Elb05, Hin08, Kra12, Kra14]
PSS has borne empirical fruit in the semantic theories that these authors have devel-
oped. These empirical successes offer some support for the bold claim that motivated
the framework's introduction.
As I argued in the previous section, Type A sentences share semantic properties with
Q-adverb and I-generic sentences, and require a similar tripartite structure at the
syntax-semantics interface. By analogy, I suggest that PSS allows us to capture those
entailment-patterns and other semantic properties that neither Landman, Szabó nor
24The abbreviation PSS is not, to my knowledge, commonly used. I introduce it here to highlight
the difference between possibilistic situation semantics and its distant relatives, collectively called
situation semantics.
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Asher's theories predict. Indeed, sec. 5.5 presents independent evidence that this is
the case, via the example of my semantic theory for simple Type A sentences. This
section sec. 5.3 is rather peripheral to my main line of argument in this chapter. Its
purpose is to clarify potential misconceptions about the goals and assumptions of the
situation semantics I will use in the following sections.
Chronologically, PSS drew influences from Barwise and Perry (1983), David Lewis's
counterpart theory in Lewis (1968), from Berman (1987), and especially from Kratzer
(1989). It became a mature semantic framework in Heim (1990), von Fintel (1994),
and Elbourne (2005).[GF12]25 Henriette de Swart's 1993 published adaptation of her
dissertation on Q-adverbs integrated situation semantics with generalized quanti-
fier theory.[dS93] There she argues, against Lewis (1975), that Q-adverbs in natu-
ral language are selective binders, and specifically, that they are generalized quan-
tifiers over situations.[Lew75, WP06]26 Stefan Hinterwimmer's work on interactions
between indefinite descriptions and Q-adverbs is a recent application of de Swart's
approach.[Hin08] In light of these considerations, there is substantial support for PSS,
independent of the present concern with Type A sentences.
The term situation semantics has unluckily been saddled with many, closely-related
meanings. Barwise and Perry (1983), however, is a convenient starting-point for the
purpose of distinguishing these meanings, since that work coined the term situation
semantics. That work grew out of its authors' shared philosophical project, which
25In a footnote, Graff-Fara notes the progress achieved in this situation-theoretic line of research,
in her entry on adverbs to the Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language (2012).
26There are two hypotheses at play here. One, that all Q-adverbs in natural language denote selec-
tive situation-binding operators. Two, that all Q-adverbs in natural language denote generalized
quantifiers. An intermediate view is also possible here, where they all denote generalized quan-
tifiers over tuples, i.e., the values of a n-place variable-assignment function like we find in the
traditional semantics for a first-order language. This view entails that all Q-adverbs in NL are
unselective binders as in Lewis (1975), but generalized quantifiers nevertheless. Westerståhl and
Peters (2006) explores this third view.
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set at least the following goals:
1. Improve upon possible-worlds treatments of attitude verbs' semantics.[Bon84,
BP83]27 The main difficulty facing a possible-worlds semantics for attitude-verb
contexts is the problem of so-called logical omniscience.[HK98] Take any two
expressions p and q that pick out , intuitively, claims that are necessarily equiv-
alent. Then any traditional possible-worlds semantics will entail that p and q
denote the same set of worlds. That being the case, we are left without a com-
positional mechanism to predict that in some cases, pa believes that pq is true
while pabelieves thatqq is false.[23] The difficulty here is that possible-worlds se-
mantics individuates claims strictly according to their modal properties. Other
properties of claims, however, are relevant to the truth-conditions of many sen-
tences based on attitude verbs like believe. Situation theories designed to
frame semantics for attitude verbs naturally permit non-identical claims that
are necessarily equivalent.28
2. Treat more context-sensitivity phenomena in semantics, instead of pragmatics.
Usually, linguists and philosophers of language say that pragmatics contributes
this contextual information to the semantics, by mechanisms that are a black
box to the model-theoretic semantic theory.[Sta14]29 Barwise and Perry (1983)
describe the move from theories characterizing a monadic truth-predicate for an
object language, to the characterization of a polyadic truth-at-a-world predicate
27One of the germs of Barwise and Perry (1983) was Barwise's work on transparent or extensional
attitude-contexts like pa sees sq, where intuitively, s picks out an event, happening, scene, etc .
See also Bonevac (1984), an independent attempt to generalize Barwise's semantics to opaque
attitude-contexts like pa sees that pq, where intuitively, p picks out a claim.
28For an axiomatic situation theory consistent with the existence of such claims, see Zalta's A
Theory of Situations in [Zal91].
29For example, Lewis's and Kaplan's similar accounts of how pragmatic factors combine with com-
positional semantics to define functions from contexts to propositions expressed by an utterance
of a given sentence in that context. Stalnaker (2014), pp.13-34, contains an excellent guide to
the development of this kind of context-sensitive model-theoretic semantics.
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in possible worlds semantics. They believed that to advance beyond the limited
context-sensitivity of possible worlds semantics, they needed a model-theoretic
reconstruction of J.L. Austin's
topic situations.[Kra14, Bar88b, BP83][24] This last goal, however, can be ac-
complished in possibilistic situation semantics, too, as Kratzer (1989) argues.
Indeed, possibilistic situation semantics still assumes that every sentence ex-
presses at most a Kripkean proposition, i.e., a function from a situation to an
ordinary proposition. Barwise and Perry wanted to annex much more of formal
pragmatics to semantics, which none of the later possibilistic situation theorists
believe to be necessary or desirable.30
3. Individuate propositions more finely than possible worlds semantics. Histori-
cally, the main motivation for situation theorists to meet Goal 3 was Goal 1.
Logically, however, the goals are distinct. Kratzer (1989) proposed a general
strategy for solving Gettier problems in epistemology based on the finer indi-
viduation of propositions that her situation semantics offers. [Rus12]31
4. Avoid ontological commitment to concrete, non-actual worlds.[Sta86, BP83]32
This goal grew out of Barwise and Perry's critical attitude towards the onto-
logical commitments of philosophical use of possible-worlds talk. It was also
30For a concise example of this reconstruction of pragmatic problems as semantic problems, see
Barwise and Perry (1983), p.139 on the claim that some natural-language sentences uttered
in certain contexts express non-persistent propositions. Also see the alternative analysis that
Kratzer (1989) proposes, based on domain-restrictions contributed to an expressed proposition
by pragmatic factors. Lastly, see the critical discussion of these two alternatives in Elbourne
(2005), pp.54-56.
31cf., Russell's puzzle about Mr. Balfour in his Problems of Philosophy. Kratzer's solution to Gettier
problems in Kratzer (1989) is not popular among epistemologists, however (David Liebesman,
pc.; he is not persuaded either).
32See Barwise and Perry (1983), e.g., p.xxxv. It appears that Barwise and Perry suspected, at
the time this work was published at least, that no other interpretation of the worlds talk
in possible-worlds semantics for natural language was tenable. Stalnaker (1986), for example,
disagreed.
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in service of their intention to design a realistic semantic framework. The
framework was to be realistic in the sense that it regarded properties, relations
and states of affairs as ontological primitives. It is supposed to vindicate a
realistic metaphysics of properties and relations, or just to be consistent with
one perhaps. This theoretical choice turns the approach of possible-worlds se-
mantics on its head; Lewis and Montague, for instance, constructed models of
these abstracta, in terms of functions in the space of primitive worlds, entities
and truth-values.[Bea98, Mon74b][25]
5. Reject a model of claims based on total functions on infinite domains. The
propositions of Lewis and Montague are sets, of non-finite cardinality. These
propositions are supposed to model the claims we express in languages. Bar-
wise and Perry (1983) objects to Lewis and Montague's theoretical assumption.
Their objection from psychological and computational considerations says that
neither our minds, nor machines that perform logical inferences, can ever com-
pute all values of those functions that Lewis and Montague employ in their
semantics even in principle.[KR93][26] Since a theory of meaning for natural
language should at least cohere with a plausible empirical theory of how a
speaker understands statements in her language, Barwise and Perry rejected
Lewis and Montague's semantic framework.
Of 1-5 above, PSS only attempts to meet Goal 3. It is incompatible with Goal 4,
because possibilistic situation theory is an extension of Lewis's counterpart theory,
involving first-order quantification over non-actual worlds.[Kra14] Kratzer (2014) ob-
serves that research in the mold of PSS has shifted away from Goal 1, which was
so important to Barwise and Perry.[Kra14] Kratzer herself rejects Goal 2, e.g., in
Kratzer (1989).[Kra89]. There, she defends the mainstream view that utterances
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vary in truth-value by context only because they express different propositions in
different contexts. In contrast, Barwise and Perry argue that propositions themselves
are efficient. For instance, the utterance u of all of the apple trees are laden with
beautiful apples determines a proposition p that is true in the small situation of the
speaker's personal orchard, but false in the larger situation that includes a dilapi-
dated old apple tree miles away.33 Kratzer argues that the context of u determines a
proposition q that quantifies over apple trees in the speaker's orchard, not all apple
trees. This property of a proposition true in s, such that it's true in all situations s′
that have s for a part, is called Persistence.34
Already in 1986, Stalnaker wrote that Barwise and Perry could meet their theoretical
requirements with a possible worlds semantics that simply takes smaller worlds
as primitives than earlier possible-worlds semantics had assumed.[Sta86] PSS does
exactly this. The main controversies over the theoretical bona fides of PSS concern the
hypothesis that there are possibilia, as in Lewis's modal realism, and the assumptions
necessary to individuate and count situations coherently.
To address the second of these two problems, Kai von Fintel introduces the notion
of a minimal situation. [Lew68, Lew86a, vF95] The intuitive idea is that a minimal
situation s with respect to a certain proposition has only those properties necessary to
make the proposition true in s. The following subsection of the present work rigorously
defines minimality for a situation with respect to a proposition or predicate. If we
assume that our domain of situations, Ds, is the closure of a set of minimal situations
33Elbourne (2004), however, doubts that there is an empirically-meaningful difference between
Kratzer's approach to context-sensitivity and that of Barwise & Perry (1983). I will not take a
position here on the claim they dispute.
34Persistence of propositions in situation semantics is similar to the persistence assumptions of
Davidsonian event semantics, but not entirely analogous. Davidsonian logical forms quantify
over events. In PSS, however, situations are both objects in the domain of quantification and the
basic ingredient in its model of propositions. PSS is an intensional semantics, while Davidsonian
event semantics is not.
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N under mereological sums, then we know the cardinality of Ds. So far as possibilia
are concerned, PSS at least deserves no greater share of the controversy than Lewis's
modal realism. PSS is not committed to any more non-actual worlds than Lewis's
theory, as the next subsection clarifies. Rather, it simply claims that each of these
worlds has proper parts.
5.3.1 ASSUMPTIONS AND PRIMITIVES OF PSS
To construct a typed semantic theory we need at least some basic disjoint sets of
entities, a convention for defining and naming functions over these sets and over sets
constructed from them, and definitions of those relations on the basic sets that will
model the basic semantic properties of natural-language sentences.
First, we have the set of all situations Ds, actual or non-actual. The relation ≤ is an
ordering over Ds, i.e., a subset of Ds×Ds that satisfies the theory of partial order. S is
closed under arbitrary mereological sums of situations with respect to ≤.[vF95] Next
we have De, the set of all non-situation individuals, possible and actual. Kratzer's
original theory also stipulates a set of thin particulars, A, and specifies that ≤ is an
ordering over Ds ∪ A. Thin (or bare) particulars are supposed to be numerically-
distinct entities that could have had no monadic properties whatsoever.[Sid06]35 I
mean to use could here in the sense of metaphysical possibility. I will not make
use of thin particulars in my semantic theory of Simple Type A sentences, although
Kratzer includes them as ontological primitives.36 Dt = {0,1}. I interpret Dt as
35See Sider (2006) for a metaphysical defense of the claim that there are thin particulars (there
called bare particulars). As Sider rightly points out, if there are any thin particulars, then all
of them could have had no properties, but some of them actually do lack any monadic properties
(numbers and points in physical space). I prefer not to take a position on this metaphysical issue
here.
36See also sec. 3.2.6.3 in chapter 3 on thin (bare) particulars.
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the set of truth-values, 1 representing truth, 0 representing falsity.[HK98]37 W =
{s ∈ Ds : ∀s′[s ≤ s′ → s′ = s}. I interpret W as the set of worlds. Each member of
W, i.e., each world, is a unique maximal element of Ds with respect to ≤. Intuitively,
this means that no situation is part of two different worlds.
The set of all proper subsets of the set of all situations, ℘(Ds), I will interpret as the set
of propositions. These are also known as Kripkean propositions (cf. Kratzer (1989)).
Their truth-values are relativized to situations. The name Kripkean proposition pre-
sumably comes from similarities between the situations of PSS and the information-
states used to interpret intuitionistic logic in Kripke (1965).[Kri65, Kra89]
Each object and each function that I'll refer to in the theory's metalanguage has a
unique type. Every type either has a name of the form a or a name of the form
” 〈α, β〉 ”. The name of each function-type marks both the domain and co-domain of
the function. The basic types are s, e, and t, corresponding to (exactly) the members
of Ds, De, Dt, respectively. If α is a type and β is a type, then 〈α, β〉 is the type of
all functions that map entities of type α to those of type β.[End77, Mon74a][27]
Some semantic types are more notable than others because they contain the deno-
tations of familiar natural-language constructions. 〈s, t〉 is the type of all functions
from Ds to Dt. I interpret these functions as propositions or situation-predicates,
since they are the characteristic functions of the members of ℘(Ds).[HK98]38 They
are the extensions of verb-phrases and other natural-language predicates in my the-
ory. 〈e, t〉 is the type of all functions from De to Dt. In my theory, these functions
are the denotations of proper names in natural language. 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈s, t〉〉 is the type
of all functions from functions from Ds to Dt to functions from Ds to Dt, which I
37I have drawn from Heim and Kratzer (1998) in this and several other basic definitions and prim-
itives of the semantics I work with here.
38For a definition of this term characteristic function, see Heim and Kratzer (1998).
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interpret as either situation-predicate modifiers or Type <1> quantifiers over sit-
uations. 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈s, t〉〉〉 is the type of all simple <1,1> quantifiers over sit-
uations, like ∀ and ∃.[WP06]39 〈〈e, t〉 , 〈s, e〉〉 is the type of all definite-determiner
denotations.[Elb05]40 〈〈s, t〉 〈〈s, e〉 , 〈s, t〉〉〉 is the type of the denotations of all func-
tional heads that introduces a thematic role like Agent or Theme in Bowers' theory
of argument-structure.[Bow10]41
A proposition p entails a proposition q iff for every w ∈ W such that p(w) = 1,
q(w) = 1. This analysis is familiar from coarse-grained possible worlds semantics, in
which propositions are sets of worlds, rather than sets of parts of worlds. The notion
of a minimal situation is also necessary to make sense of counting situations (and
the cardinality of Ds), and of the stipulation that Ds is closed under mereological
sums. The minimal situations are the basic members of Ds that generate the rest of
its members.
The two-argumentmin function goes from a situation and a predicate to a truth-value.
It goes to 1 just in case the situation s is minimal with respect to the predicate or
proposition f . Any situation s is minimal with respect to a predicate or proposition
f iff there is no situation s' extending s (with respect to ≤) that also supports f.
min(s, f) ∈ D<s,<<s,t>,t>> = λs.[λf.[1 iff ¬∃s′[f(s′) = 1 ∧ s ≤ s′]]]
The one-argument min function is a predicate-modifier. It goes from the character-
istic function of a set of situations to the characteristic function of a minimal set of
situations with respect to that predicate or proposition.
39This <1,1> refers to the type of a generalized quantifier in the notation of Westerståhl and
Peters (2006). It means that the quantifier takes one restrictor-set and one scope or matrix-set.
Generalized quantifiers, in my semantic framework, are functions from an arbitrary number of
situation-sets or relations over situation-sets, to truth-values.
40Compare Elbourne (2005), which uses the same semantic type for definite determiners in a possi-
bilistic situation semantics.
41Bowers (2010) states the semantic theory in terms of events (type v), rather than situations (type
s here). Bowers' type for (denotations of) thematic-role introducers is 〈〈v, t〉 〈〈v, e〉 , 〈v, t〉〉〉.
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min(f) ∈ D<<s,t>,<s,t>> = λf.[λs.[1 iff f(s) = 1 and ¬∃s′[f(s′) = 1 ∧ s ≤ s′]]]
5.4 FIRST ITERATION OF THE THEORY
This is a semantic theory of Type A sentences based on Kai von Fintel's 1995 theory
of Q-adverb sentences. [vF95] Von Fintel's theory assumes the standard tripartite
structure for a Q-adverb sentence:
S
δ whenp q
Figure 5.2: Tripartite structure of a Q-adverb sentence S according to Von Fintel
(1995)
In Fig. 5.2, the constituent labeled δ denotes the quantitative relation between the
restrictor set of situations and the scope set of the Q-adverb sentence.[WP06]42. The
constituent labeled whenp denotes the restrictor set, JpK. The when part of
its label in Fig. 5.2 alludes to the fact that English sentences often introduce the
restricting clause of a Q-adverb sentence with the word when, as in Usually when
Kira writes, she eats trail-mix. Finally, the constituent labeled q denotes the scope
set. Thus the structure in Fig. 5.2 is linearized as the sentence S, pδ when p, q.q , or
as some transformation of S by optional movement.
With Von Fintel's tripartite structure for Q-adverb sentences in hand, we can express
his denotation for the Q-adverb sentence S like so:
JSK = {s : JδK 〈min(F (s)) ∩ JpK , {s′ : ∃s′′ [s′ ≤ s′′ ∧ s′′ ∈ JqK]}〉}
Von Fintel specifies that f [sic] is a function from (evaluation) situations to sets
42Thus δ is what Westerståhl and Peters (2006) call a quantirelation (p.14).
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of (accessible) situations, and that its identity is largely contextually determined,
where by f he means F.[vF95]43 In other words, F is a function mapping Ds into
the set of worlds, W (i.e., ℘(Ds)). For any situation s ∈ Ds, F (s) =
{s′ ∈ Ds : s′ is accessible from s}
So min(F (s)) is exactly the minimal set of those situations accessible from the sit-
uation s. Then min(F (s)) ∩ JpK is the intersection of the set of minimal situations
accessible from s with the denotation of the restrictor clause, p. As a whole, this first
element of the ordered pair in Von Fintel's analysis of a Q-adverb sentence is best
understood as a device to whittle down the restrictor-set to its accessible members
only. Without taking this intersection, the modal profile that the theory predicts for
all Q-adverb sentences would be far too strong.
The second element of the ordered pair in Von Fintel's analysis of S is the set of all
situations that can be extended into some larger situation that supports the truth of
the scope clause of the sentence S. Call the first element of the ordered pair in Von
Fintel's analysis R for restrictor and the second element C for scope. Here, the
analysis simply says that the scope of the quantified sentence S is the set of situations
where each member is part of some larger situation that supports the scope clause of
S. This device yields a scope set for the quantified sentence that is likely to have some
non-empty intersection with the restrictor set. Without this added constraint, as
Von Fintel reminds us, the minimality constraint on the situations that make up the
restrictor set would not be likely to contain any situations able to support the truth
of the full scope clause.[vF95]44 This is because, for example, few or no situations
43See Von Fintel (1995), p.7.
44See Von Fintel (1995), p.6.
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that minimally support the truth of Kira writes will also support the truth of Kira
eats trail-mix.
It now becomes clear that Von Fintel's analysis of the Q-adverb sentence S boils
down to JSK = {s ∈ Ds : δ 〈R,C〉}. As above, R and C are the restrictor set and the
scope set of situations for the sentence S, respectively. Von Fintel chose to use sets
of situations as the denotations of clauses in his semantic theory, achieving the effect
of propositional connectives like 'and' and 'or' with the use of their corresponding
relations on sets. To put this denotation in the more familiar style of functional
denotations that we find in Heim and Kratzer (1998) for example, we simply take the
characteristic function of Von Fintel's denotation for S, char ({s ∈ Ds : δ 〈R,C〉}) =
f : Ds −→ Dt = λs. [1 iff δ 〈R,C〉=1 in s], i.e. a Kripkean proposition.
To construct a semantic theory of Type A sentences on the basis of Von Fintel's theory
of Q-adverb sentences, which I promised in this section, it remains for us to determine
what quantirelation δ should be for some Type A sentences. It is highly likely that, in
Type A sentences as in Q-adverb sentences, the appropriate quantirelation between
the restrictor and scope sets will vary from one sentence to another, perhaps even
from one context of utterance to another. For example, the most natural reading of
the old familiar John raised a question as a judge is true iff John was actually the
Agent of at least one minimal judging-situation that can be extended into a larger
question-raising situation (of which John is also the Agent). Or so my semantic
intuition tells me. This is so because the scope clause of John raised a question as a
judge is a stage-level predicate, given its perfective aspect and tense.[Kra95] It needs
only one witness-situation for it to apply to the subject, John.
The first objective is to do justice to this natural reading of John raised a question
as a judge in a Von Fintel-inspired theory of Type A sentences. It is easy to meet:
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just make the quantirelation δ Some, in the functional adaptation of Von Fintel's
analysis above, where Some(A,B) iff |A ∩B| ≥ 1. Then the denotation that this
new theory of Type A sentences predicts for John raised a question as a judge is
λs. [1 iff Some(R,C) = 1 in s]. For this sentence, R is the set of all minimal, accessible
situations in which John is a judge, and C is the set of all situations with some larger
extension in which John raises a question. I will neglect the tense of the verb raised
here, for simplicity's sake. This analysis seems to do justice to John raised a question
as a judge, and indeed, any Simple Type A sentence with a stage-level main predicate.
This result seems to meet the first objective.
The next objective is to capture our semantic intuitions about the natural generic
readings of sentences like John raises questions as a judge those readings which
Szabó's 2003 theory of Type A sentences fails to predict. I called this objection to
Szabó's theory Exception Tolerance, since the natural generic reading of the previ-
ous sentence is true if sometimes, John doesn't raise a question as a judge. Notice
that the previous sentence has an individual-level main predicate, signaled by the
so-called generic tense on its main predicate simple present tense with bare plural
verb-objects, at least in English.[KPC+95] The most straightforward way to cap-
ture the exception tolerance of this type of sentence is to make δ in our analysis
λs. [1 iff δ 〈R,C〉=1 in s] some quantirelation between Some and All in its logical
strength.45 Such a quantirelation is commonly called Most in the generalized quan-
tifier literature.[WP06, Wes11]
A common quantirelation for a Most quantifier in natural language is |R ∩ C| >
1
2
(|R|), or equivalently, dR− Ce < 1
2
(|R|). That is the relation between a (finite)
restrictor set R and a (finite) scope set C such that the intersection of R and C has
45See the definition of logical strength on 5.6.
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more than half as many members as the full restrictor set. In other words, the relation
between such an R and C, where the number of members of R that are not members
of C is less than half the number of things in R. In this case, this definition of the
quantirelation is just set-theoretic talk for: the number of witnesses to the restrictor
clause that also support the scope clause is more than half the number of witnesses to
the restrictor clause. In many contexts of utterance, John raises questions as a judge
will express a proposition that is true just in case more than half of the situations in
which John is a judge are ones in which John is also raising a question. This result
seems to meet the second objective.
In fact, however, neither of these analyses does justice to all Simple Type A sentences
with stage-level or individual-level main predicates. The reason is that these sim-
ple analyses fail to predict the boolean entailments, which any empirically-adequate
semantic theory of Type A sentences must do. I revisit and explain this failure
in sec. 5.4.546 For now, however, let's proceed as though this analysis works for all
Simple Type A sentences with stage-level predicates. In the next section, I will
perform several quasi-compositional derivations of these analyses from the sentences
that respectively inspired them, John raised a question as a judge, and John raises
questions as a judge.
46Its failure in this regard comes down to the direction of the parthood relation in Von Fintel's
analysis of Q-adverb sentences, compared with that of Szabó (2003) in his analysis of Type A
sentences. Von Fintel (1995) comments in passing on the mysterious attraction of an intuition
related to him by Chris Barker: a sentence like John usually raises questions when he is in
court is true just in case some quantity of minimal situations in which John raises questions
also belong to the set of all situations that can be extended into a situation in which John is in
court (p.6,ff.5). If the quantirelation is Some, then Barker's variant of Von Fintel's analysis is
equivalent to Szabó's analysis of a Type A sentence.
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5.4.1 THE BASICS
5.4.1.1 COMPOSITION RULES
FA (Function Application): If β and γ are sisters and β is a branching node and γ is
a branching node and α immediately dominates β and α immediately dominates γ ,
then JαK = JβK(JγK) iff JγK ∈ Dom(JβK), and JαK = JγK(JβK) iff JβK ∈ Dom(JγK).
5.4.1.2 LEXICON
J[Superman]K ∈ D<e,t> = λx.[1 iff x is a Superman]
J[Clark Kent]K ∈ D<e,t> = λx.[1 iff x is a Clark Kent]
J[John]K ∈ D<e,t> = λx.[1 iff x is a John]
JTHEK ∈ D<<e,t>,<s,e>> = λf.[λs.[
the x ∈ De such that f(x) = 1 in s
and for all y ∈ De
such that f(y) = 1 in s,
y = x]]J[bend]K ∈ D<s,t> = λs.[1 iff s is a bending]
J[raise]K ∈ D<s,t> = λs.[1 iff s is a raising]
J[judge]K ∈ D<s,t> = λs.[1 iff s is a judging]
J[steel bars]K ∈ D<s,e> = λs.[x ∈ De iff x is a steel bar in s]
J[questions]K ∈ D<s,e> = λs.[x ∈ De iff x is a question in s]
JAgK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,e>,<s,t>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
g(s) is the agent of s
and f(s) = 1]]]
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JThK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,e>,<s,t>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff g(s)
is the theme of s
and f(s) = 1]]]
JPrMostK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,t>,<s,t>>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
|char(λσ. [1 iff min (σ, f) = f (σ) = a (σ, s) = ])−
char (λs′. [1 iff ∃s′′ [g (s′′) = 1 ∧ s′ ≤ s′′]]) |
< 1/2 · |char(λσ. [1 iff min (σ) = f (σ) = a (σ) = ])|
in s]]]
JPr∃K ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,t>,<s,t>>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
|char (λσ. [1 iff min (σ, f) = f (σ) = a (σ, s) = ])
∩char (λs′. [1 iff ∃s′′ [g (s′′) = 1 ∧ s′ ≤ s′′]]) |
≥ 1 in s]]]
Note that the denotation for PrMost is essentially the Most quantifier discussed in
the previous section. Likewise, Pr∃ denotes the Some quantifier defined there. These
quantifiers themselves are adaptations of Von Fintel (1995)'s analysis of Q-adverbs.
The function a in the lexical entries above is a variant of Von Fintel's F function,
adapted to a semantic theory using functional denotations rather than set denotations.
Instead of a function from a situation to the set of situations accessible from it, like
Von Fintel's F, a is essentially a dyadic predicate. It is a function from pairs of
situations into {0, 1}, that maps the pair 〈σ, τ〉 to 1 iff σ is accessible from τ .
5.4.2 COMPLICATIONS UNIQUE TO TYPE A SENTENCES
Essentially, my analysis of Type A sentences in the First Iteration is that Type
A sentences are selective quantifiers over possible situations.[Wes11] We run into a
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problem, however, when we try to build the appropriate quantifier compositionally
on a number of natural assumptions and assumptions motivated by direct and indirect
evidence. On each reading of a Simple Type A sentence, I suppose that each of the
two Pr constituents in the tree contributes a type <1,1> generalized quantifier over
situations. These denotations agree with the semantics for PrP structures in Bowers
(2010), which I discussed in chapter 4.
On the generic reading of a given Simple Type A sentence, the wide-scope quantifier's
domain ranges over a certain subset of possible situations involving the subject. On
the extensional readings, generic or not, these two quantifiers range over the just the
actual situations involving the subject. The final argument of each denotation in the
lexicon, s, is understood to be bound to the topic situation in which the sentence
being interpreted is uttered. If an actual speaker utters a sentence S, then the topic-
situation s in which the speaker utters S is part of the actual world, since allows only
world-mates to be involved in any given situation.
Bowers (2010) speculates that Pr is a distributional class with several different lexical
entries for different Pr's.[Bow10]The First Iteration of my theory assumes that the Pr
that heads the as phrase in every Simple Type A setntence with a generic reading
introduces a Most quantifier over situations, on that sentence's generic reading. Ac-
cording to the First Iteration, the Pr that heads the main-predicate PrP of any Simple
Type A sentence introduces a Some quantifier over situations, regardless of whether
the reading is generic. Assuming semantic compositionality, however, all heads in the
Pr category have the same semantic type, which means that the existential quantifier
Some in the sentence's main predicate must be type <1,1> as well.
The second Pr quantifier indeed has a role to play in the semantic derivation, if Von
Fintel's analysis is correct. It must introduce the Some quantifier in the matrix of
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the sentence which binds those situations that extend the situations in the restrictor
set, and support the qualified predicate of the sentence.[vF95] It is not at all clear
how to implement this derivation compositionally, however. In the simple semantic
derivations below, I will use the lexical entries in the section above as written, with
a Some quantifier built into each Pr denotation. I will return to this problem of
compositional derivation in sec. 5.5.2.
5.4.3 SEMANTIC DERIVATIONS
Example 1 a non-generic reading:
JPr∃K (J[judge]K) (JAgK (JThK (J[raise]K) (J[questions]K) (JTHEK (J[John]K))))
= 1 iff | {σ ∈ Ds : σ is a minimal judging with Agent John and is accessible from s}
∩ {s′ ∈ Ds : there is some question-raising s′′ and s′ ≤ s′′} |
≥ 1 in s
Example 2 a generic reading:
JPrMostK (J[judge]K) (JAgK (JThK (J[raise]K) (J[questions]K) (JTHEK (J[John]K))))
= 1 iff | {σ ∈ Ds : σ is a minimal judging with Agent John and is accessible from s}
−{s′ ∈ Ds : there is some question-raising s′′ and s′ ≤ s′′} |
< 1/2 · | {s′ ∈ Ds : there is some question-raising s′′ and s′ ≤ s′′} |
5.4.4 INTERPRETING DP IN TYPE A SENTENCES
The First Iteration runs into two related problems with the interpretation of proper
names in the complement position to as. Though we have a grammatically realized
restrictor in a Type A sentence, unlike many Q-adverb and I-generic sentences, the
Superman sentences pose unique problems here. If [Comp,Pr] is the grammatical
realization of the restrictor in Type A, and all restrictors are situation-predicates
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of type 〈s, t〉, then [Comp,Pr] must denote such a situation-predicate. Enter the
view that no proper names' semantic values are predicates. Call this the Semantic
Objection. One classic version of this view is found in Kripke (1972), though the
Semantic Objection is logically independent of the thesis of direct reference for proper
names that Kripke defends there.
Suppose the Semantic Objection is false. Nevertheless, surely Superman and Clark
Kent are identical? How can we possibly get an individual concept for Superman that
differs from that of Clark Kent? How can we truly distinguish the two, when they
are identical? Call this the Identity Objection.
The Identity Objection is not a problem, provided we address the semantic objection.
When we call Superman Superman, we bring into play a certain role that does not
exhaust the total functional role of the man who is called Superman and Clark
Kent. If we can equip our semantic theory with machinery that does justice to this
intuition, then we don't have to worry about the Identity Objection. On a properly-
equipped semantic theory, Superman sentences are metaphysically pretty tame. It
does not resort to non-spatio-temporal parts of particulars, as Asher's 2011 theory
does. Further, we do not need to assume contradictory objects. Our semantic theo-
rizing can't be driven by the metaphysician's scruples. So much the better, however,
if our empirically-driven semantic theory ends up consistent with our metaphysical
scruples. It is, however, provided we can adequately reconstruct this talk of roles in
situation theory.
The Semantic Objection is more serious. The stakes are high, since it presents a true
dilemma: if my situation-semantic theory disposes of the metaphysical objection,
then either my theory is consistent with the thesis that the semantic value of every
proper name is exhausted by an individual (call this thesis NDI), or that thesis is
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false.47 NDI, however, is widely accepted, at least for proper names. And if NDI
is false, it's reasonable to worry that our semantic theorizing will backslide into the
semantic problems that plagued early-20th-C. theories of proper names Frege and
Russell's description theories and variants. I propose that my theory does dispose of
the Identity Objection, and though it is inconsistent with NDI. NDI, however, is likely
to be false. Indeed, the simple substitution-failures seen in Type A Superman
sentences are one prominent counter-example to NDI.[Elb05]48
It remains to be explained how to get the right restrictor-predicate from a proper
name in the semantic derivation, and to motivate the view that some (if not all)
proper names are the right semantic type to provide such a predicate. Suppose we
were to mechanize Quine's policy of logical paraphrase for eliminating proper names.
Elbourne (2005) and (2013) show us how to do this in a situation-semantic framework,
building on the work of Burge (1973). Elbourne's account of the denotations of proper
names is a modified metalinguistic descriptivist (MLD) theory. Instead of letting
the metalinguistic predicate, is called 'Superman ', for instance, be evaluated at the
various different worlds the quantifier ranges over (which will yield wrong predictions),
we can fix the restrictor predicate by rigidifying it (evaluating it at the actual world),
and applying the resulting predicate to individuals in other worlds counterparts of
our actual Superman. The point of this move is to give us a set of individuals,
in various worlds, whose thick particular supports exactly the same predicates as
some large situation that actual Superman is in, that falls short of the man's entire
thick particular. Intuitively, this large situation will be his Superman role. My
47I mean the label to evoke Names Denote Individuals. We need to be careful here to distinguish
NDI from DR, the thesis that proper names refer directly. As David Liebesman has pointed out
to me (pc), DR does not entail NDI, since names might refer directly by taking predicates as
their semantic values.
48Elbourne (2005) devotes a whole chapter to example sentences whose correct semantic interpre-
tation requires a theory that is incompatible with NDI.
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theory will then takes these Superman sentences to express generalizations about
the (matrix) situations that the various parts of these counterparts' thick particulars
can be extended into. With the right accessibility relation, this nicely captures the
intuitions I cited that explain why the Identity Objection is a non-problem.
Encouragingly, David Lewis points out in Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies
that his counterpart theory requires a class of counterpart relations for each individual
in a given world, and that counterpart relation perfectly fills the gap in my theory
which might be called how do we get the restrictor of the wide-scope quantifier in
a Type A sentence from [Comp, Pr] under the adjoined PrP, when it corefers with
the sentence subject, i.e., the thing in [Spec, TP]? Moreover, Lewis requires this
class of counterpart relations to meet an objection to his theory, which is relatively
unrelated to the problem my theory is supposed to solve. This class of counterpart
relations is thus independently motivated. A Burgean MLD theory along the lines I
have described, inspired by Elbourne (2005) and Barwise & Perry (1983), also solves
a problem for Lewis (1971). It provides him with a mechanism to pick out the F -
counterpart relation for an arbitrary predicate F that some individual j in the actual
world satisfies.
Just which individuals in which worlds are j's F -counterparts? They are those in-
dividuals i such that the thick particular of i, its real essence in Lewis's terms, is
equivalent to the maximal situation in which j is called n in the actual world, where n
is some name in the metalanguage of the semantic theory. By equivalent to I mean
roughly what Barwise calls congruent situations: any two situations s and s′ such
that for all propositions p, s supports the proposition p iff s′ supports p. In Kratzer's
possibilistic situation theory, any two situations s and s′ are equivalent just in case
for any set of situations P, s ∈ P if and only if s′ ∈ P .
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5.4.5 A LOSS OF DESCRIPTIVE ADEQUACY
All readings of Type A sentences support the boolean entailments. Moreover, this
fact is decisive evidence against the First Iteration of my theory, which fails to predict
the boolean entailments for every Type A sentence. It remains to be shown that the
Type A sentences indeed have these boolean entailments, and that the First Iteration
does not predict them. I will offer some suggestive evidence for the first claim, and
demonstrate the second claim by showing that the First Iteration cannot validate
Landman's conjunction schema for APS: if a as F G and a as F H , then a as F
G and H .
As Szabó observes, Landman (1989)'s theory has the as particle denote a function
taking Montagovian individuals (property-sets) into proper ultrafilters over the set of
all properties in the model.[Lan89, Sza03][28] The relationship between the properties
of (proper) principal ultrafilters and models of logical languages is responsible for
the success of Landman's theory in validating his inference schemata for APS. This
relationship is unfortunately discussed only rarely in philosophy outside of logic. Even
in the as-phrase literature from Landman (1989) to Asher (2011), no author explains
the significance of ultrafilters for a semantic theory of APS, even when he mentions
them in passing. For this reason, I will take a brief detour through the properties
of ultrafilters relevant to semantics. The explanation of this relationship that I offer
below is fairly standard in textbooks on boolean algebras, on lattices, and in some
texts on model theory.[BM77, BS97, Lan91, PTW90, Hal63]49
I call these semantic properties of Landman's inference-schemata boolean entail-
49Perhaps the best concise introduction I have found to the applications of ul-
trafilters is Alex Kruckman's Notes On Ultrafilters, published electronically at
<https://math.berkeley.edu/~kruckman/ultrafilters.pdf>. His comments are not confined
to philosophical logic, but touch on some of the properties important for semantics that I review
here.
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ments. The name highlights an important similarity between these entailments and
boolean algebras. Boolean algebras and their twins the boolean lattices are specially
related to the principal ultrafilters over a set, because of the representation theo-
rem for boolean algebras: every finite boolean algebra is isomorphic to a powerset
boolean algebra.50 Each of these entailments represented by one of Landman's axiom-
schemata corresponds to a different operation that every boolean algebra's basic set is
closed under: ∧ (meet), ∨ (join), and − (complement), unless it corresponds to some
iteration of these operations.51 For any boolean algebra, there is also a complemented
distributive lattice composed of the same basic set, such that each of the boolean op-
erations can be defined strictly in terms of the lattice's partial ordering. For instance,
for any distinct elements a, b of the boolean algebra, we have corresponding distinct
elements a′, b′ of the lattice, and for any element x in the lattice, x = (a′ ∧ b′) just in
case x is the least upper-bound of a′ and b′.[BS97]52
An ultrafilter on a lattice like this, based on a subset L′ of L, is a collection of sub-
sets of L that includes some subset L′′ of L just in case L′′ is not the empty set
and L′′ is a superset of L′or L′′ is a finite intersection of elements of L′. We also
say that the ultrafilter U over S is generated by an element x ∈ S just in case x
is the unique intersection of all members of U . Another point of view is that this
kind of ultrafilter over a lattice's basic set L is the cokernel of a homomorphism
50In other words, for every finite boolean algebra B, there exists some set S and a bijection h
such that for every element x of B, there exists some A ⊆ ℘(S) such that h(x) = A, for
any elements x, y of B, h(−x) = ℘(S) − h(x) (where - is understood as the usual binary
complementation operation on sets), h(x∧ y) = h(x)∩h(y), and h(x∨ y) = h(x)∪h(y). That is,
h is an isomorphism from B = 〈B,∧,∨,−〉 to the boolean algebra B′ = 〈℘(S),∩,∪,−〉, where
- in B′ is to be understood as the operation of complementation with respect to ℘(S). This
representation theorem holds for all finite boolean algebras, but not for all boolean algebras.
51The if..then.. schema for as-phrases corresponds, for instance, to the iteration of complement
and join: for any elements x,y of a boolean algebra, (−y) ∨ x. This mirrors the truth-functional
interpretation of the material conditional in a propositional calculus.
52Least upper bound of a′ and b′: a′ ≤ x, b′ ≤ x, and for any element of the lattice y, if a′ ≤ y,
b′ ≤ y, then x ≤ y.
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from the lattice's corresponding boolean algebra into the boolean algebra 2, based
on some two-element set, such as {1, 0}.53 Since the elements of the algebra 2 can
easily be interpreted as the truth and falsity of a Tarskian definition of satisfac-
tion for a propositional calculus, every distinct principal ultrafilter over a boolean
lattice uniquely determines a function very similar to the valuation function of a
model for a propositional calculus. Put differently, each distinct principal ultrafilter
over any boolean lattice uniquely determines a maximal-consistent theory in some
propositional calculus. Each theory consists of a set of axioms, each a sentence of
the propositional language, and all of the truth-functional consequences of that set
of axioms.[CK12, BS97] This 2-valued homomorphism which has the ultrafilter for
its cokernel is similar to the interpretation function familiar from natural-language
semantics, though it is very much simpler.[PTW90, HK98, DWP81][29]
Szabó (2003) observes in a footnote that the partial order his own analysis employs
essentially induces an ultrafilter over the domain of his theory's intermediate logical
language.[Sza03] This is the case because Szabó's state-parthood relation ≤ over
states (in a model) is isomorphic to another partial ordering over the extensions
of first-order state-predicates in that model. Given the standard interpretation of
one-place predicates in a first-order structure, that is to say: an ordering on the
powerset of the domain. Recall the basic logical form that Szabó's theory predicts
for pa G as F q:
p∃s [∃σ [In(a, s) ∧ F (s) ∧G(σ) ∧ σ ≤ s]]q .
Given the interpretation of ≤ and the other predicates, Szabó's theory predicts that
pa G as F q is true just in case there exists a state s and a state σ, where s is an
F -state, σ is a G-state, a is involved in the state s, and σ is a part of s.
53In this context, cokernel means the collection of just those sets that the homomorphism maps
to 1.
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Szabó's state-parthood relation ≤ induces a boolean lattice over the set of states
with which the subject of a natural-language sentence is involved. For any non-
logical constant a, (a subject) and any first-order predicate F (a qualifying predicate),
Szabó's ≤ induces a unique principal ultrafilter over the state-parthood lattice: the
set of those states that are part of the state b that is witness to ∃s [In(a, s) ∧ F (s)]
It is an established theorem of (boolean) lattice theory that for every sublattice B′ of
any boolean lattice 〈B,≤〉, such that for all x ∈ B′, b ≤ x for some b ∈ B and, there
exists a collection U of subsets of B and U is the principal ultrafilter generated by b
in B.[BS97, Lan91]
Given the representation theorem for boolean algebras and the correspondence be-
tween boolean algebras and boolean lattices, for every singleton element {x} you can
choose from a powerset-lattice over a set S, the family U , of all elements S ′ of the
powerset lattice such that x ∈ S ′ and x ≤ S ′, is a principal ultrafilter over the lat-
tice's basic set S. But then, for any non-logical constant a (subject) and (qualifying)
state-predicate F in the object-language, there exists a unique principal ultrafilter
U over the domain of the model, corresponding exactly to that ultrafilter over the
state-parthood lattice induced by ≤ given a and F . U is just that family of subsets of
the domain which is the collection of all state-predicate extensions that also include
the witness to ∃s [In(a, s) ∧ F (s)] as a member, closed under upward and closed
under finite intersections.
This is what makes Szabó's theory predict that all Type A sentences show all of
the entailments Landman stipulates. Since the ultrafilter is closed under all finite
intersections and all supersets of its basic elements, the theory automatically validates
a F as G, a H as G / a F and H as G; a F as G, if a is F then a is H , a H as
G. This is due to the correspondence between truth-functional conjunctions on the
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one hand, greatest lower bounds in a boolean algebra, and set intersections.[BM77,
BS97]54 The other truth-functional entailment-patterns, the disjunction schema for
instance, follow for similar reasons of correspondence between the algebra and truth-
functions.
Von Fintel's 1995 analysis of Q-adverb sentences does not predict that those sentences
have Landman's boolean entailments. For example, Von Fintel's analysis does not
validate the argument-schema Q.
1 a F when G
2 a H when G
Q
3 a F and H when G
Von Fintel's analysis does not validate the argument-schema above because it an-
alyzes Q-adverbs, for instance usually, as variable-quantity Most quantifiers over
situations. For the present purpose, this is perfectly analogous to a Most quantifier
over ordinary individuals. This is because, regardless of the domain on which we
define the Most quantifier we use to analyze Most within the argument-schema M
below, M has invalid instances.
1 Most G are F
2 Most G are H
M
3 Most G are F and H
M has invalid instances for roughly the same reason that independent majorities
arise in voting. For instance, suppose we define our Most quantifier on a domain
54For instance, the Lindenbaum algebra B of any propositional calculus L is that boolean algebra
formed by partitioning the set of formulas of L by a relation of logical equivalence and mapping
each partition to an element of B. See Bell and Machover (1977) or Bell and Slomson (1991) on
Lindenbaum algebras of propositional languages.
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D = {a, b, c, d, e} composed of exactly 5 people, all men (M = D). Those who are
more than thirty years old are a, b, c (T = {a, b, c}), while c, d, e are taller than 5'7
(H = {c, d, e}). Suppose that we fix Most(A,B) ←→ |A−B| < |A|
2
. Let's give
the name S to this whole set-up, consisting of D, Most, and these three subsets
M,T,H of D. Now consider the substitution-instance M' of the argument-schema M
above, each under the straightforward translation to its right.
Natural-language sentence Translation Holds in S?
1 Most men are greater than 67 in
height.
Most(M,H) Yes
2 Most men are more than thirty years
old.
Most(M,T ) Yes
M'
3 Most men are greater than 67 in height
and more than thirty years old.
Most(M,H ∩ T ) No
Now according to S and the translation of M' given in the right-hand column above,
the translation of 1 holds and the translation of 2 holds, but the translation of 3 does
not. The number of men no more than 67 in height is less than half the number of
men, and the number of men no more than 30 years old is less than half the number
of men. The number of men who are not both taller than 67 and older than 30 years
is, however, not less than half the number of men. M − (H ∩ T ) = {a, b, d, e}, so
|M − (H ∩ T )| ≮ |M |
2
since 4 ≮ 5
2
. Then M' is invalid; M has an invalid substitution-
instance. The argument-schema M must therefore be invalid itself.
So, what if all Type A sentences, or all readings of Type A sentences, do have the
boolean entailments? I do not know of a counter-example to this claim, even from
the Type A sentences that show substitution-failures that I review in chapter 2. If
all readings of Type A sentences have the boolean entailments, then we have decisive
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evidence that the First Iteration is not a correct semantic theory of Type A sentences,
even on their generic readings. It achieves exception tolerance at the cost of the
boolean entailments, which all previous theories of APS correctly predict. Indeed,
the boolean entailments are one of the few phenomena that all prior work on as-
phrase sentences assumes. The First Iteration needs work.
5.5 SECOND ITERATION OF THE THEORY
Situation theory, as I argued, allows for a nice solution to the problem of Superman
sentences, and a uniform semantic treatment of various DPs. Von Fintel's analy-
sis of Q-adverb sentences is essentially a contextually-variable Most quantifier over
situations.[Wes11, WP06]55 I argued in sec. 5.4.5 that no semantic theory of Type A
sentences based on Von Fintel's analysis, or any other Most quantifier, can predict
Landman's boolean entailments. The First Iteration of my theory, however, is essen-
tially Von Fintel's analysis of Q-adverb sentences. The First Iteration therefore needs
repair to achieve descriptive adequacy. One attractive option is to make slightly dif-
ferent use of ultrafilters than Szabó's theory does, as I described in sec. 5.4.5. In fact,
the Second Iteration of my theory will be closer to Landman's use of ultrafilters over
property-sets, than it is to Szabó's gambit to achieve the same effect using his partial
order over states. Carnielli and Veloso (1997) propose a conservative extension of
first-order logic for studying generic reasoning.[CV97] The generics that their system
deals with are the so-called D-generics that appear to deal with kinds, or at least
concrete instances of them (e.g., Dogs are furry, birds fly).[CP95] However, the
technique that Carnielli and Veloso use to model these D-generics straightforwardly
55To be more precise, Von Fintel's analysis of Q-adverb sentences is an iterated quantifier composed
of Most and a polyadic Some. From the perspective of generalized quantifiers, Szabó's theory
is the same type of quantifier with its initial Most replaced by a monadic Some.
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applies to I-generics like dispositional sentences, if we just change the quantification
domain from concrete particulars to situations.
Carnielli and Veloso criticize earlier logics for generic reasoning based on
defaults.[CV97] They call this a negative view, where the system predicts certain in-
ferences valid by default, in the absence of information to the contrary. This approach
makes their systems non-monotonic, since adding axioms can invalidate theorems. In
contrast to this negative view, they take a positive view of genericity which preserves
the assumptions of classical quantification theory. Their project is based on the in-
tuition that Dogs bark is true just in case almost all dogs bark, perhaps excluding
atypical dogs. Their analysis differs from von Fintel's Most quantifier in that they
define the relevant sense of almost all in terms of the properties of a prototypical
object of the type in question. From this one prototypical object, Carnielli and Veloso
define a quantifier that lies between the first-order ∀ and ∃, in terms of the quantity
that satisfies it. For this almost all quantifier they introduce the operator ∇.
Unlike von Fintel's analysis of Q-adverbs, ∇ does not directly compare the cardinality
of its restrictor set with that of its matrix set. Rather, ∇x [ϕ] is satisfied in some
structure iff the extension of ϕ is a member of that principal ultrafilter over the pow-
erset of the domain UM, generated by the prototypical object.[BS97]56 For instance,
perhaps the prototypical bird flies and has a beak. Then ∇x [ϕ] in a language of
Ultrafilter Logic designed to reason about birds will be satisfied by a structure for
that language just in case it satisfies ϕ [b], where b denotes the generic bird. This
condition is extensionally equivalent to the first satisfaction condition I mentioned
for ∇x [ϕ], because the ultrafilter UM is constructed from image of the total set of
56Many writers, Bell and Slomson (1997) for example, adopt the convention of writing that an
ultrafilter U on the set X is generated by some individual a ∈ ⋃X just in case U is principal
and {a} = ⋂U .
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formulas that are generically true of birds, under a function that maps each formula
to its extension in the domain ofM.
Szabó (2003) and Landman (1989) both advance semantic theories of as-phrase sen-
tences based on a (proper) principal ultrafilter.[Sza03, Lan89]57 The question natu-
rally arises whether the idea I am adopting from Carnielli and Veloso is any advance
beyond Szabó's theory. The key difference, technically speaking, is that for Carnielli
and Veloso, ∇x [G(x)]∧ ∃x [¬G(x)] is satisfiable in any structure where the interpre-
tation of the predicate G is still a proper subset of the domain.58 In other words,
Carnielli and Veloso employ this principal ultrafilter over the domain's powerset as
a {0, 1}-valued coutably-additive measure on subsets of the domain.[Kru12, Lei13]
Another way to look at Carnielli and Veloso's use of the ultrafilter is that it's an
extremely coarse probability-measure on some sample-space X, which rounds up to 1
above a certain threshold, and rounds down to 0 otherwise. The large subsets of X
are just those that this measure function takes to 1, the small ones just those that
are not large.59
It is as if each ultrafilter over a set were a very low-resolution picture of a more
traditional probability-measure on that set considered as a sample space of events. A
certain threshold value, r, determines which events get included in this picture: for
any event e in the sample space, e is part of the picture just in case the traditional
probability of e in that space exceeds r.60 This picture (the filter) resolves every event
into either the category of almost certain to occur, or that of its complement in the
57Both theorists also explicitly mention this feature of their theories in their respective papers.
58It is satisfiable, in other words, unless ∀x [G(x)] is.
59See Leinster (2013), pp.333-334.
60Of course, what traditional probability means here will devolve upon a philosophical account
of (objective) probability, not just the Kolmogorov axioms. The account I will draw on for my
own semantic theory is that of Ariel Cohen, based on R. Von Mises' frequentism with some
modifications.
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sample space. Of course, to make an ultrafilter a useful probability-measure, we have
to choose a filter over some set that we can meaningfully consider a sample space.
Later in this chapter, I will argue that the set Ds of situations as defined in sec. 5.3
can be considered a sample space. We can then define a function f mapping pairs of
subsets Ds into {0, 1} that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms that define a probability-
measure: for every event e in the sample space, f (e) = 1 iff e is a member of the
ultrafilter, and f (e) = 0 otherwise.61 We do this by his connection to objective
probability will become important in my theory's treatment of exception tolerance in
Type A sentences with generic readings.
There is a subtle difference between this approach and that of Szabó (2003). For
him, the principal ultrafilter functions as a representation of those properties of the
subject that the subject has just because there is one witness to it: a state of which the
subject is the Agent, for example.62 For Carnielli and Veloso, their ultrafilter functions
as a means to render precise a particular notion of a large subset of the domain,
corresponding to a predicate which objects of some type generally or almost always
have. This is why the probability-measure interpretation of an ultrafilter is such an
apt way to understand an adaptation of Carnielli and Veloso's idea to a domain
of situations, instead of individuals. Nevertheless, this use of ultrafilters along the
lines of Carnielli and Veloso's Ultrafilter Logic allows me to regain all of the boolean
entailments that the First Iteration of my theory lost, while retaining the advantages
of the situation-semantic approach over Szabó's and Landman's theories. It remains
to be explained how this kind of generalized quantifier falls out of the compositional
61For conditional probabilities, conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities, we will need f to range
over pairs of subsets of Ds. For basic probabilities of individual events, we only need subsets of
Ds.
62Landman (1989) takes properties as primitives of his theory. So there is no notion in his framework
corresponding to an event's being witness to some predicate which we intuitively take to apply
to the subject of the sentence. An individual simply has or lacks a property.
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interpretation of Type A sentences. I propose underspecified lexical entries for the
two quantifiers that make up the core of the Second Iteration, for the purpose of
introducing the theory. A more principled approach to semantic composition does
appears possible, though I will leave that task to future research.
Those not acquainted with natural-language semantics might find it unlikely that a
natural-language expression could denote a generalized quantifier based on a prin-
cipal ultrafilter, because nothing like this structure occurs in the standard Tarskian
interpretation of first-order logic.[BS97, CK12]63 There is empirical and theoretical
motivation for the hypothesis, however. The standard denotation for a nominal phrase
in Montague's PTQ is a principal ultrafilter over the domain of properties.[Mon74b]
For example, John, is a principal ultrafilter over the domain of properties generated
by the individual John in De, i.e the characteristic set of λP. [P (j)] where j denotes
John at every world. Second, research in syntax suggests appreciable parallels between
the structure of nominal expressions and that of predicate expressions. Nominaliza-
tions and possessive genitive phrases, for example, more or less force non-predicative
nominal phrases to encode much of the same information that their corresponding
predicate phrases do. Since they function semantically like determiner-phrases, Mon-
tagovian individuals fall to the nominal side of this distinction. The Pr head that
denotes the ultrafilter quantifier (based on Carnielli and Veloso) falls to the predicate
side of the distinction, functioning more like a Q-adverb in the syntax.
As I argued in sec. 5.2, there is a compelling literature suggesting that Q-adverbs
are selective quantifiers over situations. If there are determiner-quantifier expressions
that denote quantifiers based on principal ultrafilters over individuals, the existence
63There are non-standard ways, however, of giving a semantics for a first-order language in terms of
ultrafilters. See Bell and Slomson (1997) and Rasiowa and Sikorski, however, for a technique that
interprets first-order languages using principal ultrafilters. Principal ultrafilters are also familiar
to logicians, since the ultraproduct construction makes great use of them.
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of adverbial-quantifier expressions that denote ultrafilter-based quantifiers over the
domain of situations or events is a worthwhile hypothesis. More compelling evidence
comes from the striking parallels between the logical properties of determiner phrases
and those of Type A as-phrases. It is widely accepted that the class of denotations of
possible determiner phrases, whether descriptions or names, are closed under boolean
operations.[WP06] If the children denotes a distinct set, and so does John, then
John and the children denotes a distinct set.[Lin02]64 Likewise, if John raises objec-
tions as a councilor is true, and John negotiates as a councilor is, too, then John
raises objections and negotiates as a councilor must be true in the same context.
5.5.1 THE CORE THEORY
5.5.1.1 COMPOSITION RULES
FA (Function Application): If β and γ are sisters and β is a branching node and γ is
a branching node and α immediately dominates β and α immediately dominates γ ,
then JαK = JβK(JγK) iff JγK ∈ Dom(JβK), and JαK = JγK(JβK) iff JβK ∈ Dom(JγK).
5.5.1.2 LEXICON
J[Superman]K ∈ D<e,t> = λx.[1 iff x is a Superman]
J[Clark Kent]K ∈ D<e,t> = λx.[1 iff x is a Clark Kent]
64The same boolean entailments also hold for plurals in natural language, as Godehard Link famously
observed and explained with this lattice-theoretic semantic account of plural in Link (1983).
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JTHEK ∈ D<<e,t>,<s,e>> = λf.[λs.[
x ∈ De iff f(x) = 1 in s
and for all y ∈ De
such that f(y) = 1 in s,
y = x]]
J[bend]K ∈ D<s,t> = λs.[1 iff s is a bending]
J[steel bars]K ∈ D<s,e> = λs.[x ∈ De iff x is a steel bar in s]
JAgK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,e>,<s,t>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
g(s) is the agent of s
and f(s) = 1]]]
JThK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,e>,<s,t>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff g(s)
is the theme of s
and f(s) = 1]]]
JPrasK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,t>,<s,t>>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
char([ ]) ∈ Up(Int({min(F ) ⊆ Ds |char(f) ⊆F
and for some h ∈ D<s,t>
such that [ ] (f)(h)(s) = 1,
char(h) = F})) in s]]]
JPrGenK ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,t>,<s,t>>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
P(char(λσ. [1 iff min (σ) = f (σ) = ])
| char(λσ. [1 iff min (σ) = g (σ) = ]))
> r in s]]]
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JPr∃K ∈ D<<s,t>,<<s,t>,<s,t>>> = λf.[λg.[λs.[1 iff
(|char(f) ∩ char(g)|) > 1 in s]]]
Where char names the function of the contextually-correct type to map to its char-
acteristic set any function having the type of the function whose name, enclosed in
parentheses, follows it. Up names the function that maps a family of sets to its
upward closure.  Int names the function that maps a family of sets to its closure
under finite intersections.
5.5.2 DISCUSSION
The core of my analysis of Type A sentences in general is the lexical entry for Pras.
This is a Type <1,1> generalized quantifier over situations, based on the semantics of
Carnielli and Veloso (1997) for their ∇ operator. As will be seen from its definition
above, this quantifier closely resembles Carnielli and Veloso's ∇, with two important
exceptions.65 First, it generates an ultrafilter over the domain of situations, Ds, not
the domain of individuals, De. Second, my theory builds the filter from a basic family
of sets, determined by the second Pr quantifier in the structure of the sentence. In
this case, the second quantifier is PrGen, a definition of the unpronounced Gen op-
erator that quantificational theories of generics posit.[CP95, Was11] Assuming with
Chierchia (1995) that I-level predicates like copular constructions are inherent gener-
ics, I have adapted his hypothesis to Bowers (2010)'s PrP framework.[Chi95, Bow10]
Chierchia (1995) works with a level of LF in the syntax, and claims that some set of
features present on all I-level predicates trigger the adjunction of a Gen operator to
the I-level predicate at LF. If Bowers (2010) is correct in supposing that all Pr heads
65Disregarding, of course, the fact that Carnielli and Veloso work with an artificial language and
give syncategorematic definitions of satisfaction in a model, while my theory takes syntactic
structures of a sentences in a natural language, and maps them directly to denotations in the
space of functions built from Ds, De and Dt.
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are quantifiers over events (or situations), and that most Pr heads are unpronounced,
it is simpler just to assume that Gen is within the Pr category.
Not much literature on predicative phrases in generative grammar makes specific
proposals about the range of different heads in the Pr (Pred) phrasal category. Not
much of that literature explicitly deals with the semantics of these different Pr heads.
Three recent works that do take on both of these issues are Bowers (2011), Balusu
(2014) and Myler (2014).[Bow10, Bal14, Myl14] Bowers (2010) briefly sketches an
approach to compositional interpretation for the theory of syntactic arguments and
predicate phrases that he defends there.[Bow10] Speculating on the range of Pr heads,
he suggests that they are all quantifiers, semantically speaking. Some of these are
simple existential quantifiers to close off an event variable, Bowers suggests. Others
might be modal operators quantifying over situations, he adds. Myler and Balusu
present an alternative hypothesis. Balusu (2014) argues that there is at least one Pr
that heads Individual-Level phrases, and one that heads Stage-Level phrases.[Kra95,
Bal14, Myl14]66 Myler adopts the two lexical entries in Balusu (2014), with slight
modifications. Myler assumes with Balusu that Predstage denotes a simple predicate
mapping event-predicates, events and individuals into truth just in case the predicate
holds of the event and the individual is that event's agent. Predindividual is semantically
inert it denotes an identity function. I agree with Myler and Balusu's lexical entry
for Predstage . In an event semantics of the usual style, the head of a stage-level PrP
would have to denote something like this. My lexical entry for PrGen however does
not agree with Myler and Balusu's proposal. Suppose that Bowers (2010) turns out
to be wrong, and Balusu and Myler right, on the semantics of Pr heads. Consider
66Balusu (2014) is an informal talk given at an NYU Syntax Brown Bag meeting in 2014. I am
reporting Balusu's views indirectly from Myler (2014)'s account of them, and from her abstract
for the talk (available at <https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/nyusyntaxbrownbag/previous-
talks#41114330pm>).
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a semantic theory identical to the one I present above in this section, except that it
assigns PrGen an identity function for its denotation. Assuming that generics exist,
there is an unpronounced Gen somewhere in the structure of 143. Assuming that Gen
can somehow achieve the proper scope with the sentence on this structure, it makes
no difference for the interpretation of any Simple Type A sentence how Gen gets into
the derivation. For my theory, therefore, not much hangs on the lexical entry for the
Individual-Level Pr head.
My particular version of Gen is based on the one defended by Ariel Cohen in Cohen
(1999).[Coh99] Cohen defines Gen as the quantifier satisfied when the conditional
probability of its restrictor given its matrix exceeds a contextually-supplied threshold
value, denoted by r in the lexical entry above. As I sketched above in sec. 5.5,
Carnielli and Veloso make their definition of ∇ contingent upon a set of axioms,
which jointly define a generic individual (the element of the domain that is witness
to every one of the axioms). My theory takes a different route. Since a semantic
theory for natural language can refer directly to the (model-theoretic representations
of) the facts of the matter, my theory can avoid stipulating those predicates that
hold generally of Superman as Clark Kent, for instance. Rather, we can let another
quantifier tell us which predicates those are. In a Type A sentence with a generic
reading, that second quantifier will be Gen.
Suppose we have a set of situation predicates B, whose members are all and only
those that satisfy λP. [Gen (s) [F (s)] [P (s)]], where F is the qualifying predicate of
the sentence, e.g., Judge′ or ClarkKent′. Now let B′ be the image of B under our
semantic interpretation function. Now take this family of subsets of Ds, B′, and close
it under finite intersections to yield B′′. B′′ has the Finite Intersection Property. If
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we close B′′ upward, giving B′′′, then B′′′ is a maximal filter over ℘ (Ds).[CV97]67 The
Pr1 quantifier is satisfied if and only if the extension of the as-phrase sentence's main
predicate is a member of B′′′.68
This qualifying predicate, in [Comp,Pr] of PrP1, is a DP, syntactically speaking. It
might be a common name, like judge, a description, like the mayor or a proper
name, like Superman. In the first two cases, Kratzerian situation semantics already
suggests a denotation. A common name or a description simply denotes the set of situ-
ations that satisfies it.[Kra89] It might not be obvious, however, how my theory could
obtain a denotation for those qualifying predicates of the form [[Pr [..N..]DP]Pr']PrP,
where, N is a proper name. The present iteration of my theory obtains a deno-
tation for qualifying predicates like as Superman according to Elbourne (2005)'s
treatment of proper names.[Elb05] With the support of Burge (1973)'s evidence that
proper names distribute like full determiner-phrases, Elbourne argues that the predi-
cate is an Alfred (for example) just means is called 'Alfred '.[Bur73, Adg03][30] For
this reason, there is always a predicate in [Comp, Pr] of PrP1 available to restrict the
two quantifiers.
Consider the Type A sentence 143:
(143) Superman bends steel bars as Superman.
Example 143 has a generic reading. Fig. 5.3 displays the detail of the PrP structure
67See Carnielli and Veloso (1997), p.38, where they note that a collection of subsets of any set S can
be extended to an ultrafilter over S iff it has the Finite Intersection Property. A set S has the
Finite Intersection Property just in case every finite collection of subsets of S has a non-empty
intersection.
68I am speaking loosely here. It is not actually the as-phrase sentence's main predicate alone that
determines if the Pr1 is satisfied. Rather, the Pr1quantifier is satisfied for a given Type A sentence
iff char(λs. [a is in s and g(s) = min(s) = 1]) ∈ B′′′, where a is the individual that the subject of
the as-phrase sentence denotes, and the g is the function whose value is 1 iff its argument is a
situation that supports the main predicate of the as-phrase sentence.
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for 143.69
TP
DP
Supermani
T'
∅ PrPmax
PrP1
PROi Pr1'
Pr1 AgP
DP
Supermani
Ag'
Ag NP
Superman
PrP2
<Supermani> Pr2'
Pr2 + bend ThP
AP
steel bars
Th'
Th AgP
DP
<Supermani>
Ag'
Ag V
<bend>
Figure 5.3: Structure of a Type A sentence with a generic reading
When we try to calculate the denotation of Superman leaps buildings as Superman
using Function Application, substitutions and β-reductions, everything proceeds well,
until Pras. The [ ] notation I have used in my lexical entry marks those contexts
within the definition of the function that require material which Pras cannot get locally
through the argument passed to it. The material that Pras requires to be plugged
69The + notation in Pr2+ V means that the moved V is Chomsky-adjoined to Pr2.. In other
words, the resulting structure is [Pr2 V]Pr2 . Bowers (2000) and (2010) argue that this is the
position that the verb raises to before Spell-Out, predicting the fact that we say, e.g., Super-
man bends steel bars as Superman, and not Steel bars Superman bends as Superman, while
remaining consistent with his theory's prediction that the verb Merges before any Theme theta-
role-player. The same verb-raising goes on in any simple declarative sentence according to Bowers
PrP hypothesis, e.g. in both Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2. I write + in Fig. 5.3 just to save space in the
large tree.
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DP
∅ D'
<the>
NP
Figure 5.4: Fine structure of DP in Type A sentence
into each of these contexts are JThPK and JPrGenK, respectively. A common way
to explain how determiner-quantifiers dislocated from their semantic scope in the
surface-level structure of a sentence is Quantifier Raising (QR).[BC10, HK98, Car13]
The idea is that quantifiers can only take their proper semantic scopes if they c-
command all objects that provide them with a restrictor or matrix. Of course, this
cannot be the case for the syntactic structure motivated by distributional evidence
alone. If we assume that syntax operates independent of the semantic features of
sentences, then thee must be another syntactic representation which the semantic
theory interprets. It assigns the surface-structure a denotation only indirectly, after
quantifiers have been raised and adjoined to higher sites within the tree. As indicated
in Chapter 3, there are currently several difficult objections to QR, coming out of the
Minimalist Program.[Cho95, BC10] As we read in Chomsky (1995), there simply
must be some feature uniquely associated with all syntactic objects that end up
as quantifiers at LF, assuming that Merge builds structures bottom up (i.e., by
projecting features of lexical items upwards). If there is no such feature, then QR is
covert movement unmotivated by an unchecked feature, which would make it unlike
any other type of movement considered within Minimalist theories. Assuming this
particular economy requirement of Minimalism, then, it would be best to avoid QR
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if possible.[Jac02]70
There are several techniques gaining acceptance in semantics research that could pro-
vide strictly compositional solutions to this problem. Barker's continuization, and
semantic underspecification are the most promising approaches. A continuation, for
the purposes of compositional semantics, is a function from any constituent's direct
semantic type to that of the larger context that contains it.[Bar01, Bar02, BS14] For
my purposes, that larger context is the whole sentence under interpretation. If every
constituent is assigned the semantic type of a function from the type of its own contin-
uation to that of the whole sentence, each constituent effectively scopes over the entire
sentence, if necessary. Semantic scope becomes dissociated from c-command, with the
scoping relations between quantifiers being decided by composition rules.[Bar02]
λs.[1 iff char(λs.[1 iff s is a leaping and a building x is the theme of s
and the unique Superman y in s is the agent of s]) ∈
Up(Int({min(F ) ⊆ Ds |
char(λs.[the unique Superman x ∈ De in s is a Superman in s]) ⊆ F
and for some h ∈ Ds such that
P(char(λs. [1 iff min (s) and the unique Superman x ∈ De in s is a Superman in s])
| char(λs. [1 iff min (s) = h (s) = ])) > t
char(f) = F )) in s}]
Figure 5.5: Denotation that the Second Iteration predicts for 143
Transforming the Second Iteration of my theory into a continuation-based theory
could provide the material under PrP2to the Pras quantifier in situ, yielding a theory
that is directly compositional and variable-free in the senses of Jacobson (2002).
This would be a technical as well as a theoretical virtue. Unbound variables in
the surface-level structure introduce a questionable items into the ontology of the
70Alternatives to QR certainly exist, but perhaps the most familiar ones Quantifying In and Cooper
Storage both complicate the semantic theory significantly, in a technical and a scientific sense
of the term. See Jacobson (2002) on these mechanisms.
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semantic theory (indices).[Jac99, Jac02] Stricter compositionality is better than looser
compositionality, as a methodological principle, because it leads to a simpler theory,
and provides an important constraint on the range of empirically-equivalent semantic
theories. On the grounds of simplicity and parsimony, a variable-free and directly
compositional semantic theory is preferable to the alternatives, among empirically
equivalent theories.[BS14]
Semantic underspecification is perhaps less aesthetically satisfying than continuiza-
tion, but technically much easier to implement in this case. Underspecification is
the claim that some lexical entries do not directly specify a denotation for seman-
tic interpretation, but provide material that will allow an algorithm to compute a
denotation for the whole sentence in which they appear by plugging gaps in the
representations of some constituents' denotations with representations found in the
lexical entries of other constituents.[Egg10] The information that drives this plugging
algorithm is semantic types of constituents in the tree, and the semantic type of each
gap in the derived representation for the denotation of a constituent. For instance,
in the Second Iteration above, JPrasK contains a gap which expects a plug of type
〈〈s, t〉 , 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈s, t〉〉〉 (the type of a <1,1> situation-quantifier), and another gap ex-
pecting a plug of type 〈s, t〉 (the type of a one-place situation-predicate). JPrGenK is
the only other constituent in the tree that has type 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈s, t〉〉〉, and JThPK
on the other side of the tree can plug the 〈s, t〉 gap.
I will assume the underspecification approach here, leaving continuization of the the-
ory for future research. Once we plug the gap in JPrasK with JPrGenK and JThPK,
and after the usual substitutions and β-reductions, the Second Iteration theory pre-
dicts the denotation for Superman leaps buildings as Superman stated in Fig. 5.5.
This denotation is rather difficult to work with directly as we evaluate the Second
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Iteration. In the next section, I will restate it in a more manageable form.
5.5.2.1 AN EXAMPLE DENOTATION AND A GENERAL SCHEMA
FOR TYPE A SENTENCES
(E)
J"John raises questions as a judge"Ks,r = 1 iff
1
the set G whose members are exactly those situations in
which John is the Agent of a question-raising in s, is a
member of the ultrafilter Uj,
2
where Uj is the upward closure of the closure under
countable intersections of F ,
3
where F is the family of sets of situations whose
members are exactly the extensions of all predicates F
such that
4
Gen(s) [John is the Agent of s and s is a judging situation]
[John is the Agent of s and F (s)]
5
where in general, for any individual a and any
conditions ϕ and ψ,
6
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Gen(s)[ϕ [a, s]][ψ [a, s]] iff P (ϕ [a, s] |ψ [a, s]) > r
7
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
8
Lines 6-8 of (E) says that the conditional probability of ϕ [a, s] given ψ [a, s] is greater
than the threshold r.71
Abstracting from (E), we can state a schema (G) describing the class of functions
that the Second Iteration predicts for the denotations of whole Type A sentences:
(G) Jpa F as GqKs= 1 iff in s, the set whose members are exactly those situations
that support the truth of pa Gq or pa isGq is a member of the ultrafilter Ua over
the family of the extensions of all situation-predicates supported by some situation
of which a is the agent, where Ua is generated from the family Fa of all situation
predicate-extensions that satisfy some condition ϕ, parameterized to a and F .
One such type of condition is Gen(s)[ϕ [a, s]][ψ [a, s]]. This is the condition found
in my truth-conditions for Simple Type A sentences with generic readings. Another
condition common in Type A sentences is ∃s [ϕ [a, s] ∧ ψ [a, s]]. This condition is for
Simple Type A sentences without a generic reading. For example, a Type A sentence
with a stage-level main predicate, or an individual-level main predicate that does not
give rise to generic readings, like was born on March 26.
71Here, I am using the notation pϕ [a, s]q to name the closed sentence formed by substituting some
expressions a and s into the two-place open sentence ϕ.
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5.5.3 EVALUATING THE SECOND ITERATION
5.5.3.1 PREDICTS EXCEPTION TOLERANCE FOR TYPE A WITH
GENERIC READINGS
An interesting class of Simple Type A sentences have generic readings, as argued in
sec. 5.1.1. Generics are well known to show exception tolerance.[CP95] Example 144
is a Simple Type A sentence with a generic reading. Intuitively, it is consistent with
145 :
(144) Ernest catches long passes as a quarterback.
(145) Sometimes Ernest does not catch a long pass as a quarterback.
The semantic theory described in sec. 5.5.1 predicts this consistency. Specifically, it
predicts the joint satisfiability of 144 and 145. We can reasonably infer that the theory
predicts their consistency from the T-sentence schema above and from the fact that
the theory predicts their joint satisfaction in some structure.
To show that the theory predicts these two sentences' consistency, first recall the
general schema for Type A sentence-denotations that I derived from the Second Iter-
ation of the semantic theory in sec. 5.5.2.1. The schema includes a condition ϕ, that
dictates the basic set of predicate-extensions that will make up the ultrafilter. Now
suppose that for 144, ϕ [a, F ] is
Gen (s) [F (s) and a is in s] [ψ [a, s]]
and for 145, ϕ [a,F ] is
∃s [F (s) ∧ a is in s ∧ ¬ψ [a, s]] .
Then the ultrafilter built for 144, U1, will be the upward closure of the closure under
finite intersections of F1, the family of situation-predicate extensions of those sen-
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tences ψ that satisfy Gen (s) [F (s) and a is in s] [ψ [a, s]] . Loosely speaking, F1 is
the family of situation-predicate extensions that generally hold of a given individual
a that is in an F -situation. In contrast, U2, the ultrafilter built for 145, is the upward
closure of the closure under finite intersections ofF2, the family of extensions of those
sentences ψ that satisfy ∃s [F (s) ∧ a is in s ∧ ¬ψ [a, s]]. Informally, F2 is the family
of situation-predicate extensions X such that the situation predicate corresponding
to the complement of X in Ds holds in at least one F -situation that a is in.
On these assumptions, any structure M in which JF KM * JGKM satisfies 145. For
there will be some s ∈ JF KM such that s /∈ JGKM, so G′ ∈ F2, where G′ is the
complement of JGKM in Ds. Since G′ ∈ F2, G′ ∈ U2 also, because F2 ⊆ U2. So
M |=145. Since my theory predicts that some structure satisfies 145, we can infer
that it predicts 145 to be true in some possible case, by means of the T-sentence
schema for the theory in sec. 5.5.2.1. Call this case C.
We will now show that 144 is satisfied in this same structure M. Suppose that in
M, there is some
A ∈ ℘ (Ds) = {X ⊆ Ds : X ⊆ JJudge'KM and
P(JaKM is in some σ ∈ Ds where σ ∈ X
| JaKM is in σ and σ ∈ JF KM) > r} where r < 1
Then by definition of P, for each member X of the collection A,
∣∣∣JF KM∣∣∣ ≥ |X|. By
our previous assumption, JF KM * JGKM. So for some x ∈ JF KM, x /∈ JGKM. Then
it is consistent with our previous assumptions aboutM that JGKM ∈ A. Notice that
A = F 1. That is to say that A is the instance of Fa from the T-sentence schema
that my theory predicts for 144. Then it follows that JGKM ∈ Ua. Thus M |=144.
Again by means of the T-sentence schema, we can infer fromM |=144 that the theory
predicts 144 is true in the same case C as above.
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We have now shown that some structure satisfies both 144 and 145. All of our
assumptions aboutM have been dictated by the predictions of my semantic theory
about 144 and 145. Thus some structure jointly satisfies the two sentences. And on
our previous assumptions it follows that both sentences are true in the case C. Thus
my semantic theory predicts that 144 and 145 are consistent, which was to be shown.
5.5.3.2 PRESERVES THE BOOLEAN ENTAILMENTS FOR ALL
SIMPLE TYPE A SENTENCES
We can see why this should be so by looking at the structure of the set that my Pr
quantifiers build. In the Second Iteration, the role of Pras is to define a collection
of situation predicate-extensions from which to build the ultrafilter on which the
theory is based. By definition of a proper ultrafilter over a set X, for every subset
of X, either it is a member of the filter or its complement in X is a member, but
not both.[Kru12, BS97] This follows from the fact that the filter is maximal over X.
This guarantees that non-contradiction and excluded middle hold for every qualified
predicate G with respect to a fixed subject a and a qualifying predicate F . By
definition, the filter is also closed under finite intersections, which implies that for
every pair of a qualifying predicate F and subject a, for any qualified predicates G
and H that both hold of a, the predicate defined by the conjunction of G and H also
holds for F and a.
These three properties of an ultrafilter, and the conditions they impose on the relation
of logical consequence that my theory models, correspond to Landman's inference-
schemata 4, 6, and 7.[Lan89]72 The rest of the boolean entailments that Landman
(1989) represents in his inference-schemata for as-phrase sentences follow from my
72See sec. 1.1 for Landman's eight inference schemata.
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theory in a natural way. Thus my theory preserves the boolean entailments for all
Simple Type A sentences.
5.5.3.3 THE OBJECTION FROM TEMPORAL RELATIONS
REVISITED
Because neither iteration of my theory imposes any temporal relations whatsoever
between the situations in the extension of the qualified predicate and those in the
extension of the qualifying predicate, they avoid the Objection from Temporal Rela-
tions, and in particular, the Louise sentence in chapter 2.
5.5.3.4 THE OBJECTION FROM INTENSIONALITY REVISITED
The Second Iteration does not depart from the account of substitution-failures in
Type A sentences argued for in the First Iteration, sec. 5.4.4. Thus, like the First
Iteration, it addresses the Objection from Intensionality that I raised against Szabó's
theory in chapter 2
5.6 TAKING STOCK: WHAT THE THEORY DOES
We can evaluate an empirical theory according to its descriptive adequacy or its
theoretical virtues. My theory's descriptive adequacy exceeds that of previous theories
of APS in several areas. The Second Iteration predicts Exception Tolerance for the
generic readings of Type A sentences. It preserves the boolean entailments for all
readings of Type A sentences. It predicts factivity in both qualified and qualifying
predicates of all Simple Type A sentences. It answers my Objection from Temporal
Relations Objection from Intensionality.
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My theory also has a number of theoretical virtues to recommend it, as I have ar-
gued. The Second Iteration of my theory bases its interpretation of Simple Type A
sentences on the independently-motivated syntactic analysis of chapter 4. It is an at-
tempt at syntax and semantics pursued in tandem.73 In its present form, the theory
assumes underspecified elements in the lexical entries for the Pr quantifiers, but inter-
prets the S-structures of Type A sentences directly without the use of LF. I believe
that the Second Iteration could be made directly compositional and variable-free,
in Pauline Jacobson's sense. Perhaps one way to accomplish this end is by reim-
plementing Bowers' Pr idea in a categorial grammar with support for discontinuous
constituents.[Bac79, Jac99, BS14]
My theory is not committed to any entities that are not part of the standard ontology
of natural-language semantics research. More specifically, the theory avoids reifying
as-phrase predicates in the form of aspects. By aspects I mean objects that are
non-identical to the individuals that have them, are no spatio-temporal part of the
subject that has them, but bear some special relation to the individual. Asher's
object-elaborations, Castaneda's guises, Fine's qua-objects or the similar aspect-like
entities that Forbes, Moore and Pitt's truth-conditional analyses of APS are based
on. So far as the Quinean ontological case for aspects is concerned, they are in worse
shape than situations. Contemporary semantic theory presupposes situations, in the
sense of the term current since Kratzer (1989). My theory also addresses the Semantic
Objection and the Identity Objection, using a special type of counterpart relation,
derived from a rigidified definite description based on a meta-linguistic predicate.
73This phrase is due to Paul Hagstrom, during his seminar on topics in syntax at Boston University,
Spring 2016.
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6 GLOSSARY
adjunct : A unit defined in X-bar theory and its successors as a projection [..]
of a category at a level higher than that formed by the complement.[Mat14]1 The
coarse structure of an phrase of category X with an adjunct is therefore [XP Y]XP,
where Y stands for a constituent of any category, or [Y XP]XP, if phrase-structures
encode linear order (see Fig. 6.1).[Cho95][31]
XP
XP
adjunct
Y
XP
Y XP
adjunct
Figure 6.1: Structural position(s) of an adjunct
distribution : The set of contexts within sentences in which a unit or class of units
can appear. E.g., the distribution of 'hair' in written English is the set of contexts 'I
combed my ___', 'Give me the ___spray', 'My ___ is too long', etc., in any of
which the blank (____) can be filled by it. A 'distributional criterion', by which,
e.g, 'hair' might be classed as a noun, appeals to evidence of distributions. 'Distri-
butionalism' is the doctrine developed especially in the 1950s by Zellig Harris and by
Chomsky, that the description of a language should initially be based on evidence of
distribution alone, in abstraction from and preceding the study of meaning.[Mat14]2
c-command : A relation between a syntactic unit and another syntactic unit that
in a constituency analysis is either its sister or is included in its sister. E.g. if 'he
came to town' has the structure [he [came [to town]]], 'he' c-commands both 'came
to town', as its sister, and 'to town', as part of its sister.[Mat14]3
complement :
1. An element in a syntactic construction that may be variously required or excluded
by specific lexical units. E.g. in 'They gave me the change', an indirect and direct
object are complements required by verbs such as 'give'; similar elements are excluded,
1Quoted from Matthews (2014).
2Quoted in full from Matthews (2014).
3Quoted in full from Matthews (2014). Adger (2003) and Koopman and Sportiche (2014) contain
equivalent defintions of c-command, as I mentioned in chapter 4. There is a distinct notion of
symmetrical c-command, where every constituent dominated by some other constituent's sister
also c-commands it. I do not use this notion of c-command.
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or not licensed, e.g. by verbs such as 'appear'. Similarly of units licensed by other
units: thus a preposition has a complement, 'the table', in 'on the table'; an adjective
in 'angry with me', of a type not licensed by all adjectives; a noun in 'news of their
marriage', of a type licensed by only some nouns. In some accounts the complements
of a verb are extended to include a subject; traditionally, however, they include
arguments within a predicate [..] only.[Mat14]4
2. A structural position in the X-bar schema, [Spec [X Comp]X']XP,, namely the
one occupied by Comp (see Fig. 6.2). In this sense of the term, a syntactic object Y
is a complement to another, X, iff Y is sister to X within an XP phrase projected
by X.[KSS14]
The second sense of complement defined above in 2 is the one I mean to use when
I write complement in this thesis in a discussion of syntax, unless otherwise noted.
The definition in 1 above is vague and ambiguous, but I think it accurately repre-
sents one way in which complement is used. What makes Y a complement to X,
in the sense of complement from 1, is its functional role in relation to X. This role
seems very similar to that of the saturating argument in relation to the function
it saturates, in Frege's account of language. Since complement is a theoretical
term of generative syntax, one would hope its meaning is independent of the notion
of grapsing the meaning of a sentence that contains a complement.5 Both functions
and complement-taking objects, in the sense 1, require their arguments or their com-
plements to form a whole with some important property. Complement in the sense
that 2 above aims at is no such thing. The extension of complement in this second
sense is clear-cut. As Koopman and Sportiche (2014) point out, it is an empirical
question whether the actual extensions of these two senses of complement are the
same.
constituency : Relation, especially in syntax, between a smaller unit and a larger
unit of which it is a part.
CP : Complementizer Phrase. A type of phrase that many generative syntacticians
suppose to be the projection of heads like that and for, as in Vin hoped for rain
and Julie hoped that Vin would be on time.[Adg03] That and for are called
complementizers in this context. These syntacticians distinguish the CP, headed by a
complementizer, from the TP, another constituent of what we call clauses in our folk-
syntax. TP is headed by a tense-related object, such as a morpheme (English -s) or
4Quoted from Matthews (2014).
5Assuming Chomsky's autonomy of syntax hypothesis. In current form, this is the hypothesis that
Merge is blind to s-selectional features (semantic features). Compare, e.g., the combinatory
categorial grammar of Jacobson (1999) or Barker and Shan (2014), in which semantic type-
shifting rules change the syntactic categories of parts of the sentence. In Chomsky's terms,
syntactic markers are being added to the representation due to the needs of assigning the sentence
an interpretation. The autonomy of syntax hypothesis entails that this does not happen in human
language.[Adg03]
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a word (English will). In Quantifier Raising theories of semantic interpretation, the
specificer of a new CP adjoined to the TP of a sentence's main clause often serves as
a landing site for a raised operator. Asher's semantic theory of as-phrase sentences,
for instance, rests on this hypothesis.[Ash11]
descriptive adequacy : This is a term I have borrowed from Chomsky (1965) and
adapted to my own purpose here. Io describe a criterion for evaluating semantic
theories. In Chomsky (1965), descriptive adequacy specifically refers to the ability
of a grammar to generate all possible sentences of an I-language. By all possible
sentences I mean to include both attested sentences and those that, perhaps, no one
has ever spoken or heard yet. By my analogy, the basic criterion of adequacy for a
semantic theory T is that
1. T yields a consequence-relation over all sentences of its object language6
2. For all and only those object-language sentences a,b such that a entails b, a |=T
b, where |=T is the consequence-relation defined by the semantic theory T.7
Chomsky (1965) distinguishes descriptive adequacy from explanatory adequacy. A
theory of syntax must cover all human natural languages to reach explanatory ade-
quacy, and it must explain how a child can select a grammar that is descriptively
adequate to his experience with spoken language. It is not obvious that formal se-
mantic theories of natural language can be evaluated by some semantic analogue to
explanatory adequacy.[32]
DP : "Abbreviation for 'determiner phrase'. The 'DP hypothesis' is the proposal,
first advanced seriously in the 1980s, that phrases formed with determiners should
be represented that way."[Mat14]8 The DP hypothesis, in other words, is the claim
6The object language can and should be a fragment of some natural language. Otherwise, it is
impractical to evaluate the descriptive adequacy of the theory. Ideally, this fragment should be
defined by a formal grammar descriptively adequate to it. The formal grammar might be a set of
phrase-structure rules, a categorial grammar. On Minimalist assumptions, the grammer will con-
sist of a lexicon of feature-matrices along with a Merge function defined over the feature-matrices,
and perhaps a Move or Affect function similarly defined. In practice, not much work in semantics
pins down its object-language fragment so precisely, as Jacobson (2002) observes.[Jac02]
7Here I am omitting the details of contextual parameters on the interpretation function, which
are irrelevant to this discussion. Also, see sec. 5.3.1 for definition of consequence relation for my
theory. In that section, I follow Kratzer (2012)'s convention of calling this relation entailment,
but this relation of entailment is defined by the semantic theory, over propositions, which are
theoretical objects for Kratzer's (and my) possibilistic situation-semantics. This relation is not to
be confused with the entailment relation over sentences of the object language. In stark contrast
to Kratzer's entailments between propositions, object-language entailments are the data for a
semantic theory of that language.
8Quoted in full from Matthews (2014), with one alteration: I enclosed "determiner phrase" in
quote-marks to distinguish use from mention here.
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that every nominal phrase is headed by a determiner, even in phrases with no overt
determiner (e.g., "the", "all").
eventuality : In the vocabulary of Bach(1986), an eventuality is actual entity
with its own properties.[Bac86b] Among these properties are a location in space and
time, and typically, relations between the eventuality and sentient beings. semantic
theories that posit eventualities are called event-semantics theories. Davidson (1967)
introduces the general notion. Bach (1986) proposes a taxonomy of eventualities,
as well as the term itself. Parsons (1990) proposes a formal semantic theory for a
fragment of English that assigns Davidson and Bach's eventualities the theoretical
role they occupy in most subsequent event-semantic theories.[Par90] Notably, Par-
sons claims that the denotation of every deverbal noun-phrase is an eventuality, e.g.,
noun-phrases like [evacuation]. He also claims that all English adverbs contribute
eventuality-predicates to the logical forms of their sentences. Parsons' most novel
proposal is that eventualities are the substrates of the properties and relations known
as thematic roles in generative grammar. Thematic roles like Agent, Theme, and
so forth, are properties of eventualities. The methodology that Parsons proposes for
event semantics is to bracket metaphysical assumptions about the natures of various
eventualities during early stages of empirical work with event semantics. Perhaps,
he reasons, we can read off theoretical definitions for different types of eventuality
from mature empirical theories, by means of a Ramsey sentence.[Lew70, Hac16][33]
Kratzer (2014) argues that eventualities should be modeled as a special case of sit-
uations in a possibilistic situation theory.[Kra14]9 Since possible-worlds semantics
in the sense of Lewis (1968) is also a special case of situation semantics, Kratzer's
possibilistic situation semantics provides a generalization from which possible-worlds
semantics and event-semantics can each be derived, without positing primitive worlds
or eventualities.[Lew68, Kra14]
generalize-to-the-worst-case : A modeling strategy often applied in formal se-
mantics. Suppose there are two disjoint subsets of things, A and B. We know that we
can effectively model everything in A as a special case of B, but not vice versa. So in-
stead of introducing some primitive entity in the assumptions of our theory to model
A members, we let the needs of modelling B dictate our theory's assumptions, and
gain a simpler theory.[Sid12]10 For example, a situation-semantic theory might need
to deal with extensional 1-place predicates and 1-place predicates that are context-
dependent, in that they are true of one thing a in a situation s but false of a in a
situation s′ 6= s. To generalize to the worst case, the context-dependent predicates, we
assign all 1-place predicates the type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, the type of a function from things to
functions from situations to truth-values. For any extensional 1-place predicate, e.g.,
"is married", assigned a denotation f , the result of saturating f with the argument
9On this subject, also see sec. 5.3.
10Really, we trade some ideological simplicity in Quine's sense for greater ontological simplicity. See
Sider (2012) on the subject.
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Barack Obama will be a constant function on situations that goes to 1 ("truth").
In the context of debates over semantic methods, it is not always clear what the
drawback of a generalize-to-the-worst-case strategy is supposed to be, or even why a
given theory is an instance of generalize-to-the-worst-case, and with respect to what.
Jacobson (2002) points out that any semantic theory with type-shifting rules has its
corresponding empirically-equivalent semantic theory that lacks those type-shifting
rules but assumes the existence of covert operators in the syntactic representations
it takes as input.[Jac02] This is fairly evident, since all type-shifting operators are
just more higher-order functions within the type hierarchy of their semantic theory.
Thus in principle, there could be lexical items that denote these functions, and these
lexical items could be unpronounced in every sentence of a given natural language.
intermediate logical language (ILL) : A formal language L , e.g., a first-order lan-
guage, that some semantic theory targets, by mapping natural-language sentences
or syntactic representations into L sentences. Thomason or Montague might have
coined the term, to distinguish a semantic theory like that of "English as A Formal
Language" from that of PTQ[Mon74b]. The first paper shows how to define a se-
mantic interpretation function for a fragment of a English, that directly associates
each syntactic analysis of a sentence in the fragment with a class of models that sat-
isfies it-- relative to contextual parameters like world, time, assignment function, etc.
PTQ, in contrast, defines a translation function that maps each syntactic analysis to
a unique formula of IL, 'Intensional Logic'. Montague then gives a recursive defini-
tion of satisfaction-in-a-model relating each formula of IL under a given setting of
parameters to a class of models. Since it is always possible to eliminate the ILL from
a semantic theory without affecting the predictions it yields, the point of employing
an ILL might be unclear. If the ILL has known computational and proof-theoretic
properties however, like all first-order logics do, then semanticists can take advantage
of these properties for free. For example, Veloso and Veloso (2004) shows how the
Ultrafilter Logic of Carnielli and Veloso (1997) can be embedded in a first-order logic.
It immediately follows that Ultrafilter Logic is compact, complete, etc. Montague's
IL, in contrast, is not complete, since it is a higher-order logic. Its computational or
complexity properties are also for the most part still unknown.
logical form :
1."One of two essential representations of a sentence in Chomsky's theory of Universal
Grammar. Defined as interface between a grammar, or I-language, and what are
called e.g. 'conceptual' and 'intentional' performance systems. The grammar as a
whole computes a relation, for any sentence, between a Logical Form and a Phonetic
Form (PF)"[Mat14]11
2.The property of a natural-language sentence in virtue of which it is valid or
satisfiable.[Sza12a] Proponents of "the doctrine of logical form" suppose that logical
11Quoted in full from Matthews (2014).
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forms are shapes of sentences, in some sense.12 For instance, a defender of this doctrine
might propose the hypothesis that logical forms of NL sentences correspond 1:1 to
equivalence-classes on NL sentences defined by the sets of substitution-instances of
schemata over NL sentences.
These two senses of "logical form" 1 and 2 are logically independent of each other.
One might hold that there are logical forms in sense 1 but no logical forms in sense
2, or vice versa, or that neither exist. One might also consistently hold that there are
logical forms in sense 1, but some or all of them are not logical forms in sense 2.
logical strength : an ordinal measurement (ranking) of sentences or formulas of a
language with respect to the quantity of cases that make them true. A sentence s of
a language L is logically stronger than a sentence s′ iff s is true in fewer cases than
s′. For instance, "p ∧ q" is logically stronger than "p ∨ q" because the first is true in
1 of 4 cases and the second is true in 3 of 4. Yet "p→ q" is neither logically stronger
than "p∨ q" nor logically weaker than it, because "p∨ q" and "p→ q" are both true
in exactly 3 of 4 cases. According to classical assumptions, no sentence entails any
sentence logically stronger than it.
logical validity :
1. For natural languages: Validity of a sentence in virtue of its logical form alone.
Often opposed to lexical validity, in which the sentence in question is valid in virtue
of its logical form and the meaning of one or more non-logical terms in it (e.g.,
"bachelor").
2.For artificial languages : Validity of a sentence in virtue of its structure and the
interpretations of its logical constants alone.[34][PTW90, DWP81] Often distinguished
from lexical validity, i.e., validity in virtue of the interpretations of some terms in the
sentence as well as its structure and the interpretation of its logical constants. The
technical device often used to make a semantic theory predict lexical validity for
some inference is the meaning-postulate. A meaning-postulate is an axiom of the
artificial langauge that we interpret as a stipulation that some pattern of inference
involving a term in the lexicon is valid. The axiom-schemata of Landman (1989b)
are informal presentations of meaning-postulates that his semantic theory uses to
constrain the interpretation of as[Lan89] Szabó (2003) criticizes Landman for using
these meaning-postulates, since Szabó holds that the inference-patterns the postulates
represent are logically valid, not just lexically valid.
model :
1. A structure for a formal language or a formal theory that satisfies some set of
formulas is said to be a model of that set of formulas.
12The phrase is due to Szabó (2012a).
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2. A structure that satisfies all theorems of a formal language, such as a first-order
language. Many languages do not have a unique model in this sense. In such cases,
we might distinguish one such model from all other models of the language, for having
some nice properties. This is the intended model of the language or theory.[BM77]
partial order : Any relation that is transitive and antisymmetric. A relation in the
mathematician's sense (a set) is a partial ordering-relation iff it satisfies the following
axioms (1)-(2), when a structure's valuation-function assigns it to
the predicate ≤ :
(1) ∀x [∀y [∀z [(x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z)→ x ≤ z]]]
(2) ∀x [∀y [¬ (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)]] .
Strictly speaking, the joint requirement of transitivity and antisymmetry is consistent
with the existence of some incomparable things: some a, b such that ¬(a ≤ b) ∧
¬(b ≤ a). This is why any relation satisfying these two requirements is called partial.
Ordering relations are central to formal semantics of natural language, particularly in
the areas of semantics that use lattices. A lattice is a kind of partially-ordered object
with some additional structure.13
structure : In mathematical logic, an ordered tuple consisting of sets. A given
structure is said to satisfy a formula of some formal language, for instance, if one
member of the tuple, considered as a valuation function, maps that formula to an
object interpreted as truth, e.g., 1. Each member of a structure is necessary to es-
tablish whether the structure satisfies a given formula. A structure that satisfies
some set of formulas F is called a model of F. Tarski introduced a rigorous recur-
sive definition of satisfaction in a structure for any formula of a first-order language,
the "BSD" ("Basic Semantic Defition").[BM77] Generally, a structure for a logic in-
cludes at least a domain, a valuation function, a set of assignment functions. The
language has some sufficiently large stock of non-logical constants, variables, and
predicates. The valuation function maps each non-logical constant, into a member
of the domain, and each predicate into a subset of the domain. A stock of assign-
ment functions represents the full variety of distinct mappings between the stock of
variables and the members of the structure's domain. Some non-first-order languages
need additional elements in their structures to determine the class of structures that
satisfies a given formula. Modal logics add a set W of "worlds", a relation R on W
of "accessibility", and a modified valuation function that is parametric on "worlds"
(W). Temporal logics add a set regarded as "times" and some additional elements
to represent types of temporal relations. In some cases, there is an interesting cor-
respondence between the set-theoretic properties of elements in a structure and the
set of axioms which characterize a logical language. For example, the axioms of
the modal logic S5 are those of classical propositional logic plus "P → 2♦P" (if P
13In the more general sense of the term structure used in mathematics, not the sense of the term
defined in this glossary.
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then necessarily it is possible that P; satisfied in any structure with a symmetric R),
"2P → 22P" (if necessarily P, then it is necessarily necessary that P; satisfied in
any structure with a transitive R), and "2P → P" (if necessarily P, then P; satis-
fied in any structure with a reflexive R). It follows that every structure whose R is an
equivalence relation is a model of S5 (i.e., satisfies its axioms and all of its theorems).
TP : Tense Phrase. From Chomsky (1965) through Chomsky (1986) and Chomsky
(1995), research in generative syntax had moved through three periods, so far as the
mainstream views on the phrasal category of a whole sentence is concerned.[Cho15,
Cho86, Cho95] In Chomsky (1965), the phrase-structure rules simply set aside a cat-
egory S for sentences. By Chomsky (1986), there were compelling reasons to think
that inflectional objects (e.g., morphemes) head sentences, resulting in the phrasal
category IP. By Chomsky (1995), broad consensus had shifted to consider tense words
and morphemes the inflectional objects that head sentences. This move resulted in the
phrasal category TP. Tense objects (phrasal category T) are now widely considered
to be the heads of whole sentences.[Adg03, KSS14]
underspecified : "In the broad sense of 'not represented fully'. Hence: 1. Of a
representation at any level in which elements are unspecified if they are predictable
from others. Thus especially in phonology, of representations that make explicit
only features not marked, in that they are not seen as predictable by universal prin-
ciples. 2. Of a representation of the meaning of a sentence which is neutral in
relation to the varying meanings that it might have in specific contexts: compare
underdetermination."[Mat14]14
X-bar theory : Originally, Jackendoff's hypothesis that all phrase-structure rules
in Universal Grammar were instances of the rule-schemata 1-2:
1 XP→ YP X′
2 X'→ X ZP
The instances of these two schemata generate structures that are instances of the
X-bar schema [Spec [X Comp]X']XP (see Fig. 6.2).
XP
Spec X'
X Comp
Figure 6.2: X-bar structural schema
Here I use the more informative notation Spec and Comp to indicate that these
structural positions corresponding toYP and ZP in the rule-schemata 1-2 are
14Quoted in full from Matthews (2014).
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called Specifier and Complement, respectively (see definition of complement above in
this glossary). The Minimalist hypothesis rules out a base component or D-structure
that could justify the inclusion of phrase-structure rules in a grammar, unless some
such device is indispensible for mapping perceptual representations to conceptual rep-
resentations, or vice versa (Chomsky (1995)).[Cho95] Adger (2003) argues, however,
that this X-bar schema covers most of any human language's constituent structure,
despite the lack of explicit phrase-structure rules in the grammar.[Adg03] This is be-
cause any Merge function that respects Chomsky's Full Interpretation requirement
will generate a lot of instances of the X-bar schema, given the c-selectional features
of lexical entries for verbs, nouns, determiners, etc. In other words, even on Mini-
malist assumptions, the basic X-bar structure comes to predominate for functional
reasons (the c-selectional features), instead of the structural reasons that Jackendoff
originally proposed (the phrase-structure rules).
215
7 APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PROOF THAT NEITHER TF NOR TC CAN BE
STATE-PARTHOOD
What makes Szabó's state-parthood stronger than temporal inclusion? Since Szabó
only mentions temporal inclusion in passing, we will have to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of this phrase before answering the question. One possibility is that in-
clusion in Szabó's text means roughly overlap. From this hint we have a constraint
such that for any two states s1,s2, s1 is part of s2 iff there exists some moment of time,
t, where both s1,s2 hold at t. Call this constraint Temporal Overlap (TO). Another
interpretation of temporal inclusion is that whenever the smaller state holds, it's at
a moment within the running-time of the larger one. More specifically, for any states
s1,s2, s1 is part of s2 iff every moment when the included state s1 holds lies within
that closed interval of linear-ordered moments in time T that is the running-time of
the including state s2. Call this constraint Temporal Bounding (TB). If we take
TO and DTE, or TB and DTE, as axioms, there will be models whose interpretation
of ≤ is still too weak to be state-parthood.1 . Perhaps switching to a temporal
constraint stronger than TB will do the trick.
One straightforward constraint on the interpretation of ≤ makes state-parthood
stronger than Temporal Bounding. It requires that if a state s1 is part of a state s2,
then for every time t at which s2 holds, s1 holds at t.2 Call this constraint Temporal
Filling (TF). Stronger still, another temporal constraint states that state s1 is part
1Or rather, the extension of the state-parthood relation.
2i.e., there is an injection from times at which s1 holds to times at which s2 holds.
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of a state s2, for every time t, s2 holds at t iff s1 holds at t.3 Call this constraint
Temporal Coextension. Unhappily, though unsurprisingly, neither TF nor TC is
satisfactory. If we extend Szabó's theory with TF or TC (and DTE and IN), this
extension is less descriptively adequate than the original theory. It validates a class
of inferences whose members are all intuitively invalid.
To show this, I will formalize Temporal Bounding (TB), Temporal Coextension (TC),
and Temporal Filling (TF) in on the next page. Each translation in sec. 7 is a sentence
of the intermediate logical language used in Szabó (2003), except 1 (TB). I have
introduced a new predicate-symbol, 4 and two new function-symbols start and
end for TB. Unlike TF and TC, TB hinges on the ordering of moments in time,
and the upper and lower bounds of a state within this temporal ordering, and Szabó
(2003) does not deal with temporal order at all. The intended semantic value of 4
is a set of all ordered pairs of moments in time t1, t2 where t1 precedes or is identical
to t2. The intended semantic value of the one-place function-symbol start is a total
function mapping an eventuality to the earliest moment at which it holds. We give
end the interpretation it suggests, given the one for start.
In addition to TF or TC, I will also add the axiom that if a state s1 is part of
a state s2, and a fills the Subject thematic role of s2, then a also fills the Sub-
ject thematic role of s1. I believe that this constraint must be implicit in Szabó's
discussion of state-parthood. Call this constraint Downward Theme Entailment
(DTE). Finally, I will add an axiom that lets us validly deduce that an individual
x fills the Subject thematic role of a state s from the fact that x is in s. Call this IN.
If all models for Szabó's intermediate logical language satisfy TC and DTE, or TF and
3See  logical strength for a definition on page 212.
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Translation Translates
∀s1, s2[s1 ≤ s2 → ∀t [Hold(s1, t)→ (start(s2) 4 t 4 end(s2))]] TB
∀s1, s2, t[s1 ≤ s2 → (Hold(s1, t)→ Hold(s2, t))] TF
∀s1, s2, t[s1 ≤ s2 → (Hold(s1, t)↔ Hold(s2, t))] TC
∀s1, s2, x[(s1 ≤ s2 ∧ Subj(x, s2))→ Subj(x, s1)] DTE
∀x [∀s [In(x, s)→ Subj(x, s)]] IN
Table 7.1: TI,TF,TC, and DTE formalized
DTE, then the semantic value of ≤ comes out too strong for the resulting semantic
theory to be descriptively adequate.[Sza03]4 For instance, consider the argument J.
(a) John works a double shift as a janitor.
J
(b) John always works a double shift as a janitor.
As it stands, J is invalid. To my semantic intuition, (a) is true even if John does
not work a double shift every time he goes to his work-place to perform his janitorial
duties. I think that (b), on the other hand, is false in any case where he doesn't work
two shifts every time (regardless of what counts as time here). So (a) is true in a
consistent scenario that makes (b) false. J therefore has a counter-example and is
invalid. Now (a) is a substitution-instance of Szabó's as-phrase schema. Respecting
the extra criteria for inclusion by the theory that Szabó suggests, I doubt he would
exclude (a) from the domain of his theory. If an extension of Szabó's theory produced
by adding TF or TC to it is no less descriptively adequate than the original, then it
will not predict J to be valid. Either extension of his theory does predict J to be valid,
however, so the extension is less descriptively adequate than the original theory. The
following argument will establish this conclusion.
Szabó (2003) adopts a neo-Davidsonian account of predication. According to this
account, the logical form of pa is F q is p∃s [F (s) ∧ θF (a, s) ∧Ξ]q .
4Szabó (2003), p.404.
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I will drop the extra conjunct Ξ that stands in for some restriction, determined by
context, in Szabó's original. I will also substitute for θF the predicate In, which
in this case is an appropriate instance of the thematic-role predicate that θF stands
in for.[Sza03]5 Now we have p∃s [F (s) ∧ In (a, s)]q. The logical form that Szabó's
theory assigns an instance of the as-phrase schema without a persistent predicate for
its F -instance is the following:
p∃s, s′ [F (s) ∧ θF (a, s) ∧ Ξ ∧G(s) ∧ In(a, s) ∧ Ψ ∧ s ≤ s′]q [Sza03]6
Again, I drop the extra conjuncts, since (a) does not require them. The resulting
translation is p∃s, s′ [F (s) ∧G(s) ∧ In(a, s) ∧ s ≤ s′]q . Thus the logical form that
Szabó's theory predicts for (a), John works a double shift as a janitor, is
∃s, s′ [DoubleShift′(s) ∧ Janitor′(s) ∧ In(j, s) ∧ s ≤ s′] ,
where j is a non-logical constant whose intended semantic value is John. Now
suppose the logical form of (b) is
∀t, x[(Janitor′(x) ∧ In(j, x) ∧Hold(x, t))→
∃w[DoubleShift′(w) ∧ Subj(j, w) ∧Hold(w, t)]]
.
Call the extension of the semantic theory presented in Szabó (2003) with TC, DTE
and IN S+. The following natural deduction in the intermediate logical language
language of S+ proves that S+ predicts the (intuitively invalid) argument J to be
valid. Note that premise 1 in the deduction could be replaced by TF without rendering
the deduction invalid. This is because the deduction only exploits the consequence
Hold(s1, t)→ Hold(s2, t) of the biconditional in TC, and not its converse.
5Szabó (2003), p.401.
6Ibid., p.404.
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DEDUCTION SHOWING THAT S+ PREDICTS J VALID
1 ∀s1[∀s2[∀t[s1 ≤ s2 →(Hold(s1, t)↔ Hold(s2, t))]]] Premise, (TC)
2 ∀s1[∀s2[∀x[(s1 ≤ s2 ∧ Subj(x, s2))→ Subj(x, s1)]]] Premise, (DTE)
3 ∀x [∀s [In(x, s)→ Subj(x, s)]] Premise, (IN)
4 ∃s[∃s′[DoubleShift′(s)∧ Janitor′(s′)∧In(j, s′)∧ s ≤ s′]] Premise, (a)
5 DoubleShift′(s1) ∧ Janitor′(s2) ∧ In(j, s2)∧s1 ≤ s2 2xEI(s1, s2), (4)
6 s1 ≤ s2 ∧ − Elim, (5)
7 (s1 ≤ s2 ∧ Subj(j, s2))→ Subj(j, s1) 3xUI(s1, s2, j), (2)
8 In(j, s2)→ Subj(j, s2) 2xUI(j, s2), (3)
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9 In(j, s2) ∧ − Elim, (5)
10 Subj(j, s2) MP, (8,9)
11 s1 ≤ s2 ∧ Subj(j, s2) ∧ − Intro, (6,1)
12 Subj(j, s1) MP, (7,11)
13 s1 ≤ s2 → (Hold(s1, t)↔ Hold(s2, t)) 3xUI(s1, s2, t), (1)
14 Hold(s1, t)↔ Hold(s2, t) MP, (6,13)
15 Janitor′(s2) ∧ In(j, s2) ∧Hold(s2, t) As. for CP
16 DoubleShift′(s1) ∧ − Elim, (5)
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17 DoubleShift′(s1) ∧ Subj(j, s1) ∧ − Intro, (12,16)
18 Hold(s1, t) ∧ − Elim, (15)
19 Hold(s2, t) MP, (14,18)
20 DoubleShift′(s1) ∧ Subj(j, s1) ∧Hold(s1, t) ∧ − Intro, (17,19)
21 ∃w [DoubleShift′(w) ∧ Subj(j, w) ∧Hold(w, t)] EG(s1 to w), (20)
22
Janitor′(s2) ∧ In(j, s2) ∧
Hold(s2, t)→∃w[DoubleShift′(w) ∧
Subj(j, w)∧Hold(w, t)]
CP, (15-21)
23
∀x[Janitor′(x) ∧ In(j, x) ∧
Hold(x, t)→∃w[DoubleShift′(w) ∧ Subj(j, w) ∧
Hold(w, t)]]
UG(s2 to x), (22)
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∀t[∀x[Janitor′(x) ∧ In(j, x) ∧
Hold(x, t)→∃w[DoubleShift′(w) ∧ Subj(j, w) ∧
Hold(w, t)]]]
UG(t to t), (23)
APPENDIX B: SAUL'S PSYCHOLOGICAL ERROR-THEORY
Here I return to one of my project's primary sources, and reconsider the simple
substitution failures of Saul (1997). These substitution failures partly motivated
Szabó's 2003 theory of as-phrase sentences, the subject of chapter 2[Sau07]. Saul
(2007) marks a return to her earlier work on simple substitution failures, and defends
a new psychological error-theory that explains away anti-substitution intuitions for
her original examples. In this section I survey the evidence that Saul (2007)'s account
explains. I argue that my semantic theory and the intuitive motivations for it jointly
explain all that Saul's psychological account can. Additionally, my theory explains
some patterns within Type A sentences' truth-conditions and usage which Saul's
account cannot explain. I propose that my semantic explanation for anti-substitution
intuitions is preferable to Saul's cognitive illusion account.
Saul (2007) is essentially a defense of the thesis W.
W
Our intuitions that the truth conditions of some simple
sentences change upon substitution of apparently
coreferential names are wrong.
Saul (2007) defends at least two further theses: that we don't need a semantic theory
specially set up to accommodate these intuitions, and that if we did set up such a
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theory, and it predicted these (erroneous) intuitive truth-conditions for the sentences,
that theory would be false.
We might still want some explanation for the intuitions, but it will have to be a
psychological explanation of why we get incorrect intuitions about these sentences
an error theory. Saul's thesis has a number of nice implications in conjunction with
some of her other conclusions. Without inconsistency, we can keep a direct-reference
theory of names the semantic value of every NL name is exhausted by the object it
picks out, i.e., its referent. The two theses, that the intuitions are wrong and that no
pragmatic story about conveyed propositions explains the wrong intuitions, jointly
imply that the standard view about the role of intuitions in semantic methodology is
false.
Call this standard view SV (standard view about the role of intuitions in semantic
methodology).
SV
Whenever our intuitions about the truth-conditions of a
sentence s in context p differ from those that standard
(compositional) semantic theory predicts for s in p, either
the standard semantic theory is false or our intuition
reflects the truth-conditions of a proposition that s
pragmatically conveys in p, and is not a correct intuition of
s's truth-conditions in p.
That is, we think that our intuitions about s in p accurately represent the truth-
conditions of the proposition that s expresses in p, while they do not, but accurately
represent the truth-conditions that s conveys in p.7
7I am drawing SV from p.ix in Preface, Saul (2007). I've taken some liberties with Saul's actual
claims there, because she talks about truth-conditional intuitions are standardly dealt with
in one of two ways, rather than stating the claims semanticists believe, and which motivate
this standard treatment of truth-conditional intuitions. I take SV to be the tenet of semantic
methodology that Saul alludes to on p.ix, (Preface).
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Assuming W and SV, it is subjectively likely that these simple sentences that Saul
introduced just pragmatically convey propositions with the truth-conditions that we
intuit for them. Our intuitions about the truth-conditions of the simple sentences
in question do differ from the truth-conditions that the standard semantic theory
predicts for these sentences. So these sentences do satisfy the antecedent of SV- they
fall within SV's domain of application. And W is the claim that the intuitions are
incorrect. This does not contradict the first disjunct in the consequent of SV, but it
does mean these intuitions cannot be candidates for a compelling reason to believe
that the standard semantic theory is false. So while W does not entail that the first
disjunct of SV is false, W alone provides us no reason to believe that this first disjunct
is true. Thus if W and SV hold, then the second disjunct of SV is more likely to hold
than the first.
The icing is that Saul argues the second disjunct is false in the case of the simple
sentences. Though the intuitions are wrong, the simple sentences do not convey
propositions with the truth-conditions we intuit in these cases. Call the second dis-
junct of SV P. Then we can formalize SV as follows:
SV ∀x [M(x)→ (¬T (x) ∨ P (x))]
Where M: is a sentence such that our intuitions about its truth-conditions in a context
differ from those that the standard semantic theory T predicts in that context, T is
shorthand for the conjunction of sentences composing the standard semantic theory,
P: is a sentence such that our intuitions about its truth-conditions in a context assign
it truth-conditions identical to those that it pragmatically conveys in that context.
Saul's reasoning appears to be that, both ¬T (x) and P (x) are very unlikely, given any
simple sentence, x, among the set of those that concern Saul. Beyond doubt, though,
M(x), for any such x. Therefore, SV is probably false, given W (though possibly they
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are jointly satisfiable). There might be a way to extract a valid argument from this
strong (inductive) argument, but I can't think of one right now.
Saul considers the book's main point to be that SV is false.8 Since my project involves
denying T (x) (given W and other concerns), and I'm not persuaded that P (x) holds
for all of these sentences, my main interest in Saul (2007) is with her affirmation of
T (x) given M(x), where a is any given simple sentence.
It seems to me that the main weakness of Saul's overall argument in Saul (2007) is
her sub-argument for T, i.e., her argument that the standard semantic apparatus for
proper names is true despite our intuitions about the truth-conditions of the simple
sentences. It seems to me that Saul's argument for this claim (that T, even given our
intuitions) is an inference to the best explanation, supported by arguments that the
independent probability of her psychological explanation is greater than that of any
existing semantic or pragmatic explanation for the intuition mismatch (see p. 154).
Like so.
1. ∀x [S(x)→M(x)]
2. G→ ∀x[S(x)→M(x)]
3. SV → ∀x[S(x)→M(x)]
4. P (G) > P (SV )
5. G is a better explanation of 1 than SV.
Where S: is a simple sentence in Saul's sense. This is basically an inference to
the best explanation, with comparison of the probabilities for two competing expla-
nations.
Saul's argument for premise 4 of the above argument seems to be the following:
8 See p.ix, In this book, my main purpose is to draw out this methodological lesson.
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1. No existing semantic theory can predict all of our intuitions about the truth-
conditions of all simple sentences, in all contexts, with apparent substitution
failures (see Chapter 2)
2. There is no compelling pragmatic explanation for our intuitions in every case
of a simple sentence with apparent substitution-failures (see Chapter 3)
3. All existing semantic or pragmatic theories of simple substitution failures suffer
from the Aspect Problem or the Enlightenment Problem (see p. 7).
4. There is a compelling psychological explanation for our intuitions (G) , for each
of these cases. (see Chapter 4-6).
5. Therefore, our intuitions about the lack of substitutivity in simple sentences are
probably just incorrect.
But what if we had a semantic theory that explains p? Suppose this theory scores
well on the theoretical virtues that determine how good a theory is, in this field. Does
Saul's psychological theory alone provide sufficient evidence that the intuitions are
incorrect to make this semantic theory probably false?
Saul answers this question (p.153). There, she acknowledges that even the best em-
pirical support for her psychological explanation does not rule out other explanations
for the intuition-mismatch (semantic, pragmatic). This is pretty clearly the case, but
it bears repeating why it is. A semantic theory that explains the intuition-mismatch
via some hidden structure like an unpronounced qualifying phrase, for instance, has
no commitments whatsoever regarding mental processing (p.153). It explains the
mismatch as a mismatch between the overt form of the sentence and its actual truth-
conditions, which are the intuited ones rather than the ones that its form would
suggest. Assuming that a single given syntactic form gets only one type of semantic
interpretation. As she states on this page, she rests her claim that the psychological
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explanation is independently more likely than the semantic or pragmatic ones on the
empirical failures and philosophical shortcomings of those other theories.
One might still wonder why it can't be that the psychological explanation is true and
some semantic or pragmatic theory of the sentences is true. As Saul emphasizes on
her last page of the main text, this is quite possible. I take it that her main reason
to think this possibility unlikely is the following. Given mainstream assumptions
in the background of the psychological theory, the mental processes that seem to
cause the intuition-mismatch do not reliably track the property that they cause us
to believe we are tracking in these intuitions: the truth-conditions. These processes,
in these specific contexts of perception, give rise to an illusion, in other words. So
I suspect that Saul's argument against the consistency of her psychological theory
with semantic or pragmatic theories that respect the intuited truth-conditions is that
if the psychological theory is true, it's highly likely that the intuitions are illusory
(unreliable and false). Thus these intuitions are only apparent data for semantic
theories. While it is still logically possible, I suppose, to construct a true empirical
theory from illusory data, it is unlikely.
The semantic theories that Saul criticizes, in support of her premise 1, are all fairly
simplistic. They rely on temporal parts of the sentence's subject, or involve the
strong assumption that all such simple sentences have persons for their subjects.9
These theories are narrow attempts to patch up the substitutivity problem in simple
sentences. They have a smaller scope, and more serious flaws, than Landman, Szabó,
or Asher's theories. Saul does not cite any of these, though Landman and Szabó's
work on as-phrase sentences, the latter of which cites Saul (1997), was in print when
Saul (2007) came out. Saul's objections to the temporal-parts views are decisive,
9Pitt, for instance, since his theory refers to alter-egos, which presumably only persons can have.
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so far as I can tell. Some of her objections to the aspect-based theories are strong.
The strongest ones seem to apply to Asher's theory, too (see chapter summaries for
details). In her analysis of Forbes' theory of modes of personification, she consid-
ers an event-based theory, and recognizes that it avoids the worst objections to the
views that analyze the substitution-failures in terms of the subject's own temporal
parts simpliciter (see p.38). Yet Saul doesn't mention the intuitive similarity or even
co-extensivity of as-phrase sentences and sentences with simple substitution failures
(but no overt qualifying phrase), Landman's ultrafilter approach to as-phrase sen-
tences, or Szabo's extensional version of it. She doesn't seem to consider a hidden
modal operator (quantifying over worlds or parts of them) approach to explaining
the substitution failures, though Kripke gestures at this kind of explanation in his
Truth and Reference, which directly treats these Superman sentences. Even though
she does consider the aspect-based theories, which achieve similar predictions to a
modal-operator theory by directly presupposing the existence of special objects that
cannot be individuated by spatio-temporal location (aspects).
Much of the strength of Saul's overall argument hangs on:
1. the claim that there is no satisfactory semantic theory that predicts our TC-
intuitions for each simple-substitution-failure sentence in each context in which
it's used
2. the claim that we do use simple-substitution-failure sentences to convey propo-
sitions, but that there's no discernible pattern relating the sentences, contexts
of use, and propositions conveyed. Consequently, no pragmatic/semantic theory
of these sentences can contribute much to our understanding of the intuition
mismatches.
Consider 1 above. One could object that it neglects Saul's objections against prag-
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matic explanations of the intuition mismatch, which make up an entire chapter of
Saul (2007). However, Saul's objections to the semantic and pragmatic theories in
Chapter 2 and 3 are similar. Both mostly hang on the objection to semantic explana-
tions of the intuition mismatch. Saul raises two main objections in Chapter 3. First,
suppose the pragmatic implicature or impliciture were calculable, from the mental
states of possibly unenlightened conversants in every imaginable context. Even so, it
is not clear what exactly the implicated or implicited proposition might be, in each
of these contexts.
The second main objection that Saul presents in Chapter 3 is just her critique of the
semantic theories of simple substitution failures in Chapter 2. She does argue that
her first objection in this chapter lacks any obvious reply. The pragmatic problem is a
less serious objection than the semantic problem, however, in my opinion. If we have
no good reply to the first objection, then we have a serious objection to any purely
pragmatic explanation of the intuition mismatch. If such a theory fails to prove the
supposition, then it makes no progress over the semantic theories because it shares
all of their drawbacks. I do not doubt that a purely pragmatic hypothesis does little
to explain the intuition mismatches. This is because we simply do have the relevant
semantic intuition, in each case. Assuming (EOI), either an expressed proposition or
an implicated proposition must match this intuition. (EOI), as Saul argues, is fatal
for the purely pragmatic explanations. If for every intuition mismatch there's an
implicated proposition, and it turns out that this proposition cannot be implicated in
many contexts for certain simple-substitution-failure sentences, then either we drop
(EOI), or the pragmatic explanation has failed. I think that there is a pragmatic
story to be told here, mainly about how to determine what counts as a Superman
situation in context, etc. With Saul however, I doubt that there is any good, strictly
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pragmatic explanation of the intuition mismatch.
Consider 2 above. I fear that Saul's own account of the intuition mismatch falls into
the same trap as the semantic theories she criticizes in Chapter 2. What are the
conveyed propositions in each case, regardless of how we convey them, or if this is
calculable? I can't imagine an answer to that question that's not subject to one of
Saul's standing objections to the semantic theories on offer. The most promising
option might be to abandon a truth-conditional, compositional semantics for these
sentences, and treat them like idiom-chunks or poetry. On this account, use simple-
substition-failure sentences to convey something, and we usually succeed, but not by
causing the listener to entertain a proposition and put its entailment-patterns out on
the table, so to speak. The listener might entertain various propositions in reaction
to my utterance, but there can't be any universal, clear-cut criteria for the success of
the utterance as a communicative act. This is the view that simple-substition-failure
sentences evoke, but don't express, propositions.
The main problem with Saul's answer to 2 above is that there are patterns relating
the sentences, contexts, and expressed truth-conditions. Saul's account of simple-
substition-failure sentences doesn't predict or explain any of these patterns. Their
existence is not incompatible with the truth of Saul's account. But their existence
makes her account much less likely to be the single best explanation for the intuition
mismatches. As I'll argue, though, my theory predicts (and arguably explains) each
of these patterns. Let's consider an alternative hypothesis to Saul's (her answer to
2 above). This hypothesis explains most, perhaps all, of the data Saul presents in
Chapter 6's thought-experiments. Perhaps we have a general tendency to integrate
(psychologically) the Superman-associated and Clark-associated information our
minds store, but it's not utterly idiosyncratic and driven by details of context that
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form not semantically-explicable pattern. Rather, most listeners will tend to integrate
in cases where the property attributed to the subject in the simple-substitution-failure
sentence is intrinsic (though perhaps contingent-- e.g., being hungry, being 6' tall),
and non-habitual. For instance, eating breakfast at a particular time on a particular
day, or washing one's hair with Suave shampoo at a particular time on a particular
day.
This pattern also helps to explain why speakers bother to use as-phrases at all.10
We use them because the sorts of properties a subject can have at a time t while
also having some property incompatible with it, at time t, are just those that are
constituted by their relations to other things, and those that are constituted through
a history or repetition, or perhaps by categorical properties of the subject that ground
this habitual or dispositional behavior. In the case of a subject who is a person, these
constitutive relations are often relations to other people. The habitual or dispositional
properties constituted by intrinsic, categorical properties manifest themselves only
under in certain situations. Their manifestations occur spatio-temporally close to
certain fleeting properties of the subject, usually relational or non-intrinsic ones
the triggers of the subject's dispositions or habits. This is why so many as-phrase
sentences that show substitution-failure concern these types of properties of their
subjects, 1 and 2. This also explains why so many sentences that don't show simple
substitution failures (or concern type 1 or type 2 properties) need so much discourse-
context to make them (a basis for) informative utterances: John brushed his teeth as
a father, for instance. One could make an informative utterance using this sentence.
However, I can only imagine that an informative utterance of that sentence must
happen within a certain conversational background.
10Here I am going to assume Szabo's and Asher's shared hypothesis that simple-substitution-failure
sentences are systematically co-extensive (share truth-conditions) with what I call Type A
sentences
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For instance, the sentence might be uttered informatively in a context that presup-
poses claims about John's idea of being a good father. For instance, that idea might
highlight the practice of modeling healthy habits for his children, and his intention
to do so. This hypothesis also explains why so many as-phrase sentences and simple-
substition-failure sentences show exception-tolerance, which is not nearly as controver-
sial a semantic intuition as the substitution-failures (different truth-conditions with
substitution of co-referential names). Saul's psychological account neither predicts
or explains this tendency for these sentences to show exception-tolerance. A se-
mantic theory like mine, based on a standard device for handing other sentences
with exception-tolerance, i.e., generics and Q-adverb sentences, predicts both the
exception-tolerance and the substitution failures. That device is a quantifier over
actual and non-actual situations whose strength lies between that of the classical uni-
versal and existential quantifiers. Finally, we just don't often use as-phrase sentences
(of Type A) whose truth-conditions are a degenerate case for my semantics. That is
to say, we just don't use Type A sentences (or their co-extensive simple-substitution
twins) that attribute an intrinsic and non-habitual property  or a fleeting, non-
habitual property-- to their subjects, without a background of presuppositions to
relate the sentence (or more precisely, the proposition it expresses) to claims about
the subject's non-intrinsic or dispositional/habitual properties.
One might object: what about the property of being a Pisces? If this property is
intrinsic, not constituted by the subject's relations to anything but by his birth-time
alone (an intrinsic property if there ever were one), then it is a counter-example to
my claim above about type 1 and 2 properties. Because Pisces carries descriptive
content. Thus John as a Pisces is very emotional. Let's grant that being a Pisces is
intrinsic. Let's grant that as a Pisces carries descriptive content. It's still not the
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case that some instance of a F as a Pisces and a -F as G are both true at the same
time. The deeper explanation here is metaphysical rather than strictly semantic.
If you're a Pisces, you're a Pisces for life. Whatever dispositions correlate with your
Pisces-hood will not have triggers confined to certain spatio-temporal locations, as
we see in the dual-persona examples like Superman. Rather, the triggers will be
distributed according to whatever laws (natural or otherwise) that link Pisces-hood
to other properties.
APPENDIX C: BÄCK'S ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S
REDUPLICATION
Bäck (1982)'s analysis of pEvery S is P qua Mq is that the sentence is true if and
only if
(1) p∀x [[(S(x)→M (x)) ∧ (M (x)→ P (x))]]q
is true (Bäck, p.456).[Bäc82]11
As he claims, (1) logically implies p∀x [S(x)→ P (x)]q, though the two are not logi-
cally equivalent. If Bäck's analysis (1) captures Aristotle's idea of reduplication, then
it is irrelevant to a semanticist only interested in Type A sentences themselves. Ad-
ditionally, I will argue from an assumption of Aristotelian essentialism that (1) is not
a correct analysis of reduplication in the Prior Analytics. Even if Bäck's analysis is
nearly correct, moreover, it is no evidence that reduplication is relevant to Type A
semantics. The qua of reduplication is roughly synonymous with insofar as in my
idiolect of English, not the Type A as. Something like the qua of reduplication,
11Bäck does not distinguish between a (natural) metalanguage and (artificial) object language, so
neither will I. Assume that first-order sentences like (1) are part of our metalanguage that is,
the interpreted natural language in which I am writing. Nevertheless, sentences like (1) have
the expected truth-conditions that we can surmise from the standard semantic definitions of the
quantifiers and truth-functional connectives.
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under a strengthened version of Bäck's analysis, appears in certain readings of some
Type A sentences. As Szabó (2003) argues, though, a semantic account of the Type
A sentence's as must be part of a semantic account of insofar as. Consequently,
the semantic account of Type A as must be methodologically prior to that of the
as or qua of reduplication.
Bäck's proposal (1) is not an accurate analysis of the insofar as construction that we
use to translate Aristotle's reduplication and the Medieval Scholastics' qua. Specifi-
cally, (1) predicts pEvery S is P quaMq satisfiable in some highly counter-intuitive
cases. These cases are counter-intuitive because of Aristotle's essentialism about the
properties of individuals in a genus or species. Aristotle famously distinguishes the
essences of things, their to ti ên einai, from what the Medievals called accidents.12 I
take it that the point of qua-propositions is not just to fit two deductive arguments
into the form of one syllogism, which is trivial. It is more likely that the point of
using a qua-proposition for Aristotle is to argue that some S, that is also M , must
be P, because in general, being P is part of beingM , and necessarily so. If being P
is part of the essence or nature of beingM (to ti ên einai), then at least: necessarily,
everyM is P . The point is that Aristotle's qua-propositions are universal generaliza-
tions about the properties that instances of a species have according to their essence.
Thus they are universal generalizations with modal force, presumably. Bäck's analy-
sis (1) does not capture the modal force of a universal qua-proposition, so it generates
counter-intuitive predictions about the cases that satisfy pEvery S is P quaMq.
Let's look at one of these counter-intuitive predictions that I attributed to (1). Con-
sider an example from one of Aristotle's favorite fields: biology. I presume that 146
and 147 are actually the case.
12See Aristotle, Metaphysics Z.4 and also Aristotle's Metaphysics in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics>.
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(146) Every mammal dies before the sun supernovas.
(147) Every dog is a mammal.
(148) Every dog dies before the sun supernovas.
(149) Every dog dies before the sun supernovas qua mammal.
(150) Necessarily, every dog dies before the sun supernovas.
Then 148 must actually be the case. The argument D, however, from 146 and 147
to 149 is not valid. In any case, D would not be valid for Aristotle, which is all the
present argument aims to establish.
1 Every mammal dies before the sun supernovas.
2 Every dog is a mammal.
D
3 Every dog dies before the sun supernovas qua mammal.
It is clear that the analysis (1) predicts D valid, if its premises and conclusion are
paraphrased into first-order sentences in the usual way. The conjunction of Premises 1
and 2, paraphrased in the usual way, form a substitution-instance the right-hand side
of the biconditional in (1). The conclusion (3) forms a substitution-instance of the
left-hand side of (1). I suggested above that the sentence which forms the conclusion
of D, against the predictions of (1), entails 150, necessarily, every mammal dies before
the sun supernovas. However, the premises 1 and 2 in D do not jointly entail 150.
Thus the analysis (1) is too weak to predict all of the entailment-relations in which
149 stands. It follows that Bäck's proposal (1) is not an accurate analysis of the
insofar as construction that we use to translate the Medieval Scholastics' qua.
Even if Bäck's analysis of reduplication were accurate for the examples Aristotle con-
siders, it would not be an accurate analysis of all Type A sentences. If Bäck's analysis
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(1) is accurate, then every qua-proposition (as Bäck calls sentences like the previous)
entails pEvery S is P q. Yet (1) fails to 'scale down' to analyze a Type A sentence with
a singular subject. If we pull out the universal quantifier from (1), and assign a in
pa is P quaMq to j this leaves us with p(S(j)→M(j)) ∧ (M(j)→ P (j))q. That
sentence clearly does not share the implications of pa is P qua Mq. For instance,
p(S(j)→M(j)) ∧ (M (j)→ P (j))q does not imply M (j) but pa is P qua Mq
implies pa isMq. Most importantly, (1) fails to predict that pEvery S is P quaMq
and pEvery S is non − P qua Nq where M 6= N are jointly satisfied in any case
but the trivial one. Granted, (1) predicts that these two sentence are jointly satisfied
in some cases C. But every such case C also satisfies p¬∃x [S (x)]q, which makes (1)
descriptively inadequate. Nor can this singular version of (1) handle the Objection
from Intensionality of Chapter 2, or Exception Tolerance.
I have argued that Bäck's (1) is neither an accurate analysis of the as in a Simple
Type A sentence, nor the qua that Aristotle deals with in Posterior Analytics. I
have argued that a version of (1) with the modal force I described might be adequate
to Aristotle's qua syllogisms. Even the modalized version of (1) offers no hints on
how to analyze Simple Type A sentences, let alone articulate that analysis within
a compositional semantic theory. Despite Aristotle's seminal contribution to the
logical study of qualification, his account of qualified sentences is not a fruitful point
of departure for a semantic theory of Type A sentences.
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NOTES
[1]The Non-Identity of Discernibles is one of the four principles collectively known as Leibniz's
law. 1. If any two things differ in their properties, then they are not identical (Non-Identity of
Discernibles). 2. If any two things do not differ in their properties, then they are identical (Identity
of Indiscernibles). 3. If any two things are identical, then they have exactly the same properties
(Indiscernibility of Identicals). 4. If any two things are not identical, then they differ in their
properties (Discernibility of Non-Identicals).
[2]For example, Bernard Williams' account of Descartes' purpose in his Meditations essentially
argues that Descartes as an enquirer wants knowledge at any cost, while Descartes as Descartes
does not, though he still values knowledge very highly. See Williams (1979), pp.32-33. Another
example is the Superman sentence from Saul (1997), which Szabó (2003) considers to be synony-
mous with sentence (3) above. In his Political Liberalism (1993), John Rawls distinguishes between
the individual as a citizen and the individual as a private individual. In his Personal Identity
(1971), Derek Parfit introduces his notion of a q-intention (quasi-intention) using as to qualify the
particular successor person whom I intend to carry out my q-intention. Though he does stipulate a
meaning for his term of art, q-intend, he relies on the reader's familiarity with the qualifying use
of as to understand this stipulation. Bertrand Russell's Problem's of Philosophy (1912) includes
dozens of as-phrases. In German, Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit includes a major discussion of
apophantischen 'Als' , meaning the apophantic 'as '. The extent to which Heidegger's term als
depends on the common meaning of the word in German is not clear to me, however. It is also
important to stress that Heidegger's notion of language (Sprache) is radically different from the
one that formal semantics assumes.
[3]Landman does not intend to offer a general theory of the truth-conditions of as-phrase sentences,
as he emphasizes. His Groups II (Landman 1989) completes a study of nominal phrases that name
or describe groups like the committee or the Talking Heads. Landman's semantic structures
employ lattices of individuals like those that Link (1983) uses in his semantics of plurals.[Lin02]
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As-phrases come up in his observations about intensionality in sentences that relate an individual's
properties as a member of a group to her properties simpliciter.
[4]Szabó, however, recently criticized the doctrine of logical form, in Szabó (2012a). This doctrine
includes the claim that sentences of natural languages have all of their logical properties in virtue
of a certain property, their logical form. It also encompasses the claim that the speakers of a given
natural language know that sentence's logical properties in virtue of knowing its logical form. Yet
Szabó argues that these claims are either trivially true or false. If he is right, then in either case,
this third objection to Landman's theory is unjustified.
[5]Though he does not provide any meaning-postulates in his paper to constrain its interpretation,
I assume that the In predicate in Szabó's theory is satisfied iff the individual in question is the
subject of the eventuality in question. In Appendix A on page 216 of the present work, my meaning-
postulate (IN) formalizes this gloss of Szabó's In, allowing us to deduce conclusions from the logical
forms that Szabó's theory predicts for natural-language sentences. The point of Appendix A is to
prove that every reasonable temporal constraint on the interpretation of the state-parthood predicate
leads to a theory that validates invalid inferences. We need more than (IN) to perform e.g., natural
deduction on the forms output by Szabó's theory, however. I also introduce the Hold predicate
introduced in another classic work of event semantics, Parsons (1990). Hold is to be interpreted
in terms of the relation between an eventuality, and and a moment of time, and is satisfied just in
case the eventuality's state holds or its process is in progress at that time. I introduce the meaning
postulate (DTE) in Appendix A to formalize the intuition that the subject of any state fills the
same thematic role for each part of that state under the state-parthood relation. Together with my
temporal constraints on the state-parthood predicate, (TB), (TF), and (TC) in order of strength,
(IN) and (DTE) allow us to deduce those moments of time at which a state holds of its subject,
given that the subject is in that state. These meaning-postulates make explicit the relations of
logical implication among different logical forms of as-phrase sentences that Szabó's theory predicts.
This explicitness is necessary to evaluate the theory against the observed entailments of the natural-
language sentences themselves, since Szabó works with an intermediate logical language rather than
defining the truth or satisfaction-conditions of the NL sentences directly.
[6]Asher (2011) frames his critique of Szabó(2003) a bit differently than he did in his (2006). He
claims that any state-based theory of predication should satisfy his State Consistency Principle, the
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requirement that if for any two states s and s', φ(s) and φ(s') and s' temporally overlaps s, then
there exists a state s such that φ(s) and ψ(s). I assume φ appears twice there because of a type,
and that the second φ is supposed to be ψ. The substance of the principle seems to be that
any two temporally intersecting states form a third state with the properties of both. The State
Consistency Principle would fix the theory's problems with applying a predicate and its negation
to a subject. Szabó would reject the principle, however, because not all states s that temporally
include some state s' contain s' as part of s. This entails that not all temporally intersecting states
satisfy such a principle, either, since temporal intersection is weaker than temporal inclusion.
[7]Setting aside, for example, evidence that standard intensional semantics is actually too (logically)
strong for some of the natural-language constructions that theorists developed it to analyze in the
first place, e.g., propositional attitude contexts. Semanticists and logicians recognized this problem
early on; e.g., Cresswell (1975). Also see the discussion of intensional semantics for propositional
attitude contexts in Heim and Kratzer (1998).
[8]In other words, B and C are paradoxes in one sense of the term (Brogaard (2013)). If an
argument is valid, then its conclusion would be true if its premises were true. But the conclusion
of Partee's argument could not be true. if the modal account of validity is objectionable, a model-
theoretic account faces the same problem. If the argument is valid, then any model of the premises'
conjunction also satisfies the argument's conclusion. But while there are models of the premises'
conjunction, there are none for the conclusion.
[9]The double-quotes here are scare-quotes to indicate that the terms world and individual
entity refer to the denotations of certain expressions in the logical language. For all purposes of
the semantic theory, they are set-theoretic entities, and a variety of non-set entities could play the
roles they specify. Informally, W is a set of possible worlds and Deis a set of entities that the logic's
quantifiers range over.
[10]However, David Lewis shows that by taking intensions as primitive, we can reconstruct all of the
predictive power of an extensional semantic theory based on functions over individual entities. So
for semantic theory, it is not so important which kind of entitiy we take as primitive. See 'Tensions
(1983) in Lewis's Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (1986). I should add that Lewis's point in that
paper is not to establish this conclusion. Rather, he presents an argument for it on the way to another
conclusion. Namely, that two Radical Interpreters (in Quine and Davidson's sense), observing a new
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speech-community A, have no principled basis for agreeing betwen themselves that the discourse
they observe in A is best paraphrased in a purely intensional language, or in a purely extensional
language.
[11]You might wonder how to define the equivalence-classes over functions in the space that the
names in the type system uniquely determine. That degree of generality is not really necessary to
convey my point here, so I think a few examples of types will suffice. If we have the sets, Ds,Dt,De,
each disjoint to each other, then our function-space over Ds,Dt,De includes functions from Ds to
Dt, functions from De to Dt, functions from Ds to De to Dt, functions from Ds to Dt to Ds to Dt,
and so forth. We can name these however we like, so long as we have exactly one name for each class
of functions defined by those sets from which its arguments and values are drawn and the particular
order those arguments take. We can call functions from Ds to Dt f : Ds → Dt or f ∈ D〈s,t〉, or
f ⊆ Ds ×Dt (where f is many-to-one or one-to-one).
[12]Russell, however, built his type theory on propositions taken as primitives of the theory, rather
than modeling propositions and other intensional objects using a device like worlds or situations.
Also, Russell's motivations for introducing the type theory were very different from those of seman-
ticists in the general mold of Heim and Kratzer (1998). For Russell, the point of types was to explain
why the sentences that yield semantic paradoxes do not actually express propositions. On Russell's
philosophy of language, that entails that the semantic-paradox sentences are without meaning in
the relevant sense. Though some semanticists have used type theories to the same end as Russell
(e.g., PT1 and PT2 in Chierchia and Turner (1988)), they tend to use types primarily for other less
philosophical purposes, too.
[13]The idea behind type-shifting in this sense (on typeRs) is essentially this. Take a sentence
Professor Z passes most athletes. The quantificational determiner, e.g., most athletes, starts in
the type of a <1> generalized quantifier over individuals: 〈〈e, t〉 , t〉. It maps a first-order predicate to
a truth-value. The subject Professor Z, gets type e, since it denotes an individual. The sentence's
main verb passes gets type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, since it's a two-argument verb in the lexicon. If we mark
up the constituent structure with semantic type-names we get [[Professor Z]e [passes〈e,〈e,t〉〉 [most
athletes]〈〈e,t〉,t〉]? ]t. If our only semantic composition rule is function-application, the derivation will
crash. If we lift (i.e., shift) [most athletes] to type 〈〈e, 〈e, t〉〉 , 〈e, t〉〉, then J[most athletes]K can
take J[passes]K as an argument, and yield an object of type 〈e, t〉 = λx. [1 iff x passes most athletes] .
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Generally, type-shifting approaches to in situ inverse-scope quantification will shift the type of a
quantifier-phrase to that of a higher-order function which can then take a predicate that c-commands
it as an argument.
[14]I don't mean to single out Russell, here. Rather, my point is that Saul's objections, to what
she calls aspect-based semantic theories, have all been put to realist accounts of propositions before.
Indeed, these epistemic and metaphysical objections in part motivated the shift toward reductionist
meaning-theories in analytic philosophy, as Soames (2012) argues. These reductionist theories either
gave paratactic theories of indirect discourse and attitude-verb sentences, as in Ludwig and Lepore's
semantics, or they reduced propositions to sets of worlds (or functions from worlds to truth-values),
like Lewis, Stalnaker, and Montague.
[15]Consider a principle of compositionality that requires at least a many-to-one mapping from
the class of syntactic types (at some level of syntax) to that of semantic types. An ambiguous
structure, for our purposes, is a complex syntactic type with two different semantic types. Consider
an ambiguous structure s. If s is the input to a semantic theory that obeys the above principle
of compositionality, then s must be assigned both some semantic type 1 and some distinct type 2.
But then if this theory is to assign s a denotation, the theory's mapping from syntactic to semantic
types must be one-to-many. But this contradicts our assumption that the semantic theory obeys
the above principle of compositionality. So assuming even a weak principle of compositionality, the
input to semantic interpretation must be an unambiguous structure.
[16]J. van Benthem (1986), however, frames some compelling objections to the view that composi-
tional semantics is a science. He suggests that what semanticists call data is theory-laden to an
extent that is unacceptable for empirical science. Namely, the data is laden with the folk seman-
tic theory of the speaker who tests sentences against her intuitions. Moreover, exposure to formal
logic and semantics might shape this folk semantic theory of the speaker, in an unconscious and
theoretically problematic way. My view is that the scientific status of compositional semantics (of
natural language) is an interesting problem that deserves more attention. In any case, however, it
is clear that compositional semantics should be pursued like a science, to the extent that this is
appropriate and possible.
[17]An informal survey of friends and colleagues that I conducted, however, showed results that
contradict my own conclusions above. I surveyed 187 individuals, of whom 14 replied. I asked
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participants to rate two sentences by giving exactly one of three responses: (a) the first sentence
sounds better than the second, (b) the second sounds better than the first, or (c) neither sounds
better than the other. First sentence: How did he say that Superman doesn't leap over tall buildings?
Second sentence: As whom did he say that Superman doesn't leap over tall buildings? I received 12
(a) responses, 2 (b) responses, 0 (c) responses. If the results indicate anything, they suggest that
Haegeman and Rizzi are wrong: extraction from a VP adjunct past sentential negation is acceptable.
I find that less likely, however, than the possibility that the proportions of responses observed were
due to some pressure to conform among participants. A major flaw of the survey's presentation was
that participants could each see all other participants' responses. Since the first response was (a),
the pressure-to-conform hypothesis predicts these results. I also suspect that the relative familiarity
of wh- questions compared to as-phrase sentences might have influenced participants. Due to its
obvious shortcomings, I am not inclined to draw any conclusion from the survey.
[18]The obvious exception to this generalization is the object in [Spec, TP] in many sentences.
Controversy surrounds the role of this position in a main predicate's assignment of theta-roles. It
is not firmly established that there are any exceptions to the locality of selection principle. If there
aren't, then there are no external arguments (e.g., in [Spec, TP]) in natural languages. If there are,
then why? EPP (Extended Projection Principle) names this problem without solving it, or solves
it by stipulating an ad-hoc condition on structures that the syntactic theory generates. See Kratzer
(1996) contra external arguments. Williams (1995) presents another theory of argument-structure.
The controversy continues; see Bowers (2001), Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014), p.218.
[19]Another argument that natural language is at most binary-branching comes from Sportiche,
Koopman and Stabler (2014), pp.348-349. Suppose that morphological structure is at most binary-
branching. If morphological and syntactic units are formed by the same processes (iterated appli-
cations of Merge and Move), i.e., there is no theoretical difference between syntax and morphology,
then syntactic units of language (constituents) must be at most binary-branching.
[20]At the risk of explaining a mystery with a mystery, I would like to point out that psychiatry has
a similar difficulty with the category of schizophrenia. There is a pretty good analogy between the
concept of schizophrenia and the concept of as-phrase sentence. This strong analogy supports my
strategy of divide and conquer by restricting my semantic theory to Type A as-phrase sentences.
Frith (1992), The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia, argues that basic research cannot
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take the category of schizophrenia for granted, and should look for explanations of the associated
cognitive-behavioral signs and symptoms.[Fri92] As in schizophrenia diagnosis, experts can recognize
an as-phrase sentence with fair inter-rater reliability, but there is room for reasonable disagreement.
There are many signs that a sentence is an as-phrase sentence (e.g., boolean entailment profile,
unusual intensionality, interactions with future tense, interactions with generics). Since experts do
not agree on the disease process that causes these signs to appear, however, they do not meet the
criteria for being symptoms. To extend the analogy, in the study of as-phrase sentences, we are still
trying to discover an underlying disease. As in the study of schizophrenia, then, I conclude with
Frith that we have to specify our object of interest very carefully at this stage of research.
[21]Sider's notion of a sparse property, e.g., the property of being either exactly 5ft. or 6ft. in
length, resembles my idea of a pejoratively disjunctive kind, at least in spirit. See Sider (2006),
 Bare Particulars .
[22]The same movements appear slightly to alter the acceptability of Type A sentences, as I argued
in Chapter 4. I am not yet sure why this is the case. I would need more speaker-judgment data and
some definite background theory or explanation to draw any conclusions from my own intuitions,
here. But the intuitive differences in meaning are much subtler than the change in available readings
that the same movements produce in Type B sentences. The sentence derived by these movements
of the Type A sentence's as-phrase appear to share the same readings as the originals, at least as
far as truth-conditions is concerned.
[23]The term logical omniscience might be a puzzling label for this semantic problem. It origi-
nated in attempts to give possible-worlds semantics for pa knows that pq. Suppose p and q denote
the same set of worlds, according to a toy possible-worlds semantics for English. Then for every
instance p of p that makes pa knows that pq true, the possible-worlds semantics predicts that
pa knows that pq(other things being equal). One such instance of p will be q . So our toy seman-
tics incorrectly predicts that pa knows that pq entails pa knows that qq. Loosely speaking, our toy
semantics predicts that every knower who knows one claim also knows every claim that turns out
to be necessarily equivalent to it.
[24]On the many goals of Barwise and Perry's original situation theory, see especially Kratzer (2014),
Barwise and Perry's Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes in the reissue of Barwise and Perry
(1983), and Barwise (1989). As this last source clarifies, situation theory is not the most apt
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title, since there are many theories with this title, differing in the specific assumptions they involve.
Barwise's Notes on Branch-Points in Situation Theory (Chapter 8 of Barwise (1989)) maps out
much of the logical space of situation theories. He considers a few axioms with interesting empirical
consequences, the consistent combinations of these, and the properties of the resulting theory.
[25]His typed intensional logic introduces a hierarchy of functions (i.e. sets) according to type. For
instance, we have functions from entities to truth-values, functions from worlds to entities, functions
from functions from entities to truth-values to functions from entities to truth-values, etc. He defines
relation and relation-in-intension to denote, respectively, some subset of a Cartesian power of
the domain of entities (DxD, DxDxD, etc.), and a function from worlds W to one of these subsets
of DxD, DxDxD, etc. These sets are clearly not the kind of thing that a realist about relations will
claim a relation to be. See Bealer, Intensional Entities, (1998).
[26]A model theory for some fragment of natural language, of course, need not provide algorithms
that compute the denotations of sentences, but only define those denotations rigorously (relative
to a model, world, value-assignment, or other indices). Nevertheless, as Hans Kamp points out,
there are solid scientific reasons to prefer a model theory for natural language consistent with the
existence of such algorithms, even if it does not specify them (Kamp and Reyle (1993), pp.23-24).
His discourse representation structures, for example, are another attempt to define a framework
for model theories of natural-language fragments that can double as a framework for psychological
theories of the mental representations involved in language-understanding.
[27]Following the convention of Heim and Kratzer (1998), I will call the set that includes all functions
of type 〈α, β〉 as members, D〈α,β〉. Note that D〈α,β〉 is a set of functions, as opposed to extensions
of functions. If f is of type 〈α, β〉, then in Heim and Kratzer's notation, it is correct to write
f ∈ D〈α,β〉, but incorrect to write f ⊆ D〈α,β〉. I point out this notational convention because some
semanticists, including Bonevac and Montague, write things like f ⊆ DE, using f  to refer to
some subset that I would call the extension of a function, but they would just call a function. This
notation has the advantage of consistency with the standard set-theoretic modeling of functions and
relations in ZF. Heim and Kratzer's notation has the advantage of simplicity. See Enderton (1977),
Montague (1969).
[28]Szabó argues that Landman's way of predicting the instances of Landman's inference-schemata
is inferior to a semantic theory that validates the inference-schemata strictly in virtue of the logical
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forms it assigns to as-phrase sentences. According to Szabó (2003), the semantic theory in Landman
(1989) validates his inference schemata (representing the boolean entailments, as I call them) is
inferior to Szabó's own. The two theories do not differ in their descriptive adequacy (see Fig. 5.6).
Szabó's point, rather, is that Landman's theory validates the boolean entailments because of its
lexical entry for as, and not strictly in virtue of their logical forms. To put the objection more
bluntly, Szabó in 2003 presumably holds that each truth-apt sentence of natural language has a
unique logical form that a sentence of a first-order language fully and accurately represents. He
must also hold that the logical entailments of that natural-language sentence, map onto the logical
implications of the first-order sentence. Presumably the logical implications of a sentence are just
those that every possible model of that sentence validates. The logical constants are by definition
just those elements of the first-order language that receive just one unique interpretation common
to all structures for the language. So the logical form of a natural-language sentence is isomorphic
to a set of logical constants and a form that exhaustively determines the relations in which these
logical constants stand to each other, given the particular natural-language sentence. If this reading
of Szabó's 2003 objection to Landman from logical form is correct, then Szabó's core point is that
Landman's theory only validates all of his inference-schemata in those models where as gets the
interpretation he gives it. Thus Landman's theory does not predict that the boolean entailments
are strictly logical implications of the natural-language sentences that entail them. This argument
is sound only if there is a genuine difference between logical and non-logical elements of natural
language to ground the distinction on which Szabó's 2003 argument relies. Szabó concedes this
point in Szabó (2012), Against Logical Form, where he argues for a form of skepticism about
logical forms, if not a nihilism.[Sza12a] The question of what logic is (or is not) is clearly a deep
philosophical issue, and I will not try to resolve it here. Throughout the present work I try to remain
agnostic about logical forms. I am persuaded by Szabó's own arguments in Szabó (2012) and to
some extent by Barwise's considerations against logical forms in Barwise (1989).[Sza12a, Bar88b]
As such, I believe that none of my own arguments hang on their existence. I use the term in passing
only to explain the positions of others.
[29]In natural-language semantics, unlike other branches of logic, it is traditional to give a recursive
definition of a function, mapping syntactic objects to their denotations. In the interpretation of any
object-language, this function serves the same purpose as the satisfaction relation commonly defined
on the set of formulas of an artificial language. Unlike these definitions of satisfaction relations, an
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interpretation function is a fully compositional definition of satisfaction in a model, for the object-
language. The interpretation function assigns every syntactic type a denotation (not necessarily
unique), as opposed to a syncategorematic definition, e.g., of the truth-functional connectives. See
Bell and Machover (1977)'s discussion of Tarski's Basic Semantic Definition, and Partee (1990) on
fully compositional semantics for a first-order language.
[30]To include a metalinguistic predicate in the semantic theory itself would require the right-
hand side of the equation giving the lexical entry for Superman to include a predicate ranging over
syntactic objects. This seems to infringe on the hypothesis of independence of syntax and semantics,
from the semantic side. From the syntactic side, it is a standard assumption in generative syntax that
neither generating nor parsing constituent-structures relies on semantic information in the lexical
entries of the basic constituents involved. See Adger (2003).
[31]According to Chomsky (1995), they do not. On his proposal, Merge, the basic operation that
builds phrase-structures, does not determine the order in which the phrases it builds are linearized. In
other words, Merge(XP,Y) = Merge(Y,XP), and either might be spelled out pY XPq or pXP Yq.
Richard Kayne famously denies this, however, arguing that phrase-structure representations fully
determine the phrases' linear order in speech and writing.[Kay94] The issue is still under dispute
among syntacticians.
[32]One reason for doubt is that a semantic theory is just a model-theoretic account of some lan-
guage's (total) entailment relation. This appears to be the aim of Montague (1974), Lewis (1987)
(General Semantics), Parsons (1990), and Kratzer (2012).[Mon74b, Lew87, Par90, Dow79, Kra12]
Ludwig and Lepore (2007) puts forward the additional goal of an entailment theory that somehow
explains how an ideal speaker-hearer can understand an utterance in context.[LL07] Kamp (1981)
famously suggests that model-theoretic semantics might guide the search for an explanatory theory
of this kind. Dummett (1991) convincingly argues, however, that these two goals are logically inde-
pendent, calling the first a meaning-theory and the second a theory of meaning.[Dum91] Finally,
Chomsky (1965) argues that the only promising criterion on which to judge a decriptively-adequate
grammar's correctness is that an explanatorily-adequate theory of syntax selects it and not others.
Without some analogous argument for meaning-theories in Dummett's sense (semantic theories), I
do not see why such a criterion is necessary to judge the correctness of a meaning-theory in principle.
[33]The procedure Parsons suggests here, I assume, is the one that David Lewis describes in Lewis
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(1970), How To Define Theoretical Terms. The idea is to construct a long sentence from all
instances of a given term in a formal theory. That sentence then precisely defines the role that
any candidate for the denotation of the term would have to fill. The Kolmogorov axioms define
probability in this way, as Hacking (2016) points out. They do not, however, define it closely
enough to pin down one of the many candidates. When we say probability, do we mean a proportion
of events within a collective (in von Mises' sense)? Or do we mean that some entity has a disposition
to act? Both accounts can be made to satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms. The problem of defining
probability is much more pressing than that of defining eventuality, though, because eventuality
is a theoretical term, while probability is a pre-theoretical term. The second is supposed to denote
that which forms the subject matter of a science, while no one assumes that about eventuality.
[34]This is not strictly accurate for all logics, but the inaccuracy is harmless for the following reason.
If the variable-binding operators of a first-order language, ∃ and ∀”, are given a syncategorematic
treatment in the semantics for the language (as usual), then they do not denote logical constants.
But we can always translate sentences of a logic given the usual semantic treatment to sentences
of a first-order logic given a fully compositional semantics, as in Partee (1990) and Dowty et al.
(1981). This sort of semantics has the two first-order operators denote the appropriate generalized
quantifiers. These generalized quantifiers are just set-theoretic models of second-order relations, as
Frege originally analyzed the first-order quantifiers. More importantly, the fully compositional logic
will give us the same classes of models for its translated sentences that the original logic assigned
to its corresponding sentences. To my knowledge, the same sort of translation can be done for
any operator, with the same sort of results. Thus my definition of logical validity above is not
inaccurate in any important way.
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